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ABSTRACT 
Two thirds of the world's conflicts are in Africa. In particular, the Great Lakes 
Region (Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda 
and Tanzania), continues to see conflicts which are complex, extreme and 
seemingly intractable. By exploring the narrative experiences of those most 
affected by the conflicts in the region, specifically Burundi, DRC and Rwanda 
(refugees living in camps in North Western Tanzania) the thesis examines to 
what extent educative processes (holistic formal and informal learning 
processes) affect the identity construction/shifts that lead people to engage in 
violent conflict. These educative processes are located within a framework of 
'structural levels' of society. These reflect the likely gaps in information 
acquisition and identity construction between individuals and organisations 'at 
the top' of society and communities at grassroots levels. 
The qualitative methodology adopted gave the necessary flexibility and 
potential for opportunistic data collection essential in an environment where 
the unexpected is a daily occurrence. Through focus group discussions, depth 
interviews and questionnaires, the research identified different information 
circuits by which people learnt about conflict. In opposition to the common 
perception that formal schooling effects change, the findings indicated that the 
primary mechanisms were oral/aural, such as gossip, traditional story telling 
and radio. Individual and collective identities were constructed through this 
process and the research identified how identities could be shifted through 
different formal and informal educative processes - often through 
indoctrination or coercion. 
The thesis indicates how the synergy between educative processes, identity 
and trust could form the basis for alternative strategies for peace building 
within a refugee context. Efforts at peace building continue to falter in the 
region and this illustrates the need to construct a more inclusive peace-making 
process, taking into account the insights and values of those most affected. 
This constitutes the main recommendation of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE: LIFE AND CONFLICT IN THE GREAT LAKES - A 
RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH 
1.1 Introduction 
There have been over 9.5 million refugees and hundreds of 
thousands of people slaughtered [in Sub-Saharan Africa]. If this 
scale of destruction and fighting was in Europe, then people 
would be calling it World War III with the entire world rushing 
to report, provide aid, mediate and otherwise trying to diffuse 
the situation (Global Issues, 2002). 
This report from Global Issues highlights the trauma that millions have 
suffered and are still suffering in Sub-Saharan Africa, where terrorism, 
guerrilla warfare, constant uncertainty and displacement are facts of everyday 
life. Yet the world has still largely ignored these conflicts in Africa. If 
prevention of conflict and effective long-term reconstruction in regions of 
conflict is to be achleved it is vital to consider the key mechanisms within 
communities that might bring about positive change. 
The motivation behind thls research is presented in thls chapter, whlch 
introduces some of the contextual factors that influenced my decision to 
undertake the research. One of the key factors motivating the research arose 
out of my role as an education officer working with refugees from Rwanda, 
Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the Great Lakes 
Region in Africa. My concern regarding the complex inter-relationshlp of the 
conflicts in these countries was compounded by the low level of international 
interest in a situation where over four million people had already died in DRC 
alone. Peace deals at national and international levels had been brokered but 
apart from Rwanda where an uneasy stability is maintained, these deals have 
largely failed to bring lasting peace. 
This chapter outlines the main assumptions in the research that: 
a) there are various formal and informal educative processes that 
influence conflict (and therefore peace building); 
14 
b) informal educative processes are particularly significant III 
information transmission that influence conflict; 
c) these processes affect identity construction and shifts which in tum can 
affect the outcome of conflict; and 
d) there are different 'structural levels' of society (Smith, 1977) within 
which the relationship between educative processes, information 
transmission, identity construction and their influence on conflict are 
framed. 
Educative processes are defined here as both informal and formal learning 
mechanisms that individuals undergo as part of life's experiences i.e. formal 
implies institutional and highly structured learning and informal refers to non 
institutional and unstructured learning. These processes are as Nunan suggests, 
concerned with learning that promotes change, not just with the receipt of 
information: 
... the transmission of information is considered a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for educative processes to occur. To be 
termed educative, the process must address changes which 
occur in individual learners and teachers (Nunan, 1993: 202). 
Non-formal learning has been considered and embedded within the context of 
formal and informal in order to avoid ambiguity between the different terms. 
The thesis also examines the effect of these educative processes at different 
levels of society. It investigates the differences and gaps between individuals 
'at the top' of society and communities at grassroots level. To what extent 
these do these differences and gaps between 'structural levels' influence the 
outcome of conflict - and therefore as the flip side to conflict - the potential 
for peace building? 
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1.2 The Context 
At global and geo-political levels, peace negotiations take place, are broken or 
revised often without reflecting initiatives and experiences that have proven to 
be successful in the promotion of peace at the micro-level. Communities are 
the most affected, and women and children are typically the first to flee, 
constituting as they do, nearly seventy five percent of refugees. Yet the 
community is largely ignored in the decision making processes of either 
conflict preparation or peace negotiations. Participatory approaches are often 
used in other areas of development activity, but less so in conflict situations 
where everything takes place at a heightened pace. The Great Lakes summit 
held in Dar es Salaam in November 2004 is a case in point. Millions of dollars 
were spent l to bring together 11 heads of state from Africa and hundreds of 
donor representatives from all over the world to resolve the eight year conflict 
in the Great Lakes region. The following week, Rwanda invaded the 
Democratic Republic of Congo for the third time, having committed itself to 
regional peace initiatives the previous week. This makes one question the 
efficacy of high level peace negotiations in isolation from the reality on the 
ground and is one of the reasons why the grassroots level of society was 
selected for the research focus. 
1.2.1 The conflicts 
Despite the fact that two thirds of all global conflicts have occurred in Sub-
Saharan Africa there is little international recognition of the nature of the 
conflicts in Africa. They are regarded primarily as 'ethnic' or 'tribal' by many 
Western nations, which imply that states should be left alone to deal with their 
internal crises. In contrast, the comprehensive involvement of Western nations 
in Kosovo, Yugoslavia, highlighted the disparity of interest shown by the West 
towards so called 'ethnic' wars which were on their doorstep. With the 
1 Personal interview with a representative from one of the donors funding the summit 
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conflicts in Africa being a continent away they could dismiss the need for 
intervention with impunity (EPCP, 1999). 
This is particularly the case in DRC where more than four million people have 
died either directly or indirectly because of the civil wars raging in the country 
since 1996. Yet the international community has largely ignored the conflicts 
not only in DRC but also in the rest of the Great Lakes Region. Rwanda has 
invaded DRC at least twice with limited response from the international 
community. Reports provided by email from refugee colleagues also suggest 
that people are leaving Rwanda on a daily basis, scared for their lives. More 
than three hundred thousand people have been killed in the civil war in 
Burundi, and despite the ceasefire signed in May 2005 with the last remaining 
rebel group the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), sporadic fighting in the 
capital Bujumbura, continues (time of writing December 2005). 
Not only has the North largely ignored the conflicts between and within 
African states, but it has also failed to address the mechanisms by which 
conflicts can be mitigated or resolved on the ground. It is hoped that through 
this research, alternative mechanisms for conflict mitigation and resolution 
may be identified. 
The consequences of the conflicts in the Great Lakes on the lives of those who 
have experienced it first hand and their subsequent loss of independence and 
dignity is explored below in a brief overview of life in the refugee camps 
featured in this research. 
1.2.2 The consequences of conflict - refugees in North Western Tanzania 
As the Tanzanian Government places mounting pressure on the refugees from 
Burundi and DRC to return home, life in the refugee camps of Western 
Tanzania has become increasingly harsh. Markets in most of the Burundian 
and some of the Congolese camps have been closed, supposedly as a security 
measure but refugees suggest that it is to put further pressure on them to leave. 
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The narratives described in Chapter Six indicate the depth of negative feeling 
of refugees in the camps which they liken to a 'prison' or being 'trapped in a 
cage' . This perception of imprisonment has been compounded by the 
increased restriction of movement enforced by the Tanzanian authorities. The 
four kilometre 'zones' around the camps, instituted by the government, have 
been strictly enforced and refugees outside these zones (without written 
permission) are arrested. The increased harassment and insurgencies by rebel 
groups from across the borders have created an environment in the camps 
which is far from a situation of peace or even safe haven. Many said they 
would return to Burundi 'to die in my own country rather than like dogs here.' 
The culture of dependency that pervades the camps is aggravated by the loss 
of traditional roles and limited access to employment. This has resulted in 
large numbers of youth, particularly males, remaining idle, often leading to 
drunkenness and abuses of various kinds. 
Tanzania has traditionally accommodated large numbers of refugees in the 
past, and currently hosts one of the largest refugee populations in the world, 
but the strains on the economy and environment has led to increasing tensions, 
reflected in the attitudes of the refugees quoted above. The three hundred and 
fifty thousand plus refugees (time of writing December 2005) live in thirteen 
camps in the North Western part of Tanzania (see Annex I for maps of the 
camps and impacted areas). The Congolese are in three camps and the 
Burundians in nine, with approximately two thousand people of mixed 
nationality and mixed marriage (Hutu and Tutsi) living in Camp E. A few 
Rwandans and Congolese live in Camp D, which is a transit centre for asylum 
seekers. The five hundred thousand Rwandan refugees who crossed the border 
in 1994 after the genocide were forcibly returned in 1996, and the Tanzanian 
Government has consistently refouled (forcibly returned) any remaining 
Rwandans who have sought asylum. 
All refugees are almost entirely dependent on external assistance as the 
increasingly belligerent stance of the Tanzanian government precludes self-
reliance and integration (EC, 2004). This has stripped them of much of their 
independence and dignity, and as indicated above has led to increasingly 
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negative perceptions held by the majority of refugees towards life in the 
camps. 
The camps included in the research were Camp A, Camp B, Camp C and 
Camp D. Although Camp A has another camp adjoining it from where the 
sample groups were also selected, for the purposes of this research refugees 
from both camps were interviewed jointly as representative samples of 
Burundian refugees who had arrived in Tanzania at different times since 1993. 
Camp C was used for the training of research assistants to interview Rwandan 
respondents and during this time a small number of Rwandan respondents 
were found, but the majority of Rwandan respondents came from the transit 
camp, Camp D. 
Camp A houses approximately fifty-seven thousand refugees and was initially 
a 'semi-permanent settlement' for Burundian refugees who arrived in 1993. 
At that time, there were less than eight thousand refugees and a greater degree 
of liberality towards the refugee population was in evidence as refugees were 
provided with plots of land to grow vegetables and supplement their food 
ration. 
The adjacent camp (Camp M), bordering Camp A was opened initially as an 
extension for additional refugees who arrived in 1996. Its status changed to a 
fully independent camp in 1997 and currently houses over thirty-five thousand 
refugees. The Congolese Camp B was opened in 1998 and houses 
approximately forty-six thousand refugees, the remainder of the Congolese are 
housed eighty kilometres away in two other camps. 
Camp C in N. district, close to both the Rwandan and Burundi border, was 
also originally a semi-permanent settlement, housing only seven thousand 
Burundian refugees until the influx in 1996-7 resulted in the expansion of the 
camp to over one hundred thousand. Camp D also in N. where the Rwandan 
respondents were interviewed, housed only fifty-six refugees at the time of 
writing (March 2005), although as it is a transit centre the number fluctuates 
according to the number of asylum seekers. 
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I fIrst started working in the refugee camps in 1994 in the Burundian camp of 
Camp A. As the education co-ordinator for Concern Worldwide (from 1994-
1996) I assisted the refugees to establish their fIrst primary school in the camp, 
which was built with a grass roof and bamboo walls, but suffIcient to start 
basic teaching using the curriculum from Burundi. Although many permanent 
structures have been built since this time, these grass structures were still in 
use when I returned in 2004, although some had deteriorated to an extent 
where they looked unusable. Teachers stated however that they were still 
holding classes even under these appalling conditions (see photo below taken 
in March 2005 of a classroom in Camp A). 
Photograph 1.1: School in Camp A 
Refugee housing is of 
a similar construction 
as the school seen on 
the left, although the 
more 'wealthy' build 
mud brick rather than 
grass huts. All are 
packed tightly 
together and organised 
into 'blocks' and 
'streets' . This crowding of homes is an anathema to refugees from rural areas 
where usually only family groups live in such close proximity, and huts would 
typically be surrounded by large plots of land. While the difficulties of camp 
life - the poor diet, the reliance and dependence on external aid, overcrowding 
- cannot be ignored there are positive aspects, such as free health care and 
primary education, which are compensations that should be recognised. In 
some cases the relatively high standard of service provision sometimes 
outstrips that of the neighbouring Tanzanian villages, causing tension between 
Tanzanian villagers and refugees. 
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Working in this environment for five years (1994-1999), with teachers and 
children from a variety of backgrounds, provided me with considerable 
insights into the lives of those in exile, and into the dynamics of education 
provision for people affected by conflict. This experience was one of the 
primary motivations behind my research. 
1.2.3 The motivation/or the research 
In my role as education co-ordinator for both Concern Worldwide (1994-
1996), and UNICEF (from 1996-2000), I worked among thousands of refugees 
who consistently reported that they had lost dignity and self-esteem by the 
denial of basic freedoms and reliance on external aid. They reported that they 
were the victims of both the initiation of wars and of the failed peace deals, 
excluded as they were from any consultative processes. My experiences 
working with those in exile raised many questions about the mediation of 
education in relation to the nature of conflict and the potential for peace 
building. 
This was particularly so during my four years as an education officer working 
with UNICEF, as the Emergency Education Co-ordinator when the question 
was frequently raised as to why national and international peace initiatives 
took so long to reach a conclusion, if indeed they succeeded. How to effect 
peaceful transformation was a significant issue in organisations where there 
was increasing pressure within the education sector to initiate peace education 
programmes. It was suggested that such programmes would help mitigate 
conflict and promote peace amongst young people and their communities. In 
my capacity as education co-ordinator I was responsible for overseeing the 
development of a refugee peace education programme including preparing 
training and support materials for schools and communities. However after 
some years of development of the school based programme - which had a 
limited degree of success - I started to question whether the mechanism of 
using school as a change agent was really appropriate and effective. I wanted 
to examine the role other educative processes had to play in influencing 
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conflict. When my contract with UNICEF was completed I took the 
opportunity to conduct further research in this field not only as a doctoral 
student but also by undertaking a number of consultancies related to the topic. 
While recogrusmg my stance as 'outsider' i.e. a 'white Western woman', 
researching in a black African culture; the fact that I had already spent many 
years working with the people I was to interview, and my familiarity with the 
culture, mitigated what Owens refers to as the 'indignity' of representing 
others (Owens, 1990). The reactions to my research were extremely positive 
and people were anxious to give their opinions not just on issues of conflict. 
They saw the interviews as an opportunity to air grievances in general. They 
complained that they were rarely' listened to'. Therefore rather than accepting 
that there was indignity in representing others, I found that the research 
presented a rare opportunity for the voiceless to be heard. 
The research pays particular reference to Rwanda, Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo as these countries are critically interlinked in 
terms of the nature and causes of their conflicts (see Chapter Two for the 
cultural context of the research). They were also countries where I had a 
personal connection in terms of the work I had undertaken with the refugees. 
The groups selected for the research are Burundian, Congolese and Rwandan 
refugees residing in refugee camps in North West Tanzania (see Annex I). 
Unfortunately few Rwandan refugees were willing to participate in the 
research as they were in hiding and fearful of being forcibly returned to 
Rwanda. Therefore the data collected from this group were limited. 
Apart from the obvious security concerns, one of the primary reasons for using 
the refugee camps as the sample population was the fact that not only do 
refugees have a particular experience of the conflicts within their countries, 
(both before and after exile), they also have the potential to make a great 
impact on any future peaceful reconstruction of their country. While their 
experiences and narratives of the conflicts are in many ways retrospective, 
they have witnessed much of the conflict before they fled and retain links to 
their own countries while still in exile. These links and the information they 
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receive about the situation in their countries affect their decisions to repatriate 
and therefore the potential for post-conflict peace building in their country. 
By analysing the narratives of refugees, it is possible to begin to appreciate in 
a 'second-hand' way, the nature of the conflicts in which they were embroiled. 
This includes examining how messages of hatred and violence are promoted 
most effectively. Are they sent through the traditional healer, the radio or a 
combination of different conduits? Can you replace negative messages with 
positive ones through the same conduits? How much influence does a 
schoolteacher have, relative to other key members of the society? The research 
addresses these and other issues, to try and reveal instrumental methods of 
communication and circuits of information that affect identity construction and 
shifts within the context of refugee societies in Tanzania. By doing so it is 
suggested that some effective conduits for peace-building strategies in this 
context might be identified. 
Information in this context refers to information that the respondents received 
(both prior and subsequent to their flight from their home country) and relates 
to number of questions that were asked of respondents concerning their 
knowledge and information acquisition before, during and after the conflict. 
These included: 
a) What respondents knew about the history of the conflict - where and 
how it started and who did that information come from; 
b) What had respondents learnt more recently about the preparation or 
planning for the conflict and how did they access this information a) at 
home and b) in the camp; 
c) When obtaining information from different sources, whose information 
did respondents trust and why?; and 
d) How respondents accessed information from powerful people and 
whether mediators between the powerful and the 'ordinary' people 
were used. (see Annex V for the full text of the topic guide used in the 
data collection which contains all these questions and more). 
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1.2.4 The research 
The research examines the role of formal and informal educative processes 
and information acquisition that occur at different 'structural levels' of society. 
Formal educative processes refer to the institutional bases for learning which 
only a number of people are engaged in, while informal educative processes 
refer to the life experiences that all people undergo. These classifications are 
taken from those presented by the European Commission, and are outlined 
fully in Chapter 3.1 (pp. 82-83). These reflect similar definitions and 
perceptions of informal education from a number of authors (A venstrup and 
Swarts, 1999; Bryceson, 1999; Bush and Salterelli, 2000; McGrath and 
King,1995; Ziderman, 1997). 
Non-formal educative processes are not addressed separately in this research. 
These processes, (which are loosely based around institutions and usually 
teacher/tutor centred, but often adopting more flexible and innovative learning 
styles) are embedded in and analysed as part of the above categorisation of 
formal and informal educative processes in order to avoid ambiguity within 
the research setting, where there is considerable overlap between non-formal 
and informal processes. 
The research investigates which educative processes are perceived as most 
significant and why. The perceptions and narratives of the grassroots 
communities - who are typically the main victims of conflict - are central to 
the investigation of the gap between those with influence and those without 
i.e. the gap between the different 'structural levels' of society. It is necessary 
to examine this gap between the national and community levels of society to 
determine whether the acquisition of information concerning conflict, differs 
at different levels and thereby influences conflict. The grassroots level was 
selected as the focus of the research primarily because it is under-researched in 
terms of investigation into the influences of conflict and the potential for peace 
building. 
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There is often conjecture within the literature that access to information 
leading to informed knowledge and critical thinking is more limited the lower 
down the structural ladder one goes, and therefore the potential for 
manipulation is more likely. For example, within much of the literature 
underpinning education for conflict resolution, there is a suggestion that 
education can mitigate manipulation from malign sources (Arnhold et aI, 
1998; Boyden and Ryder 1996; Nicolai, 2003; Sinclair, 2002). However, there 
are many examples of education systems which belie this. For example in Nazi 
Germany, the education system served to inculcate the messages of the Nazi 
regime through systematic methods of indoctrination. From textbooks to 
pedagogy 
... the Hitler regime articulated anti-semitism across the 
curriculum as a central element to the understanding of an 
educated person (Wegner, 2002: 2-3). 
The legitimisation of the 'other' as enemy through education was a powerful 
means of indoctrination of age-old prejudices. In this way the access to certain 
types of information via education was controlled by the Nazi regime, the 
'gatekeeper' of information was the government. In contrast, in oral societies, 
such as those where the respondents originated, the 'gatekeepers' tended to be 
the oral transmitters i.e. the parents, elders, respected members of the 
community, who were endowed with 'wisdom' and therefore listened to. 
For example, in Rwanda it was not only the inculcation of anti-Tutsi 
propaganda through schooling, but also the lack of education of many of the 
rural population, that was considered a factor that made it easier for the 
propaganda machine of the Hutu extremists to succeed in fuelling the genocide 
in 1994 (Obura, 2003). There is a supposition that literate or educated 
communities are more competent to judge the merits of one type of 
information over another merely because they have received an education. 
However, information transmission based on oral transmission from non-
literate communities is typically considered less valid than information from 
literate sources; even though it may often be more powerful. 
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In order to determine whether these assertions regarding the role of education 
as a benign force are correct, it is necessary to investigate the role of educative 
processes within their sphere of influence over conflict. Only then, can the 
potential for effective change be identified, and the role of educative processes 
in conflict transformation and peace building, be recognised. This would then 
indicate how different educative processes could be used as bridge building 
mechanisms between different 'structural levels' of society. 
In order to identify the most effective conduits for peace, a number of 
assumptions were made and research questions identified, which are outlined 
below Ccf: 10.2.-10.3 pp.262-266 to see how these were addressed by the 
research). 
1.3 Research assumptions 
• There are various educative processes (formal and informal) that affect 
information acquisition at different 'structural levels' , and these 
influence identity construction and shifts. They in turn affect the 
outcome of conflict. 
• Informal educative processes have a particularly critical role to play in 
identity construction and shifts which affect the outcome of conflict. 
• The synergy between educative processes, information transmission 
and identity within different 'structural levels' is crucial to determine 
the most effective conduits to promote peace. 
1.4 Research Questions 
From the assumptions mentioned above, the following research questions 
focus on a central enquiry: 
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What factors in different educative processes affect information 
transmission and identity at different 'structural levels' and how do these 
influence the outcome of conflict? 
Educative Processes 
• What types of formal and informal educative processes exist? 
• Which of these are perceived by respondents as the most significant in 
the transmission of information in their countries? 
• What factors within the most significant educative processes make 
them so? 
• How do educative processes affect identity construction and shifts? 
• Which educative processes identified were perceived to influence 
conflict? 
Identity 
• Is identity as significant a feature of the Great Lakes conflicts as the 
literature suggests? 
• How does identity construction and shifts in identity affect the outcome 
of conflict? 
NB: In order not to pre-empt the responses on this issue of identity, no direct 
questions were asked of respondents in the interview schedules and topic 
guides developed for focus group discussions. This was for two reasons, a) to 
ensure that respondents were not led into prioritising identity as the key issue 
in conflict development and b) to determine whether identity was in reality 
such a significant factor in conflict development as has been presented in 
much of the literature. 
'Structural levels' 
• Do the 'structural levels' identified in the Model B (see below) reflect 
the reality on the ground? 
• Which groups and power structures are perceived by respondents to 
exist? 
• How are they perceived in terms of information transmission? (i.e. in 
terms of the relative importance of different levels and groups) 
• Is there a gap between the levels and if so what form does it take? 
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Conflict 
• What types of conflict have been experienced and what are people 's 
perceptions of the conflict? 
• How do communities resolve conflicts and how do they think conflict in 
their country might be resolved? 
• How might educative processes, used to learn about conflict, be 
transformed into peace building mechanisms? 
NB: Conflict here is seen in the light of other processes that affect its outcome. 
It is not the primary feature of the research to identify causalities of conflict in 
general, but to highlight issues relating to conflict as perceived retrospectively 
through the narratives of the respondents. 
1.5 Diagrammatic Models 
My original research proposal highlighted the gaps between the top and 
bottom levels of conflict ridden societies in terms of how peace negotiations 
might be brokered at the 'top' (e.g. UN peace-keeping) and broken at the 
'bottom'. It is at this level where the concerned people actually participate in, 
and suffer the consequence of, the conflict. The proposal suggested that peace 
agreements were typically made at only the highest level, and as a result they 
were rarely respected at the grass-roots level. 
Through reflection and discussion my original proposal was adapted using a 
model that Lederach presents as a way of viewing peace building approaches. 
It is presented below and the adaptation forms the basis for the diagrammatic 
models presented in 1.5.1-2. 
Lederach's model shown below emphasises leaders at different levels as the 
most significant actors in the process of peace negotiation. In an attempt to 
broaden the focus, I adapted the model and introduced a wider range of actors 
- alongside leaders - at the different hierarchical levels found in East Africa 
and refugee camps. The adapted models shown in section 1.5.1-2 illustrate the 
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potential for the gaps in educative processes between and among the different 
levels to influence the likelihood of conflict. 
Figure Ll: Lederach's model of peace negotiation 
High-level 
negotiations 
Problem-solving 
workshops 
Local peace 
commISSIOns 
Elite 
Middle-level 
leaders 
Grass-roots leaders 
L-__________________________________ ŸĚ
Society 
(Lederach, 1997 in Miall et aI, 1999: 18) 
The models presented in 1.5.1-2 have ansen out of my expenence as a 
practitioner and personal recognition of the different socio-economic 
hierarchies that operate within East Africa. Similar hierarchies have been 
recognised for example in literature on the Rwandan genocide which 
acknowledges both the vertical and horizontal relationships between different 
societal groups (Mamdani, 2001; Colletta and Cullen, 2000). Mamdani for 
example suggests that although during the reign of King Rwabugiri in 
Rwanda, power was increasingly centralised, the country' ... was administered 
through a threefold hierarchy, running from province to district to hill' 
(Mamdani, 2001: 68). This form of hierarchy still exists and corresponds 
largely to the vertical levels of one, two and three identified in Models B and 
C below. According to Colletta and Cullen, these 'vertical' relationships were 
reinforced by the conflict, when the 'horizontal' relationships (relationships 
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within a particular level) such as ' ... exchange, mutual assistance, collective 
action, trust, and protection of the vulnerable . .. ' were all but destroyed and 
, ... vertical relations were reinforced ... ' (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 45). 
Consequently the models that are outlined in 1.5.1-2 function in a number of 
ways: 
a) As a description of the hierarchies recognised III East Africa (and 
refugee camps) 
b) As a guide to the investigation of perceived power relations in relation 
to conflict, and the potential of the differentials in these relations, both 
between and among different structural levels, to influence conflict 
and/or peace (as indicated in Chapter Eight). 
c) As a site of explanation of the context within which, information, 
educative processes and identity can be framed. 
The models represent a visual interpretation of how certain types of educative 
processes might lead to information acquisition and identity construction and 
shifts that might influence conflict (Model A) and how these are located 
within what are defined as 'structural levels' of refugee camps and recognised 
in East Africa (Models B and C). The suggestion is that there is a substantial 
gap between the type of information acquired and utilised at the higher level 
and that utilised at the grass roots level. This in turn influences the identity 
construction and shifts that may influence conflict and therefore peace. This is 
not to suggest that if the gaps were removed there would be no conflict but 
that mitigation of conflict might be easier to manage. 
1.5.1 Illustrative model of how educative processes might affect information 
acquisition leading to identity construction and shifts that influence 
conflict 
Model A below outlines loosely what is meant by the term educative processes 
(as indicated in the outer circle). They are defined as coming under the two 
broad concepts of formal (institutional and highly structured), and informal 
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(non institutional and unstructured) educative or learning processes. The term 
educative was selected in order to avoid the formal institutional connotations 
that load the term 'education'. 
Formal 
Primary 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
Institutions 
EDUCATIVr ROCESSES 
INFORMATION 
ACQUISITION 
IDENTITY 
CONSTRUCTION 
Informal 
Family 
education 
Conversation 
Gossip 
rumour 
Multimedia 
Hidden 
Model A: How educative processes might affect infonnation acquisition 
leading to identity construction and shifts that inOuences conDict 
The second circle of the model aims to show how such educative processes 
contribute to information acquisition, in terms of creation, transmission and 
utilisation. As mentioned in Section 1.2.3 (p. 23) the thesis is concerned 
particularly with information relating to the conflicts as experienced by the 
respondents, how they received information and transmitted it to others. This 
indicates how the information acquired by community members might be 
influenced by different educative processes. These could be dependent on a 
variety of factors such as age, status and gender that affect their identity and 
relationship to the source of information. 
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The third circle illustrates how educative processes and the type of information 
they generate affect identity construction and shifts, both individually and 
collectively. The identities that are constructed, whether positive or negative, 
influence the outcome of conflict and therefore peace. Here the suggestion is 
that 'positive identity' construction whether on an individual or collective 
level, implies the adoption of an identity that as Davies suggests, 
acknowledges 'ambiguity, complexity and hybridity within an individual self, 
and similarly the avoidance of stereotypes portrayals of 'the other' (Davies, 
2004: 82) In contrast, 'negative identity' construction implies either adoption 
of or coercion into an identity that supports vengeful, mono-ethnic/religious 
viewpoints, that discourages hybridity and tolerance of 'the other' . 
The inner circle reflects the potential influences of information acquisition and 
identity construction/shifts on conflict, which are received through different 
educative processes. The representation of identity based, localised or national 
conflicts is provided as an example not as an exhaustive list. Similarly there 
are other levels of peace building beyond the ones presented as examples in 
the model. 
This model highlights the first two assumptions of the research, which suggest 
that various educative processes - in particular informal educative processes -
affect information acquisition likely to affect identity construction/shifts which 
influence conflict or peace. 
1.5.2 Graphic representations of possible inter-relationships between 
'structural levels ' and educative processes (Models B and C) 
The two models below aim to show how possible 'structural levels' both of 
East Africa and refugee camps (Models B and C respectively) inter-relate with 
educative processes. This reflects the third assumption of the thesis (cf 1.3 p. 
26) that the synergy between educative processes, information and identity is 
located within a framework of 'structural levels'. The research has largely 
confirmed the existence of these 'structural levels' and respondents identified 
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these through a process of social mapping (explained in Chapter Five and 
reflected in the fmdings in Chapter Eight). The original Model B has therefore 
been revised to accommodate some of the perceptions of the respondents 
towards ' structural levels' and reflects the proximity of social groups to the 
source of information. This was revised further (Model E) and is presented as 
part of the findings in Chapter Eight. 
These models reflect the potential and perceived gaps between different levels 
in terms of both information acquisition and influence i.e. power to affect 
change. They also signal how these gaps might influence conflict and/or 
peace. 
M odel B: Possible cstructurallevels'in East Africa 
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Model B shown above represents the wider picture of hierarchies in East 
Africa. The right hand side arrow of the framework indicates the variety of 
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educative processes that might be experienced at different levels, e.g. military 
training at Level Four and community theatre at Level One. The assumption is 
that these are some of the forms of educative processes, but it recognises that 
they are provisional and non-exclusive. On the right-hand-side of the model, 
examples are provided of possible levels of information acquisition, identity 
construction/coercion/shift and the type of conflict that may be common to 
each level and their equivalent peace mechanisms but recognises that these 
may also be found in one or all of the levels. The colours at the right and 
below this model relate to those found in Model A and represent Educative 
Processes, Information, Identity and ConflictlPeace. 
There is recognition that within these structural levels, identity construction 
and shift (sometimes through coercion or indoctrination) can occur at any 
level. However, it is suggested that more powerful members of a particular 
society are better able to 'coerce' others into a shift of identity than those who 
are the least powerful. For example, a child soldier undergoes an identity shift 
when he/she is forcibly recruited, but the process of recruiting the child is 
undertaken by influential military leaders (albeit often informal leaders). 
Only three structural levels are indicated in the model The assumption is that 
Levels Two and Three are sufficiently close that the educative processes can 
be combined. There is no significance in the shape of the pyramid, which has 
been adapted from Lederach's triangle to allow for a wider representation of 
groups to be included. 
Model C below (derived from Model B) represents Camp level, District level 
and National level, as the three levels that I perceived reflected refugee 
hierarchies. These were later confirmed by the respondents, but revised again 
according to the findings as outlined in Model D (p. 208). 
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Model C: cStructurallevels' identified in the camps 
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Although the 'Camp' level represents the refugee population, similar 
'political' hierarchies (indicated in Model B of the wider East African context) 
also exist. These however are 'hidden' within the overall administrative 
structures of the camps and their authorities. The hierarchies relate not only to 
the traditional powerbases in existence in their villages of origin, but also to 
their hierarchical relationships with the implementing agencies and camp 
management. New power bases arising out of refugee camp life often 
subsumed traditional authority structures. 
The 'District' level represents the position at which the various agencies and 
governmental organisations operate to run the camp and its infrastructure. 
Most agencies are based at the district headquarters. This level perhaps has the 
most authority in the camp and is the conduit for information from national 
level to camp level. These represent the information passed in a variety of 
ways by the agencies working in the camps with the refugees. The 'National' 
level refers to the national and international organisations and government 
agencies with responsibility for and authority over the refugee camps at 
policymaking level. 
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The groups identified within each structural level were provisional and have 
been confirmed and revised further during fieldwork (and are reflected in 
Chapter Eight). In addition, as the arrow running horizontally in Model B 
indicates, the relationship in terms of educative processes and information 
transmission is considered from a horizontal as well as vertical perspective. 
The provisional model anticipated that considerable information would be 
passed between groups within a particular level, which may be more 
significant than information that is vertically transmitted. The potential for 
power differentials between the different groups within the horizontal levels is 
also expected to highlight where the most effective mechanisms for 
information transmission lies. 
Whether within the camp or within their home context, these different power 
relations were frequently referred to by the respondents. The differences were 
often associated with the gap perceived between 'educated people ' and 
'ordinary people', i.e. people who had power and those who did not (cf: 7.2.1 
pp. 191-195). As this statement by a Burundian commercial worker illustrates: 
The ordinary people have no problem. Those big bellied are the 
cause of our misfortune. Without them there would be 
development among the people. 
1.6 Expected outcomes of the research 
Any research hopes to have outcomes that are productive and useful. This 
research emphasises the necessity for greater international attention to 
situations of conflict in Africa and to the mechanisms by which prevention and 
resolution are best approached. Arising from findings of the research there are 
certain key outcomes which are applicable to a refugee camp context in the 
Great Lakes. These are outlined below. 
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1.6.1 Increased understanding: 
Increased understanding of issues relating to education and conflict within 
academic and international circles might be enhanced by the focus on the 
interrelationship of the following areas: 
a) The examination of the critical nature of the relationship between 
educative processes, information acquisition, identity and conflict may 
determine how this dynamic affects the way in which the conflict is 
played out (this is covered in Chapters Ten and Eleven). How are 
certain types of information presented to individuals within society, 
which are then internalised to influence country level violence? 
Conflict in this context is a national and societal action, where elites 
and powerful individuals might manipulate members of a community 
to commit acts of violence that under normal circumstances would be 
inconceivable. 
b) Understanding how different societal levels VIew a conflict and 
respond to it (as seen in Chapter Eight), is critical in identifying 
potential information gaps, which in tum may influence conflict and/or 
peace. 
1.6.2 Identification of alternative mechanisms for peace building: 
Some alternative mechanisms for information transmission have been 
identified in the research as indicators of potential conduits for peace building. 
These are explored in detail in Chapter Ten. Formal education is not 
necessarily the most significant mechanism for transmission of information. 
However, many educators perceive formal education as an effective change 
agent for young people. As a result, peace building programmes are frequently 
located in schools. This is despite the gap between the knowledge that 
community members utilise, (and base their behaviour and practices upon) and 
the knowledge that schools promote. Some organisations have recognised that 
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a school-based approach is not necessarily the most successful means to affect 
change and are seeking alternatives. The recommendations outlined in the 
final chapter try to complement these with some alternative approaches to 
peace building which are appropriate in a refugee or similar context. 
1.6.3 Benefit to practitioners: 
Education practitioners working or living in refugee or similar settings in the 
South may benefit from the review of how information can be transmitted 
more effectively through formal and informal mechanisms and how education 
institutions can become involved in community dialogues and partnerships. 
Those engaged in peace building programmes and peace educators III 
refugee or similar contexts may benefit on a longer-term basis, as again they 
need to examine the most effective mechanisms for information transmission 
at different levels to ensure that peace initiatives are sustained. 
Academic Researchers working within a refugee or similar context might 
benefit in the timely examination of a topic of research that to date has 
received limited academic attention. They may also benefit from the data 
collection methods utilised e.g. the development and use of 'social maps' and 
training of research assistants for interviewing purposes. 
1.6.4 Contribution o/the research to the body o/knowledge: 
Very little substantive research has been undertaken on informal educative 
processes that affect information transmission and identity construction/shifts 
that influence conflict. Even the investigation of how formal education 
impacts on conflict is a relatively new field of study, although Davies draws 
attention to many aspects of this issue (Davies, 2003). There is even less 
research or documentation that examines both formal and informal 
mechanisms to determine where the most effective strategies for peace 
building should be placed within the different 'structural levels' . 
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The individual arenas of education, information and identity have substantial 
literature behind them, but when the interrelationship of all elements is 
examined, the literature is scarce. In addition, while many practitioners may 
understand how effective information transmission strategies can be utilised 
particularly at grass roots level either on an informal or formal basis; this area 
has not been well documented beyond the agency or practitioner arena. 
Therefore this research will contribute and further existing knowledge and 
research regarding the role of informal educative processes and oral 
transmission of information for use as mechanisms for peace building. 
1. 7 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into ten chapters which present the background and 
context of the research (Chapters One-Two), the literature that contributed to it 
(Chapters Three-Four), the methodology and research design (Chapter Five) 
and the findings, analysis and conclusion emerging from the data collection 
(Chapters Six-Ten). These are outlined in brief below. 
Chapters One and Two provide the reader with a background to the thesis and 
the context within which the research is set. The first chapter presents the 
rationale for the thesis, why the research is being undertaken and what the 
outcome of the research would be. It also sets out the context of the refugee 
camps where the research is located. The diagrammatic models presented in 
this chapter illustrate the possible inter-relationship between educative 
processes, information acquisition and identity and their influence on conflict. 
This is presented within a framework of 'structural levels' found within an 
East African and refugee context. The second chapter focuses on some of the 
historical developments leading up to the present situation in each of the three 
countries under study and other contributing factors considered by various 
authors to have affected conflicts in the Great Lakes Region and in Africa. 
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Chapters Three and Four present a review of the literature that is particularly 
relevant to the research context which reflect the key areas of the research i.e. 
a) educative processes and its impact on information acquisition and b) 
identity construction and shifts. The review does not aim to cover all the 
available literature on each of these components but highlights recent and 
relevant literature in an attempt to identify the key contributions and gaps in 
relation to educative processes, information acquisition and identity and the 
influence of these on conflict. It introduces the concept that better synergy 
between informal and formal educative processes could present alternative 
mechanisms for community peace building strategies. The review of literature 
on educative processes focuses primarily on formal and informal educative 
processes and their relationship with conflict. The fourth chapter explores 
some key identity theories and investigates the way identity is constructed, and 
can shift through changes either in context, or through coercion or 
indoctrination. It also examines some of the relationships between identity and 
conflict. 
Chapter Five presents the methodology of the research and the issues related 
to its design and implementation, as well as the process by which the data 
were analysed. It reflects on the methodology of qualitative research and the 
need for a reflexivity of response. The sample groups were selected from 
refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC primarily for security reasons and 
ease of access. The different groups came from a cross section of refugee 
society and were largely self-selected. As I was unable to speak Kirundi and 
spoke limited Kiswahili, research assistants were selected and trained to 
conduct the interviews on my behalf. During these training workshops on 
interviewing skills (see Annex II) the topic guides for the Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs) were also developed (see Annex III). The prime method 
of data collection was through FGDs and individual depth interviews. Some of 
the constraints experienced during the process of data collection are explored 
including the difficult research conditions. The chapter concludes with an 
outline of the ethical framework used and some of the ethical issues 
concerning the context of the research. 
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Chapters Six-Ten present the findings, analyses and conclusions to the thesis. 
The first chapter frames the context in which the research data were collected. 
It highlights some of the perceptions and narratives of the refugees; their 
stories and experiences of conflict and of life in exile. It also examines their 
notions of how peace might be built. Chapter Seven aims to give the reader an 
insight into the refugee perceptions of how educative processes have affected 
information transmission on conflict. The chapter considers the paradoxical 
role of formal educative processes through 'educated people' as well as 
examining the various informal mechanisms such as the oral tradition, rumour 
and radio - thus following the framework of the literature review. Chapter 
Eight looks at the different 'structural levels' identified and their influence on 
the conflicts. Different power groups were identified and the relationship of 
the powerful to conflict. Chapter Nine presents a visual explanation of the 
critical issues of educative processes, trust and identity, and how the synergy 
between these influences conflict and/or peace. The final chapter examines 
how the research questions have been addressed and the impact the research 
may have for refugee or similar contexts in finding mechanisms for peace 
building. 
1.8 Conclusion 
Peace agreements are often brokered at the highest level, but rarely account for 
the dissatisfaction at grassroots level. This dissonance was one of the 
motivating factors that initiated my research. This chapter presented the 
rationale and motivation behind this research, which was to outline how 
formal and informal educative processes might affect information acquisition 
contributing to identity construction/shifts and how these may influence 
conflict. 
The research examines the perceptions and narratives of respondents from 
Burundi, DRC and Rwanda - currently exiled as refugees in Tanzania. The 
consequences of the civil wars in these countries for the respondents were 
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highlighted in this chapter, where the reliance on food aid and dependency on 
outside agencies have stripped the refugees of dignity and independence. 
The provisional diagrammatic models presented in section 1.5 illustrate the 
synergy between educative processes, information transmission and identity. 
Hopefully the identification of this synergy may promote greater 
understanding of the nature of conflict in the Great Lakes and (within refugee 
contexts) might benefit practitioners working in this field. 
Identifying effective mechanisms for peace building is notoriously difficult. 
As the next chapter confirms, the nature of conflict is extremely complex. By 
presenting an overview of the wars affecting the Great Lakes region, the 
following chapter provides an opportunity to reflect on the key issues that 
different authors suggest have contributed to these conflicts. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICTS IN THE 
GREAT LAKES REGION 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the motivating factors for my research has been my past and present 
involvement as both practitioner and researcher in the Great Lakes region of 
Africa (which for the purposes of this study, comprise the countries indicated 
in Figure 2.1 below). These countries have a unique interrelationship in terms 
of the role each has played in the civil wars that have existed in their 
neighbouring countries, as well as the ongoing ethnic tensions that have 
characterised the exacerbation of violence within them. As one local 
Tanzanian journalist suggested: 
... conflicts in the Great Lakes Region are characterized by a 
complex interaction between localized rebellion, a clash of 
interests among countries in the region, and a lack of will on the 
part of the international community to avert the crisis (Lyimo, 
2004). 
Figure 2.1: Map of Great Lakes Regiori 
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As I have worked closely with refugees from Burundi, Rwanda and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the focus of the research is on these three 
countries. The map of the Great Lakes Region in Figure 2.1 above includes 
Uganda and Tanzania as part of the Great Lakes Region as they have had 
considerable involvement in the conflicts and peace brokerage in the region. 
While the solution to the conflicts in the Great Lakes region should be seen 
from a regional perspective, it is important to consider some of the historical 
aspects of the three countries under study in order to see the connections more 
clearly. This chapter traces some of the chronological developments leading 
up to the present situation in each of the three countries, before focussing on 
some of the factors - such as identity - that have been attributed by different 
authors to the development of conflicts in the Great Lakes Region and in 
Africa. 
Identity, whether this is ethnic identity or socio-identity (a broad definition of 
identity which encompasses ethnic, religious, social identity) is presented by 
some authors as one of the most critical factors in the Great Lakes conflicts. In 
Burundi and DRC, as well as the Rwandan genocide, identity issues are 
presented by many as the core factor in the historical interplay between these 
three countries. Certainly it can be said that much of what happened before, 
during and after the genocide in Rwanda has had profound effects on both 
Burundi and the DRC. 
The conflicts in the Great Lakes Region are extremely complex, and a single 
account is not sufficient to cover the multiplicity of historical, political and 
economic factors behind such complexity. Therefore, it is not the purpose of 
this thesis to present a definitive account of the conflicts in the region, but to 
present an overview of each of the conflicts. The accounts below are designed 
only as snapshots in order to a) provide a means of identifying some of the 
critical factors that influence conflict and therefore peace building and b) to 
give readers an insight into the perceptions from different authors on the 
conflicts in this region. 
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2.2 Rwanda: the genocide and conflict within the Great Lakes 
This section summarises much of the literature in this specific area, and is 
further informed by material from a book I wrote for UNESCO-IIEP on 
education for Rwandan refugees from 1994-1996 (Bird, 2003a). It outlines the 
build up to the genocide in Rwanda and some of the historical consequences of 
the manipulation of identity differences in terms of the past conflict and 
present reconstruction of the country. It is not a definitive account of the 
causes of the genocide - but presents a brief synthesis of some of the critical 
factors that other authors have identified as contributing to the build up, 
agency and aftermath of the genocide. 
Genocide in this context refers to the Convention on the Crime and Prevention 
of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 - United Nations Article II - which cite a 
number of acts that contravene the Convention such as those which are 
... committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group 
(UN,1948). 
A more recent and perhaps more relevant definition of genocide for the 
Rwanda context can be found from Chalk and Jonassohn for whom genocide 
is: 
A form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other 
authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and 
membership in it are defined by the perpetrator (Chalk and 
Jonassohn, 1991: 23). 
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In the context of the genocide in Rwanda, it is the 'one sided mass killing' of 
mainly Tutsis and moderate Hutus, which classifies it as genocide. The 
definitions of'Tutsi' and 'Hutu' have been very clearly defined by various 
'other' authorities throughout the history of Rwanda (and similarly for 
Burundi). The fact that hundreds of thousands of one ethnic group were killed 
in less than four months appears to warrant the definition of genocide, whereas 
the slow systematic killing of four million in DRe for example, does not. 
Similarly the Kibeho massacre of Hutu refugees in the DRe in 1996 was 
reported not as genocide (even though it was one-sided mass killing), but 
reprisal killings of' ... all who were associated with the genocidaires - which 
means a high number of innocent civilians and children ... ' (Pottier, 2002: 57). 
The slowness of the international community to recognise even these events in 
DRe and Rwanda as genocide, leads one to suspect that the definitions 
adopted by Northern governments are based more on political interests than 
humane concerns. 
There are many authors (Berkeley, 2000; Danida, 1996; Duffield, 2001; 
Gourevitch, 1999; HRW, 1999; Lemarchand, 2001; Mamdani, 2001; Pottier, 
2002; Prunier, 1995; Reyntjens, 2004) who have written extensive and varied 
accounts of the genocide in Rwanda, so the outline below is a brief overview 
that draws together some of the factors presented from these different sources. 
Although the ethnic divisions that fomented the genocide in Rwanda are 
typically ascribed in the literature to the colonialists, the roots of the genocide 
stretch back to pre-colonial times. In particular they connect to the reign of the 
Tutsi King Rwabugiri in the second half of the 19th century. The regime he 
instituted between 1860 and 1895 introduced a feudal system that largely 
discriminated against the Hutu peasantry who were not cattle owners. This 
Pottier suggests was just' ... one mechanism in the development of a complex 
set of social and political relations under Rwabugiri ... ' (Pottier 2002: 65). 
Furthermore, although the differentiation imposed by Rwabugiri was initially 
wealth related, it was almost impossible for a Hutu to achieve the level of 
wealth required to 'become' a Tutsi. In this way, ethnic differentiation based 
on social positions was institutionalised by Rwabugiri in a way that was easily 
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exploited by both the German colonists and Belgian trustees in the early part 
of the 20th Century. By introducing identity cards in 1933 to indicate each 
person's ethnicity, (Hutu, Tutsi or Twa) the Belgian colonists further 
reinforced the divisions established by Rwabugiri. This emphasised what they 
perceived as Tutsi superiority (Tutsis were regarded as more aristocratic and 
educated) over the Hutu peasantry. The colonists then educated the Tutsis to 
become skilled administrators and leaders in the country (Danida, 1996). 
Following the Second World War, a new generation of egalitarian, anti-
Walloon, Flemish missionaries reversed this policy of favouring Tutsis by 
educating increasing numbers of Hutus. As a result of this the two ethnic 
groups (one educated by the former Belgian regime to believe in their 
superiority and the other through recent education provision beginning to 
resent their perceived enslavement), became more polarised and the potential 
for conflict exacerbated (Pugh, 1998: 2). Such examples of how formal 
education contributed in different ways to the construction of identities which 
exacerbated conflict can be seen in all three countries in this research. 
The subsequent 'revolution' by the Hutu majority in 1959 led to widespread 
massacres of Tutsis, tens of thousands of whom fled to neighbouring 
countries, including Uganda and Zaire. In an attempt to regain control, the 
Rwandan Peoples Front (RPF) - a rebel Tutsi army - spent years strengthening 
their forces in Uganda with the aim to overthrow the Hutu governmental 
regime in Rwanda. They staged an insurgency in 1990 through incursions 
from Uganda, but this failed and they were forced to retreat. A civil war 
ensued in early 1990, which Mamdani suggests was the precursor to the 
genocide (Mamdani, 2001). The ongoing incursions and military victories by 
the RPF, who gained control of large tracts of land, resulted in reprisal 
massacres of Tutsis by government 'death squads' during the early 1990s. The 
subsequent investigation into massacres of Tutsis in Gisenyi and Bugesera for 
example, led to warnings from the international community that 'the rising 
tide of political extremism could easily develop into unprecedented chaos and 
violence' (Pottier, 2002: 23). These warning however were ignored, even in 
the face of the rise of 'Hutu Power', a militant Hutu group opposed to the 
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'ethnic reconciliation' process planned by the moderate Hutu government 
under President Habyrimana. Optimism was the preferred approach, 
particularly when peace appeared to be within sight in 1993 after the Arusha 
Peace Accord was signed by President Habyrimana and the RPF in Arusha, 
Tanzania. 
Some of the literature suggests that it was the extremist elements in the 
divided Hutu groups who were determined not to support a power sharing 
structure and planned to undermine the peace agreement (Gourevitch, 1999; 
HRW, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995). These groups had already been 
building up the Interahamwe (militia) and controlled the presidentially 
appointed mayors (the infamous bourgemestres) who initiated and maintained 
a highly centralised system of political and social control. On the 6th April 
1994 President Habyrimana's plane was shot down, possibly by the extreme 
elements ofthe Hutu Power groups (although the current President of Rwanda 
Paul Kagame has also been accused of the same). These groups in 
combination with the Interahamwe proceeded to dictate developments within 
the country. The strong social control, combined with the highly effective 
public information system through the local and national radio networks, then 
enabled the systematic killing of over 800,000 people, mostly Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus, to take place in the space of 100 days (HRW, 1999). 
Mamdani however, questions the emphasis placed by many authors on social 
control as the significant factor leading people into mass killing, and also the 
'unquestioning obedience to authority' that Prunier for example presented. 
Alternatively, Mamdani highlights the high level of incentives that were 
offered to poor peasant farmers. He quotes a survivor: "It was politics. 
Politicians told the people: kill and you will get your neighbours' goods and 
land." (Mamdani, 2001: 201). To many who had been displaced by the RPF 
appropriation of their land, this was an attractive mechanism for expanding 
their wealth or reclaiming lost land. Mamdani also highlights the role of local 
authorities who made violence against former friends and neighbours 
palatable. To do this, the local leaders reaffirmed the traditional 'customary' 
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apparatus which had been employed during and after the colonial regimes. 
Mamdani states that this enforced 
... obligations on entire communities .. .in the name of serving 
custom ... When it came to pressing ordinary people into a 
violent political campaign, it was not at all surprising that the 
genocidaire tendency decided on "customary" power as the 
agency most suited to cleanse the community of threatening 
alien influences (Mamdani, 2001: 194). 
The language of 'customary' obligation was also one that was utilised 
consistently throughout the genocide. The terminology adopted by the 
instrumentalists in promoting the genocide supported the dehumanisation of 
the enemy. As Mamdani suggests: 
Killings became referred to as umuganda (communal work), 
chopping up men as "bush clearing", and slaughtering women 
and children as "pulling out the roots of the bad weeds." 
(Mamdani, 2001:194). 
Terminology was also a critical factor in schools, and the role of the education 
sector is mentioned by many as being a contributory factor in fuelling the 
social and identity divide. Accusations that children were manipulated through 
the curriculum and indoctrinated with hate messages against the Tutsis have 
been numerous and well documented elsewhere (Mamdani, 2001; Obura, 
2003; Rutayisire et al, 2004). However, one example from a Tutsi girl's 
experience in school highlights the level of insidious manipulation and fear 
that was transmitted building up towards the genocide: 
I remember in school we were afraid. They said, "Tutsis, raise 
your hands." But we were afraid to raise our hands, because the 
Tutsi was always described as a snake. A snake is dangerous and 
it should be destroyed. I can never forget this, because this story 
was repeated year after year in school, from the ftrst to the sixth 
grade (Blackside Inc., 2000). 
This repetitive negative stereotyping experienced in schools and as part of 
daily life through radio, failed to alert the international community to the 
seriousness of the ensuing tensions. While education, as Roger has suggested 
can be used as a 'barometer' of hope (Roger, 2002), it could also have been 
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used in this instance as an early warning system for the conflict about to 
emerge. But both during the build up to the conflict and at its onset, the 
international community repeatedly ignored warnings of the impending 
disaster. The moral authority ofthe international community was absent. 
Six months before the genocide, General Dallaire the Canadian UN 
commander in charge of the UN peacekeeping force, informed the United 
Nations about the forthcoming genocidal preparations. He had sent repeated 
warnings about an imminent massacre and requested assistance and authority 
to take action. The United Nations and the international community ignored 
his pleas. As Amnesty International reported: 
In one of the great historical betrayals of conscience, the 
Security Council, led by the United States at the urging of 
Belgium, voted to withdraw the peacekeepers, leaving a small 
contingent of 270 in Kigali who protected some refugees in a 
stadium and who assisted with protection of expatriates. The 
flight out of Rwanda had begun for anyone who could escape 
(Amnesty International, 1995: Chapter 16). 
The resulting massacres and frenzied butchering of hundreds of thousands of 
people devastated a nation which many others have documented (Berkeley, 
2001; Gourevitch, 1999; HRW, 1999; Prunier, 1995). The horrific stories of 
death, torture and rape that others have told will not be covered in detail here. 
The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), waiting for their opportunity to regain 
control of the country, took little over three months to assert their ascendancy 
and oust the Hutu extremists. These fled, along with hundreds of thousands of 
civilians, the majority of whom were women and children, into neighbouring 
countries during the period from mid-April to the end of July 1994. Many of 
those who fled claimed there was butchering of Hutus in reprisal attacks 
during the days when the RPF were taking control. One refugee respondent in 
the research claimed that RPF soldiers deliberately killed Hutus and placed 
them under the bodies of Tutsis to make it look as though more Tutsis had 
died. 'After all,' he said 'how can you tell what is a Tutsi skull and what is a 
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Hutu skull.' Another Rwandan woman hiding amongst the Burundian refugees 
told a similar story: 
All together those massacred by the Ikotanyi [RPF] themselves 
and those killed by Interahamwe were collected and put on the 
back of Interahamwe. They called the world and said "Come and 
see what Interahamwe have done" So the International 
community would believe that Interahamwe are really killers 
while Ikotanyi had killed more. 
The similarity of the stories of massacres by both sides is an indication of the 
reluctance of both sides to admit culpability. 
As the RPF managed to restore some stability from chaos, the war in one sense 
was over, with a nation left reeling and half empty from its aftermath. The new 
leadership under President Paul Kagame began the long struggle towards 
reconstruction in Rwanda, while neighbouring countries coped with the influx 
of close to two million refugees fleeing the RPF and possible consequences of 
capture. It was not until two years later that the refugees were forced to return 
after events unfolded in neighbouring Zaire. 
During the days of the forced repatriation of refugees from Tanzania - an 
operation I personally observed while working for UNICEF - many refugees 
told of their fear of return. Few admitted culpability to crimes they described 
as 'part of the madness' or as inevitable. One teacher elaborated: 'my baby 
was held up with a knife to her throat - what choice did I have?' The choice 
was between your own life, and that of your family, or the life of your 
neighbour. The majority of civilians in the camps were less the orchestrators 
than the victims of violence. However, some infamous genocidaires from the 
Interahamwe resided in the camps with impunity, where as Pottier indicates, 
'Not once had the [humanitarian] operation attempted to separate extremists 
from innocent civilians' (Pottier, 2002: 77). 
The fear by the majority of refugees of return to the expected reprisal killings 
was not reflected in the media at the time which had presented the refugees as 
'liberated' from the camps and returning home 'happy and singing'. A 
Rwandan teacher explained that the song families were singing on the trucks 
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taking them back across the border - was 'we are going home, we are going 
home, we are going home .... To our deaths.' This was not a voluntary 
repatriation based on the return of refugees in dignity and safety, but a forced 
one engineered between the governments of Rwanda and Tanzania with the 
tacit approval of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR). 
After the mass return and attempted reintegration of refugees, the subsequent 
move towards reconstruction of the country was slow, with considerable 
tensions still marring activities implemented to minimise the underlying ethnic 
divisions. One positive move was the revival in 2002 of the gacaca court 
process, which is based on a traditional participatory justice system that builds 
on the community's ability to solve their own disputes. The gacacas differ 
from Western ideas of justice, as the objective is not just to find and punish the 
criminal, but to find appropriate solutions in order to restore a sense of balance 
in the community. However, the system has been dogged by difficulties 
including the lack of sufficiently trained judges, and the potential for false 
accusations or revenge. Despite these problems, many see the gacaca process 
as having potential to give a voice to survivors and offer some hope of justice. 
The gacacas have also taken pressure off the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), initiated by the UN and the Rwandan courts to bring 
justice to major genocide suspects. This Tribunal held in Arusha, Tanzania has 
proven to be woefully inadequate for the task and has only managed to 
'convict a small number of high-ranking suspects' (Havermans, 1999: 249). 
Perhaps if similar levels of funding had been invested in the gacaca system as 
have been poured into the ICTR, there may have been quicker resolution to 
many of the pending court cases in Kigali. 
However, at the time of writing, (September 2005) despite the many positive 
reforms, the Rwandan government has had no apparent wish to broaden their 
power base to accommodate a more equitable arrangement for Hutus. This is 
reflected in the highest political and military levels of the administrative 
structures where Tutsis control the government and armed forces, as well as 
the ÜŸŬŲÙWXĚof high-ranking or powerful administrative positions. The ruling 
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party also blocked the development of a political opposition. The anny is 
controlled by Tutsis and is accused of committing many violations both in 
Rwanda and in DRC where Rwandan forces have supposedly committed acts 
of rape and sexual violence (OCHA, 2002). 
Reyntjens expresses similar sentiments about the current Rwandan regime, 
which he likens to a dictatorship: 
Ten years after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda is experiencing not 
democracy and reconciliation but dictatorship and exclusion. 
Although the government led by the Rwanda Patriotic Front has 
achieved rapid institutional reconstruction and relatively good 
bureaucratic governance, it has also concentrated power and 
wealth in the hands of a very small minority, practised ethnic 
discrimination, eliminated every form of dissent, destroyed civil 
society, conducted a fundamentally flawed 'democratization' 
process, and massively violated human rights at home and abroad 
(Reyntjens,2004: 177). 
While not to undermine some of the positive aspects of reconstruction that the 
current Rwandan regime has achieved, Reyntjens' critique, while harsh, is 
complemented by some of the reports coming out of Rwanda by refugees who 
fled to Tanzania in recent months. My research uncovered unconfirmed 
narratives of intimidation and 'disappearances' admittedly only from 
anecdotal evidence of Rwandans who fled into Tanzania and who remain in 
hiding. However, these stories are sufficient to make the tensions in Rwanda 
still palpable and fear of speaking out against the regime a reality. The guilt 
that the international community still feels over the genocide, has allowed the 
Rwandan government to operate with impunity. As Pottier indicates when 
discussing where some of the responsibilities for the Rwandan situation lay: 
While the failings of the international community were 
deservedly underscored, the absence of a critical look inside the 
Rwanda government was equally striking (Pottier, 2002: 79). 
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2.3 Burundi and the ongoing conflict 
Historically, like Rwanda, Burundi society has been characterised in the 
literature as being ethnically divided into Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, the latter being 
the indigenous ethnic group of the region. When the Bantu tribes migrated to 
Central Africa in the 10th or 11 th Centuries, they dominated the Twa - who 
currently fonn just over one percent of the population. The Bantus were said 
to fonn what is now known as the Hutu ethnic group - which constitute 
approximately eighty five percent of the population. From the 16th Century 
onwards Tutsi pastoralists reportedly arrived initially from the North and in 
the 17th and 18th Centuries from the East and asserted their dominance over 
both the Hutus and the Twa, establishing several states that were ruled by the 
Tutsi kings or 'mwami '. Tutsis comprise fourteen percent of the population 
and have vied with the Hutu majority for political and social control over 
many decades. Like Rwanda the colonial period compounded the dominance 
of the minority population who were adopted by colonialists as de facto 
administrators. 
Burundi had been under Gennan control as part of Gennan East Africa from 
1890, until the end of the First World War, when Belgium was mandated by 
the League of Nations to take control of what became known as Rwanda and 
Burundi. Independence was granted to Burundi by the Belgian colonialists in 
1962 to the Tutsi King Mwambutsa IV, who some years later - when 
parliamentary elections were held in 1965 - refused to appoint a Hutu Prime 
Minister despite the overwhelming Hutu majority in the election result (BBC, 
2003). Further fighting between Hutu gendarmerie and Tutsi leaders resulted 
in a failed coup that led to a major purge of Hutus in the armed forces and the 
political class, and power became an exclusively Tutsi preserve. 
Mwambutsa attempted to preserve the monarchy, through his son Charles, 
who declared himself mwami as Ntare V. Ntare appointed Michel Micombero 
prime minister, but Micombero however succeeded in a military coup in 1966 
and declared himself President (Reyntjens, 1995). Any later attempts by Hutus 
to retaliate were cruelly suppressed by Micombero, and in April 1972, a Hutu 
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insurrection in which two thousand to three thousand Tutsis lost their lives, 
resulted in the armed forces launching genocidal reprisals and the massacre of 
more than one hundred and fifty thousand Hutus (ISS, 2005). Over three 
hundred thousand Hutus fled into neighbouring Tanzania, Rwanda and DRC. 
The virtual dismissal or removal of all Hutus from the armed forces allowed 
the Tutsi army to carry out reprisals against Hutus with impunity, in particular 
those who were educated. It was a 'watershed' period in the history of the 
country as it polarised the Hutu and Tutsis increasingly on ethnic rather than 
the traditional kinship lines. Some authors have argued that these pre-colonial 
kinship ties indicated that there had previously been more to unite than to 
divide the two groups (cf: 2.6 pp 68-74) (Obura, 2003). 
By the post-colonial era, the Hutu perception of the political situation focussed 
on what they saw as the 'genocidal' Tutsis who wanted to suppress the 
majority through fear and murder. The contrasting Tutsi view believed that if 
the majority Hutu came to power then Tutsis would be exterminated as a 
minority. Subsequent systematic killings by both groups led to a culture of 
impunity which tolerated routine massacres by either side in which no justice 
was administered to the perpetrators (BBC, 2003; Reyntjens, 1995). 
Political instability continued throughout the 1970s. In 1976, President Bagaza 
came to power through a military coup, and maintained an uneasy peace until 
1987, when Pierre Buyoya replaced him in another military coup. Buyoya was 
a shrewd political statesman who after another round of massacres of Hutus in 
1988, saw the need for some form of power sharing, and appointed a Hutu 
Prime Minister allowing equal numbers of Hutu and Tutsi as members of the 
National Commission for National Unity (Lund, 1999). Buyoya also insisted 
that through the new constitution, issues of discrimination against Hutus in 
education, employment and the armed forces would be addressed. This led to a 
period of positive involvement by Hutus during the late 1980s and early 
1990s. There was expansion in the freedom of speech, an increase in the 
number of Hutu students attending secondary and higher education and more 
Hutus serving in the civil service - previously the preserve of Tutsi elites 
ĜŎŤXŪŸŤŪVHĚ1995). In 1992, Buyoya reformed the country's constitution to 
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allow a multi-party political system to be established after decades of military 
dictatorship and single party leadership. 
Although the main political parties declared themselves to be non-ethnic and 
included members from both ethnic groups, the government backed party 
UPRONA (Union pour Ie Progres National), typically represented the Tutsi 
interests. FRODEBU (Front Democratique de Burundi), as the main party in 
opposition, represented the interests of the Hutus. The democratisation process 
that Buyoya had instituted culminated in parliamentary and presidential 
elections in June 1993 when Melchior Ndadaye succeeded by a two-thirds 
majority to become the first democratically elected Hutu President to rule 
Burundi. However, just a few months later in October 1993 he was 
assassinated in a failed and confused military coup, causing massacres of 
Tutsis as part of a 'popular resistance'. Subsequent vicious reprisals by the 
Tutsi army killed over a hundred thousand Hutus (Prunier, 1996). 
Consequently, approximately seven hundred thousand Hutu refugees fled from 
Burundi into Rwanda, Tanzania and DRC. The assassination of the first 
democratically elected Hutu President had sparked off yet another round of 
ethnic tension which Havermans sees 'as the starting point of the current phase 
in Burundi's civil war' (Havermans, 1999: 198). 
The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 alarmed Tutsi hard-liners further, afraid that 
similar actions might be taken against Burundian Tutsis. Although another 
Hutu president was appointed in 1994 - after the plane carrying both the 
Rwandan and Burundian Presidents was shot down - the violence escalated, 
especially between Hutu militias and the Tutsi controlled army. Hutu 
guerrillas attacked government posts and swept through villages, attempting to 
increase the recruitment of rebels within their factions. Tanzania was regularly 
accused of hosting Hutu rebel groups and extremists who were said to operate 
from the refugee camps in North Western Tanzania. 
The escalating violence and clashes between the different factions and the loss 
of control by the government comprising moderate Hutus and Tutsis created a 
power vacuum and consequently Pierre Buyoya led another military coup and 
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succeeded in overthrowing the government in July 1996. The cyclical nature 
of the rebel attacks followed by army reprisals became a consistent feature of 
the following years. In an attempt to bring control and security to areas 
engaged in insurgencies, the government initiated a policy of 'regroupement' 
in 1996. These were effectively concentration camps, which enabled the army 
to separate the rebels from the civilian population and assert their control over 
rebel held regions. The conditions in the camps were abysmal, with little or no 
access to humanitarian assistance. The eventual international outcry at the 
forced removal of the Hutu peasantry into camps led to their closure in 2000. 
An estimated five hundred thousand were displaced because of the civil war 
and over three hundred and fifty thousand Burundian Hutus fled as refugees to 
neighbouring Tanzania (OCHA, 2000). 
Coming under increasing international pressure and suffering economIC 
sanctions from the international community, Buyoya eventually agreed to a 
transitional constitution under which he was sworn in as president in 1998. 
Former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere attempted to broker a peace deal 
between the different factions in 1999. At every stage of the peace talks there 
were one or more groups that refused to participate or to sign the cease-fire 
accords. This was the case even in October 2001, when the installation of a 
power sharing government - brokered by Nelson Mandela - was supported by 
a UN peacekeeping force. Fighting intensified despite successive attempts to 
bring the warring factions together under power sharing agreements (BBC, 
2002). 
In 2003 under a power sharing agreement inaugurated in 2001, Domtien 
Ndayizeye - a Hutu - succeeded Pierre Buyoya as President. Despite 
continuing rebel action during that year a peacekeeping deal was brokered in 
November 2003 between President Ndayizeye and the FDD leader Pierre 
Nkurunziza and was signed in front of a summit of African leaders held in 
Tanzania. The deal, which gave ministerial posts to Hutu rebel leaders, 
appears to have stabilised the country sufficiently for large numbers of 
refugees to return home, even though the faction of the Forces for National 
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Liberation (FNL) remains active and eleven parties failed to sign the power 
sharing agreement of August 2004. 
According to an interview with a diplomat engaged in the peace negotiations 
between different factions in Burundi, the agenda of the FNL remains different 
to that of other rebel groups. This difference has led to the continuation of 
insurgencies against the government forces. FNL leaders argue that they are 
interested 'only in truth' not in power sharing. They state that their main 
concern is for both sides to admit culpability - in the form of a truth and 
reconciliation process. Similar views were reflected in the data collection from 
Burundian respondents who asserted the need for 'truth' and for Burundians to 
'stop telling lies'. As one refugee educator working for an NGO stated: 'Until 
we tell the truth, there will be no peace.' 
Burundi has entered into what looks like a relative period of peace, despite 
sporadic insurgencies around the capital Bujumbura. Over ninety percent of 
the country is now stable and refugees are returning in their tens of thousands. 
The challenge for Burundi will not only be in maintaining the fragile peace 
accord, but also assimilating the hundreds of thousands of refugees in exile, 
into an infrastructure which is already over-stretched. 
2.4 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the two wars 
DRC is a vast land of over fifty million inhabitants. It has had a turbulent past 
and has been ruthlessly and consistently exploited for its mineral wealth since 
the time of the Belgian colonists. After independence in 1960, Patrice 
Lumumba the popular socialist leader, became head of state, but was regarded 
as a threat to US interests in the region and assassinated in 1961, by troops 
loyal to Joseph Mobutu, a US backed army colonel. After four years of unrest 
(induding a civil war in Kitanga the rich south-east region of the country), 
Mobutu seized power in 1965 renaming the country Zaire. To ensure 
continued US backing he allowed Zaire to be used as a base for anti-Soviet 
operations in Angola. He then initiated what amounted to a thirty-year 
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kleptocracy, which stripped the nation of billions of dollars of mineral wealth, 
before the events of the Rwandan genocide sparked the civil war that brought 
Mobutu's reign to an end. As mentioned above, many Tutsi from Rwanda had 
fled the pogroms in Rwanda in the 1960s, and it is often believed that these 
groups of Banyarwanda were the group that form the 'Banya - Mulenge' the 
people residing in Mulenge. 
This view ignores the previous migrations of Tutsis during the mid-Nineteenth 
Century when cattle owning Tutsis, avoiding the taxation system imposed by 
King Rwabugiri of Rwanda, crossed to Eastern Congo. Furthermore, after the 
creation of the Belgian Congo in 1855 (with 'Ruanda-Urundi' as effectively 
annexes of Congo), large numbers of Rwandan migrants were sent from 
Rwanda and Burundi as cheap labour for the mines and plantations in the east 
of the country (lCG, 2005; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004). 
The migration of Rwandan Tutsis was compounded during the ethnic purges 
of Tutsis in Rwanda in the 1960s, when large numbers of relatively wealthy 
Tutsi elite fled to Congo. Many of these were encouraged by Mobutu to join 
his party the 'Movement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR). Barthelemy 
Bisengimana became his powerful cabinet director, while other Tutsis 
obtained positions in his central office' (lCG, 2005: 13). The subsequent 
granting of citizenship rights by Mobutu in 1972 protected many of the pre-
1950 Banyarwanda immigrants further and gave them even greater political 
access and land ownership. Under increasing popular pressure Mobutu 
rescinded his earlier law of 1972, and their national citizenship rights were 
based on a case by case basis, so that by 1981 the Banyarwanda had to apply 
individually for naturalisation. However, as Pottier suggests the 
, ... wider significance of 1981 ... was the context in which it was 
passed: with the elections looming, heightened political 
struggle easily turned into scapegoating against 
'foreigners' ... Control over land became fully ethnicised and 
exceedingly aggressive. (Pottier 2002: 28). 
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The combination of the different generations of Banyarwanda many of whom 
had lived in Eastern Zaire for generations, along with those who had fled 
Rwanda and Burundi in the late 1950s and early 1960s, are often referred to as 
the 'Banyamulenge', lumped together in what Pottier suggests 
... became the omnibus term for referring to all Tutsi who 
resided in North Kivu, South Kivu and Shaba; a group much 
larger than the descendants of the original 'Banya - Mulenge 
(Pottier, 2002: 43). 
Pottier further suggests that it was Rwanda's Vice-President Paul Kagame, 
'who with Kabila in mind as leader of this civil conflict, masterminded the 
revolt ... ' of Banyarwanda Tutsi and Banyamulenge (Pottier 2002: 44). 
Laurent Desire Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) took just a few short months to reach 
Kinshasa - perhaps with the backing of the US government, who were anxious 
to secure mining rights to some of Zaire's vast mineral wealth (Pottier, 2002). 
An alternative viewpoint - one coming primarily from the US - was that the 
build up of hostilities arose during the 'first' civil war because of Hutu 
extremist refugees expelling locally born Tutsis in early 1996 (Reiff, 1996: 1). 
It was suggested that these were backed by the Zairian army and local Zairian 
officials who were already anxious to oust the unpopular President Mobuto 
Sese Seko. The refugee influx itself was considered by some as one of the key 
factors in the build up and initiation of the conflict, destabilising a region that 
was already fragile and on the brink of implosion. However, as in the case of 
the genocide in Rwanda, the international community did nothing to prevent 
the exacerbation of the consequent civil war from going to scale (Reiff, 1996). 
Threatened with expulsion, the Rwandan backed Banyamulenge seized the 
opportunity in September 1996, to oust Hutu extremists in the east of the 
country. The resultant fighting factionalised the conflict into a battle between 
Hutu extremists, who had the support of the Zairian military, against Tutsi 
Zairian rebels supported by Rwanda. When the Zairian army and Hutu 
extremists were driven out of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira regions in November 
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1996, as many as four hundred thousand refugees returned to Rwanda in the 
space of a few days (Reiff, 1996: 1). Many more refugees decamped into the 
forests, where large numbers remained to continue their insurgencies. 
However, Laurent Kabila, the leader of ADFL, defeated the poorly disciplined 
Zairean forces and swept to power in 1997 as President of the renamed 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The country returned to a brief period of 
apparent stability until the rival factions within Kabila's ADFL group split, 
and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie or Rally for Congolese 
Democracy (RCD) was formed. 
By 1998, internal pressures from within the DRC forced Kabila to expel 
numbers of his 'Rwandan' advisors. In a reaction against their ousting by 
Kabila, these RCD 'rebels' backed by Rwanda and Uganda rose up against 
Kabila and advanced on Kinshasa. This sparked the 'second' war. A number 
of other countries became involved at this time, whether to protect their own 
borders, or to try and exploit the vast mineral wealth of the country is not 
clear. However, the subsequent plundering of the country by foreign troops is 
perhaps an indication of their reasons for intervention. Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia among others sent troops to assist Kabila and resist the 
R wandanIU gandan backed rebels who took control of much of the east of the 
country. The situation became even more complex when 'stalemate in the war 
and lack of progress in the peace process led to a de facto partition of the 
country under four regimes, each depending on foreign troops for its survival 
(HRW, 2001: I). 
The Congolese government initially under Laurent Kabila and then after his 
assassination, under his son Joseph, controlled the west of the country with 
increasing reliance on foreign assistance. The rebel group the Movement for 
the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo, MLC), 
controlled the north and were backed by Uganda. They later merged (but only 
temporarily) with the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement 
(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Mouvement de Liberation 
(RCD-ML), which claimed to control some provinces in the east. Human 
Rights Watch suggest that 'this merger brought together several of the RCD-
ML leaders and created the Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front pour 
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la Liberation du Congo (FLC)' which continued to be backed by Uganda 
(HRW, 2001: I). The remaining provinces in the east of the country were 
controlled by a third rebel group, RCD-Goma, who were backed by Rwanda. 
What these divisions highlight is the complex and volatile nature of the 
conflict in DRC which is heavily influenced by the involvement of foreign 
actors, whether as belligerents, exploiters of mineral wealth, or as suppliers of 
arms. 
The involvement of foreign actors in the illegal extraction of mineral resources 
from DRC was of such significance that a UN investigation was established in 
2000 to examine the link between resource exploitation and the conflict. 
Although clear links were established after the reports from the 'expert panel' 
(between April 2001 and October 2003), there was little effort on the part of 
the international community to intervene in the prevention of further 
exploitation (HRW, 2005). The panel also established obvious connections 
between 
... the exploitation of resources and international business. The 
minerals and other resources from Congo were predominantly 
destined for multinational companies based in Europe and 
North America (HRW, 2005: IX). 
There was an expectation that after the UN panel's report, member states 
would ensure that companies involved in supporting the illegal extraction of 
mineral wealth, in particular gold, would be held to account. This was not to 
be the case and illegal extraction continues and has funded directly, or 
indirectly, many of the rebel groups still engaged in the conflict in the east of 
the country. 
The international community only reacted with any real degree of interest 
when events during 2003, including the systematic rape, torture and murder of 
civilians by rebel groups in Bunia, Eastern Congo, sparked a wave of 
humanitarian and UN intervention in an attempt to curb the worst atrocities. 
However, the supply of arms from Uganda and Rwanda to the rebel groups 
has yet to be addressed by the international community. The UN imposition of 
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an arms embargo on Congo in July 2003 was not extended to Uganda and 
Rwanda at the request of Britain and the US (Kiley, 2003). Although the UN 
Security Council warned Rwanda over its incursions into DRC, they have 
refused to institute any sanctions. The action of Rwanda in the latest invasion 
(in November 2004) has yet again been dismissed by the international 
community as propaganda. 
In the eyes of many Congolese refugees suffering in exile in Tanzania, the US 
and the UK are responsible for arming the factions currently fighting in DRC, 
and in particular, Rwanda. Many of the respondents in the research asked the 
same question: "The US and the UK could stop this war tomorrow, so why 
don't they?" The presence of mercenaries from the US, UK and South Africa 
in DRC was further confirmed during an interview with a senior diplomat who 
had spent many years in the Great Lakes Region. It perhaps also explains the 
reluctance of these countries to become involved in a major peacekeeping 
initiative. 
According to Pottier, this reluctance is largely due to the acceptance by the 
international community of the 'dominant narrative', which has been 
constructed by Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Pottier suggests that Kagame 
has successfully exercised his hold on the construction of knowledge 
concerning the conflict in Eastern DRC. This narrative Pottier claims has 
focused on a 
... single cause - aggression by an external force (refugees) -
and had an attractive, simple solution: 'the Banyamulenge'. As 
found in the American press, the dominant version of why Kivu 
had become 'a problem' stressed the work of Hutu refugee 
militias (Pottier, 2003: 218). 
The consequence of this complex interplay of warring factions, the scramble 
for mineral resources, interference by external forces and the lack of concern 
by the international community is a deeply divided nation. Despite a number 
of peace talks, the country remains in a state of confusion with an ongoing 
civil war in the east of the country (at time of writing February 2005). The 
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international community have failed yet again, as they did in Rwanda, to take 
affirmative action to stop the civil war in DRC. In Pottier's opinion, the 
'culture of impunity' is compounded by the regard in which the UN and other 
nations are held by the Rwandan President Paul Kagarne, as perhaps one of the 
most significant external players in the DRC conflict. Pottier suggests that in 
the Rwandan culture there is a perception that people caught 'red-handed' (as 
the UN was caught by its failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide), have 
, .. .lost face, must not be taken seriously and can be lied to ... [and which 
makes] repeated mass killings and genocide possible' (Pottier, 2002: 156). The 
signal failure of the international community to bring the Rwandan 
government to task over its involvement in DRC, or to stop the deaths of over 
four million Congolese citizens, confirms this statement. 
The lack of political will from all sides to put an end to the DRC conflict is 
summarised clearly by the UN Security Council Report of December 2005. 
This indicates that despite supposed gains in the peace process, 
The transitional process remains fragile and plagued by: 
• corruption; 
• difficulties in disbanding foreign forces and militias, 
particularly in the Kivu provinces and in lturi; 
• the continuous flow of weapons; and 
• the illegal exploitation of natural resources m 
Congolese territory. 
The intimate connection between the illegal exploitation of 
resources, whose revenues continue to be used to maintain the 
dominance of military players in the ORC including through 
the purchase of weapons in violation of the arms embargo, and 
the perpetuation of conflict has all along been a prominent 
characteristic of the situation (UN, 2005: 5). 
2.5 The role of Uganda and Tanzania 
In the attempt to fmd credible and sustainable solutions to the types of 
conflicts described above, there have been many attempts at peace brokerage 
which have encountered difficulties at different levels. It took the shock of 
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genocide for relative stability to return to Rwanda, Burundi is still emerging 
out of conflict with a peace that has yet to be tested and DRC is still in 
turmoil, despite national and international peacemaking efforts. This section 
briefly considers the neighbouring countries, Uganda and Tanzania, in the 
dynamics of the Great Lakes conflicts and their role in both conflict 
exacerbation and peace brokerage. 
While nearing completion of this thesis a new report was published by Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) 'The Curse of Gold'. This is a documentation of the 
involvement of various external forces in the control of the gold fields of 
DRC. Their summary below dramatically highlights some of the issues 
outlined above and demonstrates the continuing role both Uganda and Rwanda 
have to play in the outcome of the conflict in DRC. 
The Ugandan army withdrew from Congo in 2003, following 
Rwanda, another major belligerent, which had withdrawn the 
year before. Each left behind local proxies, the Lendu 
Nationalist and Integrationist Front (Front des Nationalistes et 
Integrationnistes, FNI) linked to Uganda, and the Hema Union 
of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriotes Congolais, UPC), 
supported by Rwanda. With continued assistance from their 
external backers, these local armed groups in turn fought for the 
control of gold-mining areas and trade routes. As each group 
won a gold-rich area, they promptly began exploiting the ore. 
The FNI and the UPC fought five battles in a struggle to control 
Mongbwalu, each resulting in widespread human rights abuses. 
Human Rights Watch researchers documented the slaughter of 
at least two thousand civilians in the Mongbwalu area alone 
between June 2002 and September 2004. Tens of thousands of 
civilians were forced to flee from their homes into the forests to 
escape their attackers. Many of them did not survive (HRW, 
2005). 
Both Rwanda and Uganda still deny their role as external backers and refuse to 
admit culpability for the systematic human rights abuses committed over the 
fight for gold and mineral resources in DRC. 
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2.5.1 Uganda 
As noted above, Uganda in particular played a critical role both in the build up 
to the genocide in Rwanda and in the escalation of conflict in ORC. Uganda 
housed and armed the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Tutsi rebel faction that 
attempted a coup in Rwanda first in 1990 and then successfully expelled the 
Hutu extremists during the genocide in 1994. Uganda was also fully involved 
in the support of rebel factions in ORC, in particular the Congolese Liberation 
Movement (MLC) which controlled the Northwest of the country. The 
argument of the Ugandan Government for keeping troops in ORC was based 
on national security. However, the fact that Ugandan officials have been 
implicated in the plundering of mineral resources from ORC suggests their 
involvement in the war has an economic as well as political motivation (van de 
Veen, 1999). ORC has since sought legal retribution and compensation for 
what it regarded as illegal acts of aggression on the part of Uganda. The 
hearing, which was to have taken place in the International Court of Justice in 
The Hague in November 2003, was suspended after talks between Presidents 
Y oweri Museveni and Joseph Kabila were mediated by the United States in 
November 2003. 
2.5.2 Tanzania 
Tanzania's involvement in the regIOn stretches back to the time of the 
overthrow of Idi Amin in the 70s. Tanzania was also a main supporter of the 
East African Community in its early days, arguing for greater regional 
integration. By virtue of its borders with Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and ORC, 
Tanzania has always been a concerned neighbour and has been affected 
directly or indirectly by the events in these countries. 
Tanzania hosted a massive influx of over five hundred thousand Rwandan 
refugees in 1994, and after their subsequent repatriation in 1996, received 
mass influxes of Burundian and Congolese refugees totalling over four 
hundred and fifty thousand at the end of 1996. These influxes have resulted in 
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an increasingly belligerent stance towards refugees in general, which in some 
cases has resulted in the refoulement of both Burundian and Rwandan 
refugees. Tanzania currently houses over three hundred and fifty thousand 
refugees of mainly Burundian and Congolese extraction, with small numbers 
of Rwandans and Somalis (time of writing December 2005). This is still one 
of the largest refugee programmes in the world, yet has received very limited 
international attention after the return of the majority of Rwandan refugees in 
1996, despite the intensification of demands by the Tanzanian Government for 
more recognition and compensation from the international community. 
Tanzania has also played a key role in peace brokerage for both the Rwanda 
and Burundi conflicts. In 1993, Tanzania assisted in the development of the 
peace accord in Arusha, Tanzania between the RPF rebel movement, who had 
their base in Uganda, and the Rwandan government of President Habyrimana. 
Negotiations led to an accord based on a transitional power sharing 
government, integration of all military forces into a united national army and 
agreement to democratic elections (Havermans, 1999). Unfortunately, the 
possibilities for peace were destroyed with the death of the Rwandan President 
in April 1994, which sparked off the genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. 
Tanzania also played a key role in the attempts to negotiate peace settlements 
in Burundi between Hutu rebel factions and the Tutsi government. Again held 
in Arusha Tanzania, the mediation was led by former Tanzanian President, the 
late Julius Nyerere. After his death, the former South African president, 
Nelson Mandela was appointed as mediator for further talks, but the later 
peace deal signed in December 2002 also failed, and fighting continued. 
As mentioned above, Arusha hosts the ICTR, which deals with war criminals 
from Rwanda. However, despite the millions of dollars incurred each year, this 
court has succeeded in sentencing only twenty-five out of the thousands 
suspected of involvement in the genocide. While the gacaca courts may have 
their faults, had similar funds been poured into supporting the internal prison 
and justice systems within Rwanda, one wonders if the wheels of justice 
would have ground more quickly. 
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More recently the series of talks and conferences leading up to the Great Lakes 
Summit held in Dar es Salaam in November 2004, indicates the significant 
role that Tanzania has to playas perhaps the only truly peaceful country in the 
region. It is a potential role model for countries emerging from crisis towards 
political and economic stability. 
2.6 Identity issues in the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region 
Until the populations of the three countries in this research are convinced that 
the deep-rooted needs and wishes of all groups are recognised and 
representatively addressed through effective democratic elections, it is 
unlikely that the region will emerge into stability in the near future. In a region 
where identity issues are considered one of the prime motivating factors in the 
ongoing conflicts, this section examines the specific identity issues considered 
by different authors to be a feature of the Great Lakes conflicts. It 
complements Chapter Four which approaches the issue of identity from a more 
theoretical standpoint. 
Much of the literature on the Great Lakes Region suggests that the deep-rooted 
ethnic divisions, which many authors suggest underpin the conflicts in the 
region, were systematically exploited by colonial rulers (Lund, 1999; Prunier, 
1996; Reyntjens, 1995). According to Reyntjens both German East Africa and 
later the Belgians, capitalised upon the supposed ethnic differences of the 
Hutu and Tutsi tribes, which had been based traditionally on political clan ties 
rather than pure ethnic distinctions. In this way, ethnicity, while being a 
mobilising force in the development of power structures, was 'manipulated by 
elites in their political strategies' (Reyntjens, 1995: 6). The colonialists further 
manipulated the potential for ethnic division by developing the power base of 
Tutsis through provision of education and of instrumental positions in the civil 
administrative structure. This reinforced the myths and stereotypes that had 
been built around the three ethnic groups of Rwanda and Burundi. It 
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emphasised the 'superiority' of the Batutsi, over the 'peasant' Bahutu, with the 
third 'tribe' the Batwa hardly featuring as an ethnic group to be considered. 
Ethnicity is often considered one of the key issues concerning the conflicts in 
the Great Lakes, but Bigagaza et al argue that ethnicity is 'a cover for 
competition to control scarce land' (Bigagaza et al, 2002: 52). In Rwanda 
where the ethnic dimension is considered by many as the most important 
factor in fuelling the genocide of 1994, Bigagaza et al assert that: 
Ethnic differences were less important in understanding the 
dynamics of the conflict than were elite competitions to 
dominate critical environmental decision-making processes 
through control of the state. In turn, elite groups characterised 
these competitions in ethnic terms (Bigagaza et aI, 2002: 52). 
Prunier also argues that cultural mythology surrounding the ascription of 
ethnic tension in the war in Rwanda was a critical factor in determining the 
ethnic definition of the genocide. He cautions against artificially imposed 
definitions on Rwandan culture where traditionally the different tribes had 
coexisted in relative harmony (Prunier, 1995). Despite the peaceful co-
existence that Prunier asserts was a feature of pre-colonial life in the region, 
the complex nature of ethnicity and identity, of clashes between Hutu and 
Tutsi have dogged the region for the past two centuries. Prunier suggests that 
any existing tensions were exacerbated by colonialists not only through 
divisive border divisions, but also by ascription of ethnic identities, which 
traditionally had not been a cause for tension. In contrast Pottier argues that 
this view is convenient for those who want to place the blame squarely on the 
shoulders of the colonists rather than accepting the role of their Tutsi 
forebears. 
The intellectual challenge academics face today is that they 
must see through the smokescreen of sameness (same territory, 
same language) and must appreciate the divisive institutions 
and practices which preceded European rule (Pottier, 2002: 
116). 
Some other authors however suggest that although divisions did exist before 
colonial rule in Rwanda, they do not explain the collective violence of the 
genocide. In support of this assumption, Rutayisire, Kabano and Rubagiza, 
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suggest that although 'ethnic differentiation was a social reality in pre-colonial 
Rwanda' (Rutayisire et aI, 2004: 324) it does not sufficiently account for the 
violence that ensued. They contend that there is little evidence to suggest that 
ethnicity caused the level of tension between the ethnic groups, who shared a 
common language and culture. They had much more in common than is 
generall y recognised. 
Whichever viewpoint one ascribes, to, what is evident is that the colonial 
policy of 'divide and rule' ensured that any differences that did exist were 
fully exploited in order to strengthen the colonial power base. In this way as 
Mamdani suggests, the identities of the different groups have changed over 
time. He suggests that Hutu and Tutsi should 'be seen as political identities 
that changed with the changing history of the Rwandan state' (Mamdani, 
2001: 73). 
Mamdani concisely summanses the argument between these differing 
opinions regarding the nature of conflict in East Africa: 
The two sides of the controversy can be summed up as follows. 
One recognized the existence of ethnically defmed movements 
(tribalism) but saw them as some sort of a primordial carryover, 
a traditional or atavistic residue, to be cured or erased with the 
march of modernity. The other viewed tribalism as the result of 
a modern conspiracy either external or local. Those who saw it 
as a foreign inspired conspiracy marshalled evidence to show 
that many of the tribes of Africa were an arbitrary colonial 
creation, whereas those who held the roots of this conspiracy to 
be local traced them either to tactical manouvers by the state to 
divide the people or to elite strategies to "use" popular 
allegiances to gain advantages for themselves. Whereas the 
conspiracy theorists saw tribalism as a kind of cancer 
introduced from without and above, the primordialists regarded 
it as an ahistorical original sin afflicting African peoples from 
below. Both agreed that tribalism is a curse of which Africa 
must be rid (Mamdani, 1996: 187). 
The effect of such ascribed 'tribalism' was to ensure that in the eyes of the 
North, any conflicts in Africa could be ignored as 'tribal' or due to 'ethnicity'. 
In order to move beyond the emotiveness associated with these terms, 
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particularly ethnicity, I distinguish between ethnicity and identity in my 
research findings. Identity encompasses political, 'clan', religious and social 
identities which are often more flexible and inclusive than the notion of ethnic 
identity. Some of these issues relating to the formation or shifting of identities 
through subscription, force or indoctrination are explored in depth in Chapters 
Four and Nine. 
Obura recognises the nature of what she terms 'socio-identity' in Rwanda as 
being a more apt term than ethnicity. By utilising this term she implies a 
broader concept of identity that encompasses a range of identity-defining 
factors, beyond mere ethnicity. She suggests that recent Rwandan historians 
are increasingly challenging the 'myth' of ethnic division in Rwanda. She 
states: 
The historians of Rwanda have convincingly argued that the 
Bahutu, the Batwa and the Batutsi are socio-identity groups. That 
is they know themselves and are known by others as belonging to 
specific groups. They therefore have a group identity. These 
identities seemed to have changed over time ... More importantly 
they say that historical evidence points to the mutability of the 
groups and to the fact that these identities did not play as 
predominant a role in the past as colonizers believed (Obura, 
2003: 105). 
However, it appears that the notion of ethnic identity has become internalised 
through the process of history, resulting in the swinging of power from one 
group to another. As one Burundian teacher in this research said, 'it matters 
little what is the history or where it came from, it is the reality of now that 
counts.' In order to understand the nature of the supposed ethnic conflict in the 
countries under study, it is therefore necessary to consider how the schisms of 
the two groups have emerged over time. If one looks at the opposing 
perceptions that the Hutu and Tutsi have constructed and internalised both 
historically and more recently, two distinct and polarised images emerge. 
The Hutu position is best explained from a study of pre-colonial times when 
Hutus believed they were treated as inferiors by the 'lordly' pastoralist Tutsis. 
This sense of inferiority and exploitation was bolstered during the initial 
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colonial period when Hutus were denied access to education and Tutsis were 
empowered as skilled administrators. Any historical or recent killing of Hutus 
is seen as ' proof of the intrinsic perfidy of the Tutsi ' (Prunier, 1996: 10). 
Retaliation or reprisal against the Tutsis, and even genocide, is considered 
justifiable as a legitimate response to their oppression by Tutsis. For example a 
paper circulating amongst the refugees interviewed, was first distributed in 
1998 (provided by one of the Burundian respondents in my research3) and 
highlights what Hutus perceive as the intention of the Tutsis to establish a 
'Hima Empire' . This was a common perception by Hutu respondents who 
insisted that there was a regional Tutsi plot to take over the Great Lakes 
Region as a Tutsi stronghold. The paper supposedly written by a member of 
the RPF from Rwanda, exhorts Tutsis to unite across the region, by 
... posting our best human resources in services dealing with 
security, economics, fmance and administration, particularly in 
the Provinces of north and South Kivu which are an integral 
part of our homeland. 
While the provenance of the document might be questioned, the fact that such 
text is believed and circulated is evidence of a sophisticated propaganda 
machine. 
The alternative construct of the Tutsi standpoint supposedly arises from an 
historic memory of being superior to the Hutu who were perceived as peasant 
farmers and less intelligent. The Belgians supported the dominance by the 
Tutsis who believed themselves successors to white rule. Killings of Hutus are 
downplayed while the massacres of Tutsis and in particular the genocide in 
Rwanda are seen as the Hutu genocidal plan to eliminate all Tutsis. Hutus are 
seen as bloodthirsty killers. Therefore, democracy is to be avoided, as it would 
give victory to the majority Hutu, who would then eliminate the Tutsis both 
politically and physically (Prunier, 1996). The fear of the extermination as a 
minority either physically or politically is the driving force behind the Tutsi 
rationalisation for maintaining control. 
3 Something similar can be found on UŲWŮ JÙĦÒĞĞẀŲŨŨŪŊ Ù Ĥ V ÙŨŸĒ Ħ ȘŬWŨŨ I ŠŦŨŨȘŘŘẀÙŮ Ħ UWÍŨÍĚ
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This polarisation of viewpoints impinges on all aspects of life and perceptions 
of historical and current events. This is particularly the case within Rwanda 
and Burundi, but also in the East of DRC where ethnicity formed the basis of 
the escalating tension that led to the first of the civil wars of 1996. One 
narrative asserts that Tutsi settlers, (formerly from Rwanda but who renamed 
themselves Banyamulenge - 'people who live in Mulenge') were being 
expelled in a systematic 'ethnic cleansing' strategy familiar to Tutsis in 
neighbouring Rwanda. The Tutsi rebellion against this strategy initiated the 
full-scale civil war, which eventually led to the downfall of Mobuto Sese 
Seko. The opposing narrative from the indigenous Congolese refutes this 
accusation insisting that the 'Banyamulenge' or 'Banyarwanda' (as they are 
referred to by the Congolese 'nationals') 'demanded citizenship by force' and 
had systematically taken over land traditionally owned by indigenous tribes. 
The resistance to the appropriation of land and violent demands for citizenship 
sparked the war in 1996. 
What these opposing narratives demonstrate is the significant role of identity 
in forming these narratives. Identity issues also impinged heavily on the 
education system, which was used by some as a tool to engender hatred and 
violence based on ethnicity. A common example given in the case of Rwanda 
was that all children were taught that Tutsis were 'snakes' or 'cockroaches'. 
An example given by a senior Ministry of Education official in Rwanda stated 
that before the genocide, it would be common for a teacher in a mathematics 
lesson to say to a class of schoolchildren, "You have five Tutsis, you kill three. 
How many are left?" When interviewing Hutu refugees from Burundi, similar 
'enemy' stories were narrated describing how Hutu children were 
discriminated against at school, or how Tutsi children would bring arms into 
the school ready to kill their Hutu peers the next day. The importance of these 
'enemy' stories lies in the strength they have of affirming existing stereotypes. 
Children did not just learn these stories at school, through teachers, but they 
were part of the fabric of life around them. They would be passed on from one 
generation to the next. The creation of an enemy culture in terms of identity 
construction is explored further in Chapters Four and Nine. 
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The schisms identified above, between the different identity groups are 
overplayed according to some authors. For example Obura, in her analysis of 
the education system in Rwanda pre- and post-genocide, suggests that in pre-
colonial times 
... there was a high degree of assimilation and integration of the 
groups, although they retained some distinct socio-identity 
features. The concept of cohabitation and common interests is a 
theme that the government would like to emphasise (Obura, 
2003: 104). 
Mamdani concurs when he states: 
My second conclusion is that the predecessors of today's Hutu 
and Tutsi indeed created a single cultural community, the 
community of Kinyarwanda speakers, through centuries of 
cohabitation, intermarriage, and cultural exchange (Mamdani, 
2001: 74). 
Although as mentioned above, Pottier points to the convenience of this view 
for the existing leadership in Rwanda (Pottier, 2002), many respondents 
(particularly those from Burundi) indicated that at grassroots level, there has 
traditionally been peaceful co-existence, often based on traditional clan 
kinships. One suggestion from some of the Burundi respondents was to 
enhance these ancient clan structures, as potential future 'entries of peace', 
which might perhaps focus on cultural unities and the crossing of ethnic 
divides. 
What is seen as an overemphasis by some authors on identity issues is 
supported by those who suggest that there were significant economic and 
resource factors that contributed to conflict in the Great Lakes. While other 
authors might perceive identity as less important than economic or resource 
based factors in causing conflict, the narratives gathered from this research 
indicate the contrary. Whether the conflict-inducing identity issues suggested 
by respondents would be mitigated by an absence of poverty and an increase 
in land is a different question. Some of these resource based issues and other 
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factors affecting conflict in the Great Lakes and in Africa are explored in more 
detail below. 
2.7 Other factors affecting conflict in the Great Lakes Region and 
Africa 
In order to set the issues of identity within the broader context of conflict in 
Africa, it is necessary to look at some of the specific theories in the literature 
considered as additional factors affecting conflicts in the Great Lakes and in 
Africa. This section recognises however, that the conflicts in the Great Lakes 
and Africa are extremely complex and presents a brief overview of different 
issues merely to place the research within a specific context, rather than to 
explain conflict theory in depth. 
2.7.1 Economic and resource basedfactors 
In contrast to the belief by some authors that identity is one of the primary 
motivations for conflicts in Africa (as outlined above), alternative viewpoints 
suggest that economic and resource factors have more of a role to play than 
ethnicity. It is suggested that the role of rich nations in terms of the debt 
burden and their interference in the economies of poor nations and in control 
of natural resources has more of an impact. In many cases, it is against the 
interest of national parties and international collaborators for the war to cease 
- as in the case ofDRC - until the wealth of a nation has been fully exploited. 
Tandon for example suggests that the debt burden of African states is a key 
'root cause of peacelessness' in Africa. He presents a critique of another 
widely held view that conflict in Africa is due to the lack of economic growth 
and poor governance. He questions whether these factors are really the cause 
of conflict in Africa and whether conflicts are the 'fault' of the rulers of Africa 
and their inability to govern effectively (Tandon, 2000). Instead, Tandon 
argues that the debt burden imposed on African states is a key factor in 
75 
conflict causality. Creditors can use debt as a lever to impose structural 
adjustment programmes on African nations and ensure an open door policy 
that allows a free market of foreign goods and capital that is to the advantage 
of the creditors and the detriment of recipients. Tandon further argues that 
when one considers the link between a) debt and economic development, and 
b) the link between the lack of economic growth and conflict, it is evident that: 
One of the significant causes of conflict in Africa is the struggle 
for survival in a situation of scarce resources. Add to this the 
argument that the struggle for resources manifests itself in the 
struggle for state power. .. (Tandon, 2000: 176). 
One might dispute his suggestion that the cancellation of the debt burden 
would reduce conflict significantly and give rise to sustainable development. 
The level of corruption in many African states has not been considered in his 
argument as a factor that influences the economic debate. Furthermore, the 
priorities of many African states, which favour high military and low social 
sector expenditure as part of their strategic budgetary plans, do not provide an 
environment in which the basic social as well as economic needs of the 
population can be met. 
Rogers sees the problem as less to do with the debt burden and potential for 
economic growth but more with the divide between rich and poor, not only 
between nations but also within nations. He asserts that the 
... widening rich-poor divide contrasts markedly with an 
implicit assumption of most current economic thinking that 
economic growth is part of the world-wide phenomenon of 
globalization that is delivering economic growth for all 
(Rogers,2000: 12). 
He counters this assumption suggesting that there is an increasing division 
between small numbers of rich and large numbers of poor countries based on 
new investment focussed on already rich or growing economies. He suggests 
that 
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... one of the crudest measures is that the 300 or so dollar 
billionaires in the world are collectively as wealthy as the 
poorest 2.4 billion people (Rogers, 2000: 12). 
Federici indicates the link between structural adjustment policies of the World 
Bank and IMF in the 1 980s and a state of ongoing conflicts in the African 
continent as a factor in the development of conflict in the region (Federici, 
2000) and concurs with Nathan who suggests that African states 
... lack the resources or expertise to resolve disputes and 
grievances, manage competition, and protect the rights of citizens, 
[in which case] individuals and groups may resort to violence 
(Nathan, 2000: 190). 
Many states therefore rely on external agencies to support or manage their 
financial affairs if conflict breaks down the internal infrastructure necessary to 
sustain the country independently. The dependence upon, and economic 
polarisation of poor countries from the rich, may exacerbate and heighten 
tensions and disparities, leading to the desire for change against inequity. This 
desire for change is often manifested through armed struggle. 
This viewpoint highlights the 'winner takes all' mentality that characterises 
the power brokers of conflicts in Africa where the exploitation of resources 
and wealth by the most powerful is commonplace (EPCP, 1999). This is 
contrary to the belief that stability and peace is the desired outcome for all 
parties. In some cases, continuing the conflict is in the interests of those 
perpetrating it. For example in DRC the protagonists of the conflict and more 
crucially their backers, have little interest in a stable state while they are still 
able to plunder the mineral resources of the country with impunity. Miall et al 
suggest that the belief that altruism is behind the process of peace building in 
many of these countries is a naIve assumption (Miall et ai, 1999). The 
recognition that maintaining conflict might be in the interests of a powerful 
few is highlighted by the comments of the respondents in this research. This 
statement from a Congolese teacher in the refugee camps is similar to many 
from others interviewed in the research: 
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Politicians are good at fanning trouble. They use us for their 
own interest. We have become their project to get what they 
want: power and wealth. 
2.7.2 Theories of conflict in Africa 
Nathan, in opposition to much of the writing on contemporary conflict in 
Africa, contends that conflict per se, is not necessarily negative. It can be a 
positive, energising part of human existence and can be managed as such by 
open and responsible states that do not repress or deny opposition (Nathan, 
2000). Rogers also builds on the positive potential of conflict by suggesting 
that in some cases conflict is necessary as a 'regenerative' force to oust an 
oppressive regime (Rogers, 2000). Similarly, Lund argues that there is a 
possibility for the regenerative power of conflict and cites Yoweri Musevyni's 
regime in Uganda as an indication: 
... bloody internal conflicts such as in Rwanda and the earlier 
struggle he [Musevyni] waged in Uganda simply reflect how 
regenerative forces are transforming feudal, undemocratic 
societies into meritocratic, democratic ones. The conflicts are not 
cause for pessimism but signs of hope, because forceful 
overthrow is often the only way to get rid of unjust regimes who 
follow the old beliefs and policies (Lund, 1999: 55). 
Unfortunately, Lund's analysis of Uganda as a 'meritocratic, democratic' 
country fails to recognise the ongoing civil war that has affected Uganda for 
the past ten years, where the Lord's Resistance Army in the north of the 
country continues its insurgencies. He further fails to acknowledge Uganda's 
role in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1996, where 
Ugandan troops played a significant part in backing rebels groups in the 
ongoing civil war. 
This dialectic between the two sides of culturally accepted or non-accepted 
violence has survived throughout history. The war on Iraq in 2003 
demonstrated how Saddam Hussein was an ally and trading partner one year, 
and then demonised and reformulated into a terrorist a decade later. Nelson 
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Mandela was considered a terrorist by many international regimes before his 
release and rise to national and international hero. As Nef suggests, 'terrorism 
and counterterrorism are often dialectically intertwined as two explicit or 
implicit sides of the same coin' (Nef, 2003: 55). Socially constructed violence 
where armies give legitimacy to war is often accepted by many nations, as Nef 
contends, 
This pro-violence attitude has long crossed the cultural, ethnic, 
and gender divides ... All around us violence is glorified in the 
name of history, destiny, or patriotism (Nef, 2003: 55). 
If social violence is a learned behaviour through societal approval of state 
violence, 'the professionalization of violence' adds a new dimension to the 
arguments of how educative processes have affected the development of 
conflict particularly in the Great Lakes region of Africa. As Nef argues: 
There are two basic manifestations of the pedagogy and culture of 
violence. One is the explicit induction of individuals and groups 
by means of professional or paraprofessional training in "best 
practices". The other is a more implicit, subtle, and systematic 
pedagogy, seemingly outside intentional settings. In the second 
case, the culture of violence is imbedded by multiple influences, 
from peer groups, to daily activities, to the media, games ... and 
above all by the allegedly neutral education system (Nef, 2003: 
56). 
Educative processes in this way have a critical role, both in a formal sense 
through 'intentional' training for war, or via informal mechanisms that 
contribute to a socially acceptable culture of violence. It is this embedded 
culture of violence that Nathan suggests leads to further escalation of conflict 
in Africa. He argues that repression of constructive conflict has the potential to 
exacerbate violence rather than developing a liberating experience. Such 
escalation, Nathan asserts, can arise out of the lack of institutional capacity of 
a weak or impoverished state to contain or manage conflict within its borders. 
He proposes that crises, 
... arise from four structural conditions in particular: authoritarian 
rule; the exclusion of minorities from governance; socio-
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economic deprivation combined with inequity; and weak states 
that lack the institutional capacity to manage normal political and 
social conflict. These conditions - the "four horsemen of the 
apocalypse" - are the primary causes of large scale violence 
(Nathan, 2000: 189). 
Nathan argues that the combination of these four 'horsemen' permit the 
conditions for violent conflict to thrive in countries in Africa, where all four 
conditions prevail. He suggests that countries become even more vulnerable to 
conflict when these conditions possess additional structural and historical 
legacies from the colonial era. These include the colonial imposition of 
borders without regard to cultural or ethnic ties as well as the colonial tradition 
of ethnic favouritism or discrimination (Nathan, 2000). The colonial influence 
in terms of ethnic favouritism is one of the accepted features of the conflicts in 
Rwanda, Burundi and DRC and is recognised in the narratives of the 
respondents of the research. Some see their plight as a direct result of the 
interference of 'whites'. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Issues affecting conflict in the Great Lakes Region (for the purposes of this 
research, Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) 
formed the basis for this contextual background to the conflict. Although 
connected along political, economic and social lines with the three main 
countries, Uganda and Tanzania have not experienced the same level of 
conflict that sparked the massive exodus of refugees from Rwanda, Burundi 
and DRC, and therefore have not been considered in detail in this chapter. 
The chapter indicates that much of the literature concerning the conflict in the 
region suggests that the ongoing conflicts in the region are the result of ethnic 
divisions. These are said to have dominated the region for several centuries. 
The existing divisions were later exploited further by colonial rulers, who 
through their divide and rule policies set the foundation for the subsequent 
'ethnic' wars in Rwanda and Burundi. These wars destabilised the region 
further when over a million Rwandan and Burundian refugees surged into 
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Tanzania and DRC after the genocide in 1994. The effect of the remaining 
Rwandans in DRC 'exported the Rwandan ethnic and political conflict into 
Zaire' (Havermens, 1999: 237). 
Others however VIew the ethnic divisions as political or social identity 
constructs rather than ethnicity per se, while some authors suggest that 
economic factors also contributed to the continued conflicts in the region. This 
was particularly so in DRC, where despite the kleptocratic exploitation of 
mineral wealth on a grand scale, there has been no international impetus to 
halt the war. 
Although education is seen by many respondents as a 'way out' of conflict and 
of life as a refugee, as will be highlighted in the following chapter, it is often 
perceived in a negative light - contributing to and fuelling conflict. This 
paradoxical nature of formal education is explored in depth in the following 
chapter and is a significant feature of the findings, which indicated the 
contradictory role 'educated people' played in the conflict. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS 
3.1 Introduction 
My assumption in this thesis is that there are formal and informal educative 
processes which are contributory factors in the transmission of information 
and the construction of identity and that these influence the development of 
conflict. The term 'educative processes' is used in preference to the more 
institutionally invested term of education and refers primarily to formal and 
informal learning mechanisms. It was decided that 'non-formal' mechanisms, 
which have an informal but often institutional basis, would be analysed within 
the literature relating to formal and informal processes, where there is 
considerable overlap. Thus while there is a recognition that non-formal 
mechanisms are important educative processes, the representation of these are 
embedded within the examination of formal and informal learning. 
In order to clarify the term 'educative processes' further, the following 
definitions of formal and informal learning were adapted from a European 
Commission classification: 
Formal learning: learning typically provided by an education or training 
institution, structured (in terms of learning objectives, learning time or 
learning support) and leading to certification. Formal learning is intentional 
from the learner's perspective. 
Informal learning: learning resulting from daily life activities related to 
work, family or leisure. It is not structured (in terms of learning objectives, 
learning time or learning support) and typically does not lead to certification. 
Informal learning may be intentional but in most cases it is non-intentional (or 
"incidental"/ random) (EC, 2001: 32-33 in Colley, Hodkinson and Malcolm, 
2002). 
'Educative processes' therefore encompass all of these elements, both formal 
and informal, as all-encompassing life-learning processes. 
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The review of literature in this chapter highlights the contributions and gaps in 
the existing literature concerning educative processes within the contexts of 
the countries concerned in this research. Most significantly for this research, 
the literature reviewed on informal educative processes within a Southern 
context, provided the basis for the analysis of findings on informal educative 
processes in Chapter Seven. 
This review does not claim to provide a comprehensive review of education 
theories in general. Nor does it enter into a comparative debate on education 
practices in the 'North' compared with those of the 'South'. The chapter is 
more concerned with the totality of educational experiences that individuals 
undergo throughout their life whether formal or informal - and the potential of 
these to influence conflict and/or peace. Through these formal and informal 
processes, the transmission of societal values invests educative processes with 
the potential for transformation which mayor may not be benign. 
Much of the literature that examines the relationship between education and 
conflict recognises both the positive potential of education - usually in its 
formal sense - to build peace, but also acknowledges the possibility that 
education can also exacerbate differences that lead to conflict. Bush and 
Salterelli (2000), Davies (2003), and Smith (2002), for example, all reflect on 
how these 'two faces' of education highlight both the positive and negative 
potential of education. Others place increasing emphasis on the positive and 
transformative potential of education and the possibility for using education as 
a mechanism for peace building (Boyden, 1996; Pigozzi, 1999; Sinclair, 
2001). 
3.2 The education dialectic: a right of protection or preparation for 
war 
Although many authors supported by the international conventions cited 
below, assert that education should be 'the right' of all children, this is more 
difficult to sustain particularly in an environment of conflict. The 
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contradictory nature of formal education, presents education on the one hand 
as a 'safe haven' from conflict, and highlights the potential harm that some 
formal education systems can engender, on the other (cf: 3.3 pp. 87-91). 
Much of the development literature states that the right to basic education is a 
primae facie principle for most agencies engaged in assistance to Southern 
countries, particularly those ridden by conflict (Bird, 2003a; Bush and 
Salterelli, 2000; Nicolai, 2003; Pigozzi, 1999; Sinclair, 2002; Smith and Vaux, 
2003). This is supported and guided by a number of international conventions 
and human rights acts to ensure that education is available to all children in all 
circumstances, as both a place and a system of protection from harm and 
abuse. The key protocols are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (1949), UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1951), UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), Convention against 
Discrimination in Education (1962), International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and the Convention on the Elimination of 
all forms of Discrimination against Women (1981) (Smith and Vaux, 2003: 
11). One recommendation not covered by Smith and Vaux's list is the 
UNESCO 'Recommendation Concerning Education for International 
Understanding, Co-operation and Peace and Education Relating to Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms'. All member states of UNESCO 
unanimously adopted this recommendation - later known under the title 
'Recommendation on International Education' - at its 18th session of the 
General conference on 19th November 1974 in Paris. 
Critically, the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child Article 28 (1989) and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 26, both state that 
education is a universal right for all children and these conventions are the 
most cited by international agencies concerned with education in difficult 
environments. Because of the emphasis placed on education within these two 
conventions, the importance of education provision in all countries including 
those engaged in, or emerging from conflict is recognised by educators all 
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over the world (Machel, 1996; Pigozzi, 1999; Sinclair, 2002; Sommers, 1999; 
UNESCO, 2000; UNHCR, 1995). Education in emergencies is often seen as 
... not only providing essential social cohesiveness for adults 
and children alike; but also ensuring the potential for future 
economic and social growth (Bird, 2003a: 33). 
Unfortunately, despite the rhetoric and good intentions of many educators in 
emergencies, in times of conflict, education rarely features as a priority issue 
among the major humanitarian agencies. Survival needs tend to be the priority 
for most agencies engaged in humanitarian relief work, and few recognise that 
education can be provided in tandem with health, food and water. For 
example, the department head of one major relief agency stated clearly in an 
interview that education in emergencies was not a necessity. Survival needs 
came first and his agency was not willing to consider education as a funding 
priority. 
Such attitudes survIve even though much of the literature concerning 
education in Southern countries confirms that education is regarded as 'a 
rightful safe haven for children' (Boyden, 1996; Machel, 1996; Roger, 2002; 
Smith and Vaux, 2003). Roger adds that through the provision of 'quality' 
education, children and families can be protected from some of the worst 
excesses of conflict. Schools or their equivalent can also be a place for 
psychosocial healing and reconciliation and can act as the community's 
'barometer' of hope for the future (Roger, 2002). 
Many agencies and practitioners working in emergencies argue that education 
needs to be sustained for functional as well as social reasons. They suggest 
that the future prosperity and reconstruction of a nation is a significant factor 
in the justification for provision of education in situations of conflict. Another 
similar rationalization is Sommers' argument that education has a critical role 
to play in occupying large numbers of young people in order to avoid the 
potentially volatile consequences of large numbers of idle youth roaming 
around refugee camps (Sommers, 1999). This reduction of education to a 
functional perspective fails to acknowledge the fundamental right of all 
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children to basic education regardless of circumstance. The UN Millennium 
Development Goals in contrast recognise the importance of education as a 
right for its own sake when they state that by 2015 Universal Primary 
Education should be available to all. This was declared in the Jomtien 
Declaration of Education for All in 1990 and reiterated in the Dakar 
Framework for Education of 2000, which states: 
... that all children, young people and adults have the human 
right to benefit from an education that will meet their basic 
learning needs in the best and fullest sense of the term, an 
education that includes learning to know, to do, to live together 
and to be (World Education Forum, 2000b). 
In contrast to these declarations, much of the literature in development circles 
emphasises the increasing demand for school systems in Southern countries to 
be more responsive to economic development (more productive workers and 
thus more 'adaptive' students). Spring for example argues that the debate is 
concerned with the dependence on education to supply successful employees. 
In a world where employability becomes the driving force for education, 
S pring suggests that there is an 
.. .increasing demand for high levels of literacy, 
numeracy, technological skills and the competencies, such 
as problem-solving and team-working abilities that are 
required for successful work (Spring, 1999). 
This functionalist perspective has increasingly become part of the Southern 
education agenda and characterises the ideological position of many engaged 
in provision of education in emergencies. It contradicts the 'rights approach' 
to education, which is integral to the human rights conventions mentioned 
above; where education is perceived as a right for its own sake, for the benefit 
of the individual, not the state or the state economy. 
However, whether taking a functionalist perspective or a human rights 
approach, education in this context is still regarded as a positive force, whether 
it is for economic growth and reconstruction or for peaceful transformation. 
There is an alternative body of literature emerging however, which focuses on 
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the potentially negative impact of some types of education in conflict-ridden 
societies. This paradoxical nature of education is explored below. 
3.3 The paradox of formal education and its role in conflict 
The recognition of education as a force for positive change as discussed above 
is often counteracted by the perception of education as a failure and a causal 
factor of children's involvement in war. Krech and Maclure examine this 
argument, saying that the contradictions of education are 
... problematic, largely because they hinge on deterministic 
notions of education as an autonomous force for change ... 
[instead of being] ... highly constrained by political, economic, 
and ideological forces that are national and international in 
scope (Krech and Maclure, 2003: 141). 
This paradox of formal education, its potential for breeding violence or for 
promoting social and civic reconstruction is reiterated by several authors. It is 
also a significant factor in the [mdings, which present 'educated people' as 
possessing paradoxical roles in relation to conflict (9.2.1 pp. 233 -237). 
In the collection of works edited by Tawil and Harley, authors were asked to 
assess' ... the ways in which formal schooling may be seen to have undermined 
social cohesion.' but this was contrasted with the examination of ' ... how 
education can also contribute to reconstructing and renewing social peace 
based on justice' (Tawil and Harley, 2004: 7). This duality of roles within 
formal education is also highlighted by Bush and Salterelli who refer to the 
paradoxical nature of formal education as the 'two faces of education'. 
In their analysis of whether education can alter the 'rules' of ethnic conflict by 
early educational and social interventions, Bush and Salterelli indicate how the 
negative face of education has the potential to exacerbate conflict while also 
highlighting how good quality education can have cumulative benefits as a 
mechanism for conflict prevention. They argue that the 'conflict-dampening' 
impact of educational opportunity can encourage the promotion of linguistic 
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diversity, the nurturing of ethnic tolerance, and the 'disarming' of history 
(Bush and Salterelli, 2000). However, they also recognise, as does Nelles, that 
education can counter the positive when it is 
... used to preserve and in some ways promulgate an identity, 
concentrating on differences in socioeconomic status, language 
or nationality. [Therefore,] ... education presents a paradox for 
those examining it with a view toward understanding conflict 
(Nelles, 2003: 131). 
In emphasising the paradox of education, Bush and Salterelli similarly argue 
that: 
If it is true that education can have a socially constructive impact 
on inter-group relations, then it is equally evident that it can have a 
socially destructive impact (Bush and Salterelli, 2000: 9). 
The potential for negative manipulation embedded in some education systems 
is perceived in the literature as being a significant factor in influencing 
conflict. This was indicated at the outset of this thesis in reference to Nazi 
Germany. In his comprehensive review of Nazi Germany's education system, 
Wegner presents the historical development of the curriculum materials 
developed by theoreticians and pedagogues as an 
... ambitious project to transform curriculum along racial anti-
semitic lines through the union of myth with science ... Nazis 
were the first political culture to legitimize racial anti-Semitism 
in school curriculum with the full legal support of the state 
(Wegner, 2002: 3-5). 
The legitimisation of prejudice - the licit demonisation of the 'other' - through 
the formal education system is something that is common in the conflicts dealt 
with in this thesis. Schools and teachers become part of, or subject to, 
manipulation and control, as repressive regimes often regard education either 
as a threat to their power or as a tool for indoctrination. Not only can 
educational institutions become a target of war, but education can also be a 
contributor to the causes of war. Bush and Salterelli for example point to 
education as a contributory factor in conflict through the uneven distribution 
of education provision - which creates or preserves privilege - as a weapon of 
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cultural repression, and through the production or doctoring of textbooks to 
promote intolerance (Bush and Salterelli, 2000). 
Similarly, Davies argues that there are a number of dimensions to the 
'education-conflict interface', one of which is the potential of education to 
contribute to social inequalities which may in tum generate conflict. She 
suggests that school can actually be a preparation for war, through violence 
either in the school or through the curriculum. The competition and 
examination systems of many schools also subject children to fear, and 
anxiety, where failure may lead to frustration, low-self esteem, and a 
predisposition towards violence or tension (Davies, 2003). 
Likewise, Smith and Vaux suggest that education can be used in a negative 
and harmful way through the manipulation of textbooks either for political 
purposes or through inculcation of attitudes of superiority of gender, culture, 
religion or race. They assert that because education can contribute to and even 
exacerbate conflict, the relationship between education and conflict should be 
a core component of educational planning in countries undergoing or 
emerging from conflict (Smith and Vaux, 2003). 
The political and social manipulation of history education has been well 
documented elsewhere and a number of authors provide examples of negative 
elements that they believe have exacerbated recent conflicts in Africa (Arthur 
and Phillips, 2000; Baranovic, 2001; Bird, 2003a; Bush and Salterelli, 2000; 
Davies, 2003; Obura, 2003; Slater, 1995; Smith and Vaux, 2003). However, 
Obura's illumination of history teaching in Rwanda is of particular interest to 
this research and is discussed briefly below. 
The teaching of history and the manipulation of historical facts was a key 
factor in the Rwanda genocide according to Obura. She states: 
Rwandan nationals are pointing also to how the education 
system was used over several decades as an instrument for 
fomenting exclusion and hate (Obura, 2003: 98). 
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In her examination of the reconstruction of the Rwandan education system 
after the genocide, Obura indicates that dealing with the sensitivity of teaching 
history in an objective but meaningful way is proving to be a very difficult 
task as ' there have been no history textbooks written or published since 1994' 
(Obura, 2003: 99). She suggests that the historical myths that were perpetuated 
before, during and after the genocide have constructed an erroneous 
worldview of the dynamics of Rwandan society. These 'myths' as she explains 
them suggest that the three 'tribes' of Rwanda, i.e. the Bahutu, Batutsi and 
Batwa, were from different origins. The supposed ' indigenous' Batwa were 
dominated by the later arrivals in the mid to latter part of the last millennium 
by the Bahutu and then by the Batutsi who were regarded as coming from a 
more sophisticated and educated culture. Colonialists perpetuated these myths 
as part of their justification for placing Tutsis in positions of administrative 
power. Obura argues that this view of how the different tribes arrived in 
Rwanda is 'untenable' given recent Rwandan historical evidence, which 
suggests that the ' ancestors' of the three groups lived in Rwandan territory and 
the Great Lakes region for over two thousand years. 
Obura also points to the comments of Rwandan elders who have described 
their common heritage as descendants from a shared ancestor 'Gihanga' 
(Obura, 2003). This view of Rwandan history - as discussed above in Chapter 
2.6 - Pottier argues is the predominant view of the leaders of the current 
Rwandan government. They have chosen to ignore decades of historical 
evidence prior to the genocide, in preference to the expedient assertion that the 
colonists were primarily responsible for instituting the Twentieth Century 
ethnic divisions (pottier, 2002). 
Obura suggests that the view that created the Banyarwanda as separate ethnic 
groups is based on the misperceptions and misunderstandings of 
European explorers, missionaries and colonizers, which they 
created for themselves in an attempt to explain African cultural 
phenomena through their own world view (Obura, 2003: 101). 
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Rwandans were then in effect forced to take on the European perceptions of 
Rwandan society and to learn the European view of their own history in the 
classroom. An interesting parallel to this can be seen in Northern Ireland, 
where in the past, the education system reflected the divisions within the 
society. The history curriculum in Protestant schools for example, taught only 
the history of Great Britain. Schools it seemed 'attempted to exclude 
engagement with issues related to the divisions and conflict in wider society' 
(Arlow, 2004: 278). 
The manipulation of history and textbooks highlights just one of the factors 
indicating how formal educative processes can contribute to the exacerbation 
of conflict, where ' ... versions of "official history" are often integral to the 
roots of the conflict, thus making history a highly charged concept' (Tawil and 
Harley, 2004: 12). 
What few of the authors mentioned above have examined is the interface 
between formal and informal educative processes, in the prevention, 
mitigation and reconstruction of what Tawil and Harley have termed social 
cohesion, during conflict and post-conflict situations. The potentially 
transformative aspects of informal education are examined in the section 
below where informal educative processes are perceived as part of a life 
process. 
3.4 Informal Educative Processes 
Much of the literature suggests that informal educative processes - usually 
described in the literature as informal learning - is typically unstructured and 
does not lead to certification. Using the learner' s own experience (instead of 
externally imposed curricula) is how Livingstone describes the process of 
informal learning, which he suggests is 
... any activity involving the pursuit of understanding, 
knowledge or skill which occurs without the presence of 
externally imposed curricular criteria .. .in any context outside 
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the pre-established curricula of educative institutions 
(Livingstone, 2001: 4). 
Billett argues however that the term informal learning is misleading as all 
actions imply some from of learning. He suggests that most learning takes 
place outside educational institutions (Billett, 2001 in Colley, Hodkinson and 
Malcolm, 2002). 
In the Southern context, this assertion IS particularly valid, as in most 
traditional societies the knowledge and experience has been handed down 
through the generations. As Obanya suggests: 
... in traditional African societies, the venue for learning was 
the entire society ... Generally speaking, general education was 
given by parents, elders, and within age groups and castes. The 
"teacher" in this case would be anyone who was older than the 
"pupil" and so knew more about the world (Obanya, 1995: 4). 
Informal educative processes are part of life experiences and as a result face 
similar accusations laid at the door of formal education i.e. that they have the 
potential to breed violence. As Nelles argues, informal educative processes 
can equally be 
... complicit in, or directly responsible, for the reproduction or 
mitigation of violence, including specific formats or responses 
such as terrorism and war (Nelles, 2003: 239). 
He also points to educative mechanisms, which although within a formal 
learning environment, are informal in nature. He highlights the role of the 
'hidden curriculum', i.e. informal values that are part of educational 
institutions, which are often stronger in terms of inculcating attitudes and 
beliefs than the formal structures. He suggests that 
... the hidden curriculum concerns itself with school values, 
rituals, group loyalties, peer influences and friendship patterns 
(Nelles, 2003: 131). 
He also argues that these patterns from the basis 'on which society later builds 
a superstructure of political, demographic, recreational and social segregation' 
(Nelles, 2003: 131). The findings of this research reflect Nelles' arguments 
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regarding the strength of the hidden curriculum, where infonnal peer networks 
and organisational structures fonned within the school grounds were identified 
as significant learning conduits (in relation to conflict), sometimes more so 
than fonnal class teaching. 
Out of these infonnal educative processes, the social construction of reality 
and the development of infonnation societies are created. Critical social 
theorists such as Freire and Habennas perceive educative processes as part of 
the social construct of power. They suggest that these maintain the inequalities 
of relationships within society. In this way, the manipulation of knowledge 
through control of education by central power structures and elites also 
ensures the control of knowledge (Freire, 1970; Habennas, 1968). The control 
of knowledge if viewed on a global basis is certainly centred upon literate 
rather than oral cultures, where power structures are maintained by dictating 
whose knowledge counts and whose 'discourse' is the most powerful. The oral 
tradition in this context is frequently given less status and recognition than a 
literate tradition. The value placed on whose knowledge counts and the value 
placed on orality when compared to literacy is explored in more depth below. 
3.4.1 The oral tradition 
Much of the research literature acknowledges that literate societies, typically 
in the North, place greater emphasis on infonnation and knowledge that is 
received through the written fonn (Goody, 1987; Kimmerle, 1997; Mafu, 
2004; Ong, 1982). In the era of globalisation, oral cultures tend to be 
disempowered by the importance placed on infonnation that is derived from 
text. This is despite the fact that there is a strong oral tradition in the majority 
of African cultures, which often possesses greater significance than text. As 
the findings illustrated, the oral transmission of infonnation was particularly 
critical for the refugees in passing down stories relating to the perceived 
historical causes of the conflict. Oral transmissions were also refugees' main 
source of infonnation about the current situation in their countries of origin. 
Pottier similarly points to the importance of the oral tradition in developing 
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and maintaining dominant narratives; as the remembrance of things past and 
passed down is also critical in the accepted narratives of international aid 
organisations and journalists (Pottier, 2002). 
Vansina also indicates how oral tradition is part of the remembrance of things 
past, and therefore the source of history. He defines these as 'verbal messages 
which are reported statements from the past beyond the present 
generation .. . [which are] spoken, sung or called out on musical instruments 
only' (Vansina, 1985: 27). 
Learning in a traditional African culture is part of everyday life in an informal 
sense. Individuals, as part of a community, are continually learning through 
the environments they are placed in and the hardships they face. Traditionally 
the acquisition of wisdom was respected and young people looked to elders to 
assist their progress towards acquiring knowledge. Traditional knowledge was 
passed down through the generations though a culture of oral tradition. While 
in many countries these traditions are eroding, this educative relationship 
between the young and old has been given greater significance in the refugee 
camps of this study. It is typically women, children and the elderly who are 
first to flee from conflict, and elders on arrival in the camps are frequently left 
as caretakers of the young. Some of the historical prejudices passed on to 
children from their grandparents were visible in the paintings that children 
produced in a series of printmaking workshops conducted in the camps (cf: 
5.7.5 pp. 157-158). Some of these children had not been involved in the 
conflict, but had learnt about it from their elders and presented visual 
representations of conflict that they had never witnessed, but which were 
graphic in their violence. 
In contrast to some of these negative aspects of oral history passed down in the 
refugee camps, many authors writing on oral tradition focus on its positive 
elements as provider of entertainment through stories, myths and legends, and 
as a strong educative process that imparted moral, societal or tribal skills and 
values. This was often through the 'apprenticeship' of the younger generation 
to older members of the tribe or group (Mafu, 2004). The learning of skills 
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through clan associations was another significant mechanism for young people 
to learn skills from their elders. 
These skills would invariably be taught orally, and would bind members of the 
same clan together in strong kinship networks (Mafu, 2004). The traditions of 
clan culture were rarely written down. Mafu, describes certain clans who he 
said were 
... held to be endowed with supernatural powers and here too 
the transmission of the knowledge needed to exercise these 
powers was always by face-to-face communication. The secrets 
were not written down (Mafu, 2004: 54). 
The clan networks that Mafu describes, were also found in Burundi, and were 
mentioned by respondents as possible entries for peace. Some respondents 
argued that as clans spanned ethnic divides, thereby mixing ethnic groups, 
there was a possibility of utilising clan culture for peace building. One 
Burundian educator for example in an individual interview discussed the 
relationship of clans in Burundi many of which still exist, and some of which 
cross the ethnic boundaries: 
These are more clans than tribes and are not based on family or 
other lines, but more through common interest. For example 
there might be a clan of potters, or a clan of basket makers. 
These might not be from the same region, although there are 
some clans which do reside together. A lot of times the 
members of the clan don't know each other, but if they find out 
that they are from the same clan then there is an automatic 
bond/friendship. 
Another example of how ethnic barriers can be crossed was the example 
provided by the same educator of the 'joking tribe'. He describes how the 
... joking tribe while joking the other clan also has a 
responsibility to them as well which are taken very seriously. 
So for example if a person dies from one tribe and the joking 
tribe comes to the funeral, they will say to the coffin, 'get up 
you lazy man, what are you doing down there you're not dead' 
but at the same time they will be providing maybe money or 
food for the funeral feast or one person will have to help the 
family for the whole week. 
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Again most of these traditions would be passed down as part of the oral 
culture. For some societies, including that of Tanzania where Mafu's research 
is located, formal education and the development of a written language came 
into force during the colonial era. Mafu suggests: 
... formal education organised by Christian sects gradually 
replaced the indigenous traditions for educating and training 
young people. The missionaries, and later the state in the form 
of the colonial government, dislocated traditional education 
(Mafu, 2004: 56). 
This overriding of indigenous culture forced the oral tradition towards the 
written form, which rarely considered the preservation of the traditional 
practices and folklore, focusing instead on the moral and cultural values to be 
imparted through a largely Western education system (Mafu, 2004: 56). This 
not only affected the oral tradition but also the language in which that tradition 
was held. The introduction of formal education and the need for textbooks 
required a standardised language, thereby undermining the traditional 
languages of various tribes. 
In his article on written text in an African oral tradition, Kimmerle indicates 
this undermining of oral cultures is a hierarchical perspective that highlights 
the 'opposition of oral and literate' societies. He summarises Jacques 
Derrida's argument suggesting that the dominance of the literate culture is 
typically a recent Eurocentric phenomenon. Derrida points out that 
traditionally there was a preference for the oral over the literate dating back to 
the time of Plato, which has been largely ignored. In cultures where writing 
was traditionally only an aide memo ire, one would expect that 'orality' should 
be preferred over 'literacy' and that cultures with strong oral traditions should 
be preferred over literate societies. As Kimmerle indicates however, this is not 
the case and 
... paradoxically the valuation is vice versa. Mainly literate 
cultures are highly preferred above mainly oral ones 
(Kimmerle, 1997). 
In situations of conflict where there is little opportunity to engage in or 
develop a literate society - as access to printed texts is limited - orality and the 
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oral tradition is particularly significant. It not only provides a strong social 
function in cementing community networks, but also is sometimes the only 
mechanism by which some marginalised groups receive their information 
about the conflict. Local knowledge and local traditions are similarly highly 
valued. Elders have a particular status and role to play in traditional societies. 
Although in the refugee camp, they saw their status eroded because of the 
changes in administrative structures of the camp, there was still recognition 
that 'wise men' had the moral authority to judge others - even in the camps. 
For example in Burundi, 'abashingantahe' like the gacaca courts of Rwanda, 
is a long-standing common-law system of justice practised among Burundians. 
Under this system, jurors are trained to dispense justice to breakers of 
community laws and codes of acceptable conduct. The jurors are typically 
'wise men' who have been selected from the 'moral members' of the 
community as being particularly knowledgeable and fair minded. Their age 
and wisdom is valued. 
While the status of elders and of the oral tradition is still recognised in African 
cultures, many Southern countries are increasingly aware of the development 
discourse that is required in order to receive much needed funding and are 
very clear whose epistemology counts. The literature suggests that the rhetoric 
of development agencies encourages the use of indigenous knowledge through 
the promotion of partnership dialogue and 'ownership' of indigenous led 
projects (Kampe, 1997; Obanya, 1995; Pottier et aI, 2003; Robinson-Pant, 
2001; van der Velden, 2003). However, most countries or communities adapt 
and subsume their own knowledge in favour of what a particular development 
agency wants to hear (Robinson-Pant, 2001; Pottier et al, 2003). 
Similarly, Visvanathan suggests that it is rare that development agencIes 
consider the variety of different knowledges, the relative values of each and 
their link to livelihoods. He suggests there is a need to consider 'cognitive 
justice' where different knowledges exist on equal terms (Visvanathan, 2001). 
Only if all partners in the dialogue are equally recognised in terms of their 
contribution can true partnership be implemented. Vander Velden also 
questions whether the 'Development Gateway' (the World Bank led 
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knowledge repository for developing nations) really allows vanous 
knowledges to meet on an equal basis as its slogan insists (van der Velden, 
2003). Traditional knowledge for development is rarely given the same value 
that it possesses in its own culture. 
The limited value placed on indigenous knowledge is also reflected In 
education provision, which has traditionally failed to meet the needs of 
indigenous groups. The Education For All drive tends to strengthen 
standardisation, for a 'quick fix' education that fails to cater for the needs of 
minority groups, or recognise indigenous knowledge as education in its own 
right. As Kampe suggests, 
· .. indigenous education has been denigrated by outsiders for so 
long that the people themselves now rate it as insignificant 
(Kampe, 1997: 157). 
Such reductionism Kampe suggests has translated into a lack of 
acknowledgement of local knowledge or conditions in the formal school 
system. These he suggests 
· . .implicitly [promote] urban values, and by ignoring 
indigenous knowledge and skills also appears to dismiss the 
likelihood of an important contribution being made by 
indigenous leaders and others whose job it is to carry and pass 
on the accumulated traditions of the culture (Kampe, 1997: 
157). 
The disrespect surrounding information and knowledge that is not within the 
globally accepted norm highlights the polarity of values placed on different 
knowledges. Until people can take control and power over their own 
information, then the dialectic between 'knowledge, people and power' 
favours what van der Velden terms, 'a corporate framework of knowledge 
management' (van der Velden, 2002: 3). She contradicts the World Bank view 
that knowledge can be neutral by suggesting that 
· .. the new development paradigm is likely to be shaped by the 
institutions and experts positioned to exert the greatest 
influence and control. It is their knowledge and their 
understanding of the role of knowledge in development that 
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informs the new development discourse (van der Velden, 2002: 
3). 
Few development agencies go beyond the rhetoric of partnership and 
ownership to ensure that indigenous knowledge and traditions are fully 
recognised in the development discourse. The knowledge that is accepted as 
the most valid typically comes from those countries delivering development 
assistance not those receiving it. Despite their rhetoric, few development 
projects are truly accountable to their local counterparts. As mentioned above, 
the reality of the development discourse is dependent on whose knowledge 
counts. 
Although access to internet, radio and television in Southern countries may 
increase access to wider forms of knowledge than before, there are still issues 
of power and control over these media, particularly when related to 
development. As McGrath asks 'who constructs, defines and controls 
knowledge for development?' (McGrath, 2001: 5). Those societies which have 
less access to knowledge will be increasingly marginalised and unable to take 
up their own position in the knowledge development race. Their inputs will be 
defined by those who have greater power and control over the media that 
controls knowledge for development. This is particularly so for countries 
engaged in conflict as they have less access to media that is independent of 
state control or manipulation. 
Van Der Welden also recognises the importance of capacity in the knowledge 
development process by suggesting that 
How people will actually use information, integrate it in their 
knowledge, is more a function of people's capacities, 
opportunities, education, experiences, senses, values and 
intuition, than of the information that reaches them. The 
availability of information or knowledge alone does not change 
behaviour (van der Velden, 2003: 8). 
In order that knowledge creation for development can truly work, she argues 
that it must be 'generative', taking account of people's contexts, culture and 
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diversities when exarnmmg their existing knowledge capacities (van der 
Velden, 2003: 8). 
Much of the literature surrounding the knowledge for development discourse 
focuses on knowledge economies, knowledge societies, and knowledge 
management. Without 'knowledge' nations cannot 'develop'. Once again, this 
view ignores the historical and traditional cultures of societies where countries 
are seen to be 'developing' because they have yet to reach the required norm 
of what a 'developed' society looks like. Therefore 'developing' nations must 
acquire more knowledge - the 'correct knowledge' in order to develop. 
Sarnoff and Stromquist challenge this assumption that transition towards a 
knowledge economy will reduce the disparities between rich and poor nations, 
suggesting instead that 
There is no reason to think that a transition to a knowledge 
economy will necessarily be better for poor people or poor 
countries than whatever preceded it. Indeed, those who are 
currently powerful and influential will be best placed to 
manipulate the new setting and new rules to their advantage 
(Sarnoff and Stromquist, 2001: 632). 
This manipulation and control of information, and therefore knowledge, as 
outlined in the arguments above, not only applies to rich and powerful nations, 
but also within the countries under study. The powerful and influential people 
are the gatekeepers of essential pieces of information. This is reflected in the 
findings from this research on 'structural levels' in Chapter Eight where 
respondents clearly identified different levels of society in terms of their 
access to, and utilisation of, information and therefore knowledge. The 
marginalised of society, the lowest level according the respondents' own 
definitions of 'structural levels', were perceived to have little or no access to 
information and therefore knowledge and power. They knew that the 
knowledge of people they described as 'outside the circle' did not count. 
For locally adapted knowledge strategies to be effective it is also necessary to 
recognise the mechanisms for passing on information and knowledge in 
traditional societies and provide opportunities for new knowledge to be 
transmitted by traditional means. The traditional culture of learning in African 
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societies was through infonnation and knowledge passed down from 
generation to generation through an oral tradition. Specialised knowledge 
residing in libraries, museums or laboratories was restricted to few educated 
individuals and the knowledge and skills required to access this knowledge 
'was a long and arduous' process (Obanya, 1995: 5). The challenge is for 
development agencies to ensure their strategies that claim to respect local 
knowledge, also respect and utilise traditional mechanisms for transmitting 
that knowledge. 
When infonnation and knowledge is received and transmitted through 
traditional mechanisms, it implies utilisation of a primarily oral culture. This 
includes the mechanisms by which individuals and communities communicate 
on a daily basis through gossip and 'street talk'. However, there is limited 
literature available regarding the influence of gossip and rumour, which as 
indicated below is highly influential both socially and psychologically. 
3.4.2 The power of gossip and rumour 
In all societies, gossip and rumour are part of everyday existence that define 
our reality and the constructs of the world around us. We extract meaning and 
learn through the practice of believing or disbelieving, trusting or not trusting 
the infonnation that is given to us, whether it is in written fonn, or through 
gossip and rumour. As indicated above, the power of the oral tradition is 
significant in African societies, and gossip and rumour in the African oral 
tradition - as with any other society - has a powerful role to play, 
psychologically, socially and culturally. 
Despite the obvious role that gossip possesses within every culture there is 
limited literature available that focuses on the discourse of gossip. This is 
particularly the case for research that focuses on gossip in African cultures. 
Wickham in his analysis of gossip among the medieaval peasantry argues that 
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There are almost no cultural or historical analyses of actual 
gossiping sequences or practices, even in the present day. (A 
new, systematic, analysis of such sequences is spoilt by its 
amazing assumption that gossip is always regarded as 'morally 
contaminated') (Wickham, 1998: 3). 
Wickham further suggests that one of the reasons for this might be because the 
disciplines 
... most capable of generating an adequate gossip theory, oral 
history and cultural studies, have suffered so much from having 
the stigma of being about 'mere' gossip thrown at them that 
they have for the most part worked fairly hard to avoid overt 
links with studying gossip at all (Wickham, 1998: 3). 
Gossip is typically imbued with certain malign influences that ignore its 
potential for social bonding that result from gossiping within and between 
social networks. It is seen as undermining, 'as going behind one's back', as 
creating tensions, accusations and a culture of fear. However, a small body of 
literature counteracts this popular perception of gossip. It emphasises the more 
positive aspects of gossip i.e. that it helps to establish working and social 
relationships and cement social ties (Levin and Arluke, 1987; Rosnow and 
Fine, 1976; Wickham, 1998). This cementing of social ties is particularly 
important in African cultures where there has been a long tradition of gossip as 
part of the fabric of daily life, whether through families gathering at the water 
points, elders sitting under the mango tree or families chatting after church. 
All are places where gossip is a natural and important function of finding out 
new information or confirming existing anecdotes. It is not considered as idle 
or malign, just normal. 
Some of the literature indicates that gossip is part of the social construction of 
reality for most socio-identity groups. Wickham for example asserts that 
cultural identity and group identity is defined by 'talking'. He suggests that the 
way gossip defines group identity is of interest to historians, because: 
Groups construct themselves by talking. Some of this talking is 
about shared memories, what I have elsewhere called social 
memory: the socially relevant past, which legitimates or gives 
meaning to the present for the group which commemorates it 
(Wickham, 1998: 3). 
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The social interaction and construction between individuals and groups which 
define gossip is by its nature paradoxical. As Field highlights there is potential 
for 'rejection' or 'affirmation' depending on the type of social interaction that 
contextualises the gossip. He suggests: 
Gossip defies rigid and closed scientific truths and therefore 
requires open-ended conclusions that affirm its elusive and 
paradoxical characteristics ... The manner in which gossip acts 
as both mechanism for rejection and affirmation, exclusion and 
inclusion, is not given sufficient acknowledgment. Social 
boundaries are as paradoxical and equivocal as the social 
activities that happen behind and through them (Field, 1996). 
The definition of identity through social interaction, a large part of which 
centres on gossip was reflected clearly in the research findings. Many of the 
respondents said that they had discovered their ethnic identity not only from 
their parents - as one might have expected - but also from neighbours 
'gossiping' about them, or people talking about them or to them in the street. 
In this way, gossip acted as either, social cement within an ethnic group, or as 
a mechanism by the opposing group to warn others to steer clear of the 
'enemy'. Vans ina suggested this was 'a traditional technique for discouraging 
the enemy and for rallying faithful followers, which consists of spreading false 
rumour for this purpose' (Vansina 1961: 118, in Malkki, 1995: 307). 
Rosnow and Fine also indicate the importance of talk, of gossip, as a 
mechanism for social inclusion, for forming and maintaining social networks. 
They suggest that there is something 'wrong' in life if people are not talking 
about other people. It is a sign of social alienation (Rosnow and Fine, 1976). 
Similarly, Wickham argues: 
What people gossip about, what stories they tell, will also tell 
you how their group socially constructs the world outside as 
meaningful, and about how it understands the processes of 
practical behaviour, 'habitus', as Pierre Bourdieu calls them, 
which structure the way everyone deals strategically with that 
world (Wickham, 1998: 3). 
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The daily process of gossip is becoming increasingly supported by technology 
and is explored in more detail in section 3.4.4 which outlines how in most 
modem cultures (and now in the refugee camps), technological advances have 
moved the culture of gossip away from the street comer to the mobile phone 
and internet chat room. In her summary of research into the role of mobile 
phone gossip, Kate Fox likens gossip to 'social grooming' among primates, a 
form of social bonding that builds alliances and networks. Mobile phones have 
facilitated the process of gossip in the fast-paced modem world of technology 
as demonstrated in the case of Paul Cooper a young British man beaten to 
death because of local gossip that had branded him as a paedophile. He was 
totally innocent (The Independent, 2005). The gossip fed on the community's 
'fears of crime' which also is a feature of rumour as described below. 
Rumour is sometimes perceived as different from gOSSIp, as rumour IS 
believed to have an underlying motive attached, which is not typically benign. 
Rumours tend to deal with people's anxieties; and are frequently a reflection 
of societal hopes and fears. Rosnow and Fine separate these kinds of rumours 
into two distinct categories, those that we wish are true and others that we 
dread and 'pray are false'. (Rosnow and Fine, 1976). The example that Ssereo 
provides of Somalis (which until the early 1980s was an oral culture), 
highlights the anxiety factor embedded in rumour ' in maintaining tribal 
allegiances, creating fear and intimidation' (Ssereo, 2003: 32). State security 
officers were not required to produce written reports, only daily oral 
submissions. Arrests were made without written warrants. The judicial system 
therefore was based on unsubstantiated oral communications, which could 
often be little more than rumour or gossip. Ssereo points to the fact that: 
The private and state information service also relied upon 
rumours and hearsay for their information. The source of oral 
information was neither investigated nor confirmed (Ssereo, 
2003: 33). 
The fact that rumour plays so successfully on people's fears and anxieties, is 
the reason why rumour is often treated with suspicion, and its success is 
particularly dependent on who is spreading it. Consequently those rumours 
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that come from within one's own trusted network are more likely to be 
believed and more likely to be transmitted to others. The findings in the 
research confirmed that rumours from trustworthy sources - typically from 
'own group networks' - were believed more readily than 'fact' from sources 
considered doubtful. Trust plays an important role in the successful spreading 
of rumour. In this way, rumour shares similarities with gossip in terms of its 
tendency to spread information within rather than across social groups. 
Rumour spreads most rapidly along pre-existing networks rather than among 
persons of unequal social status. As Colletta and Cullen suggest: 
These civic networks foster norms of reciprocity that reinforce 
sentiments of trust within a society and improve the 
effectiveness of communications and social organization. Trust, 
improved communications, and the flow of information 
enhance the efficiency of institutions (Colletta and Cullen, 
2000: 7-10). 
This relationship of trust as the cementing factor between social networks, and 
the 'glue' that binds collective identities is explored in more depth in Chapters 
Nine and Ten. 
In their classic book on the Psychology of Rumour, Allport and Postman 
created a formula to try to deal with the spread of rumour and how to 
counteract it. Their definition of rumour is pertinent to this research: 
A rumor, as we shall use the term, is a specific (or topical) 
proposition for belief, passed along from person to person, 
usually by word of mouth, without secure standards of evidence 
being present. The implication in any rumor is always that some 
truth is being communicated. This implication holds even though 
the teller prefaces his tidbit with the warning, 'it is only a rumor, 
but I heard .. .' (Allport and Postman, 1947: 15). 
Allport and Postman's formula tried to establish how a rumour could be 
scotched by providing what they term ' secure standards of evidence' . They 
suggest that a rumour can only exist where there are no secure standards of 
evidence available. As soon as something is verifiable and facts established 
the rumour dies as a rumour and is recreated as either fact or fiction. 
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Most critically for this research, it is the element of truth and trust that are the 
essential ingredients for a rumour to be taken seriously. Vansina similarly 
recognises the need for truth in the distinction between narratives that 
... belong to two different classes according to the criterion of 
factuality. Factual traditions or accounts are transmitted 
differently - than are fictional narratives such as tales, proverbs 
or sayings. The criterion hangs on the notion of 
truth ... (Vansina, 1985: 13). 
The respondents in the research consistently stated the desire and need for 
truth. For rumour - as well as other information - to be believed, truth was a 
necessary element. Truth was also related to trust and trustworthy sources. The 
importance of trust is a significant element in the' life' of a rumour. The recent 
examples over the build up and execution of the Iraq war from 2002-2004 
have highlighted this graphically. The British government provided a great 
deal of 'evidence' about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq as their central 
argument for going to war, but the population were still not convinced of the 
veracity of much of the information. Their suspicion over the truth of the 
'evidence' was illustrated by mass anti-war demonstrations in 2002 and 2003; 
suspicion since proven to be justified. 
3.4.3 Belief systems: propaganda, 'magic' and the use of the media 
Thomas (1971) suggests that once initial belief systems are accepted, nothing 
will shake them, but this has not stopped propagandists and others from 
attempting to influence and alter popular belief systems. Their techniques aim 
to make enemies acceptable targets, to justify war, to demonise the enemy in 
order to make it palatable to kill them as an inevitable consequence of the 
intended war. Propaganda was powerfully evident in activities such as the 
'mass motivation' of peoples e.g. Christianity, Islam, as well as figures such as 
Cromwell, Mussolini or Hitler. 
The level of mass motivation and co-operation, Thomson asserts, is 
determined by the capacity of leaders to effectively utilise and control 
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different fonns of media (Thomson, 1999: 6). Control of media by either 
manipulation of business and commercial interest or through state run media 
houses, ensures that leaders are able to guarantee the nature and timing of the 
infonnation and propaganda that is broadcast. 
Although media is no doubt a powerful mechanism for transmitting important 
propagandist infonnation, Ellul suggests that there is a level of consent 
achieved between the propagandist and the propagandee which reflects the 
reciprocal needs of both. He states: 
There is not just a wicked propagandist at work who sets up 
means to ensnare the innocent citizen. Rather there is a citizen 
who craves propaganda from the bottom of his being and a 
propagandist who responds to this craving ... propaganda is not 
just a deliberate and more or less arbitrary creation by some 
people in power. . .it is a strictly sociological phenomenon, in 
the sense that it has roots and reasons in the need of the group 
that will sustain it (Ellul, 1966: 121). 
Propaganda in this way works - as rumour also does - on people's existing 
beliefs and fears to build a fonn of consensual legality which legitimises what 
the propagandists want to promote. The fear factor was used to such effect by 
the propagandists in Rwanda through the notorious Radio Milles Collines. As 
Mamdani highlights: 
For Hutu Power propagandists, the Tutsi question was not one 
of rights, but of power ... that the real aim of the RPF was not 
rights for all Rwandans, but power for the Tutsi. This is why 
one needs to recognize that it was not greed-not even hatred-but 
fear which was the reason why the multitude responded to the 
call of Hutu Power the closer the war came to home (Mamdani, 
2001: 191). 
Propagandists therefore in this instance were manipulating the existing Hutu 
psyche and working upon it to build up the fear of Tutsi repression as 
palpable, closer and more dangerous. As Ellul asserts, propaganda does not 
come out of nothing, it has to 
... attach itself to a feeling, an idea; it must build on a 
foundation already present in the individual (Ellul, 1966: 36). 
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Thus for propaganda to be successful it must touch the individual's sense of 
self-affirmation and identification with the propagandist. Typically nowadays, 
this is through means of mass communication such as radio, television and 
internet. It is for this reason that Ellul suggests propaganda rarely succeeds 
with organised groups, because the values of the group overrides the 
individual. For mass propaganda to work it needs to appeal to the individual 
sentiment or need. While propaganda within a group can be highly successful, 
Ellul identifies this as a different issue, which is more akin to political or 
religious indoctrination (Ellul, 1996). 
Such group identification is often a factor in strongly held belief systems such 
as Communism or Christianity, which are very rarely changed by 
'psychological manipulations.' Ellul argues that for example 
... a Communist or a Christian with strong beliefs is very little, 
if at all, shaken by adverse propaganda. Similarly, a prejudice 
or a stereotype is hardly ever changed by propaganda; for 
example it is almost impossible to break down racial prejudice 
by propaganda (Ellul, 1996: 33). 
One of the outcomes of this research is hopefully to uncover more effective 
mechanisms to shake entrenched values and prejudices. To do this one has to 
understand some of the cultural contexts and belief systems in which the 
research is embedded. For example 'magic' and 'witchcraft' stories hold 
particular significance for the respondents in this research. 
The belief in myth or 'magic' is classed as knowledge that is not based on 
known fact or truth, but which arises from a human belief that problems of the 
natural world can be overcome through supernatural means. This power of 
myth and 'magic' should not be underestimated particularly in explaining the 
willingness of certain groups to go to war. As seen above, propagandists and 
state leaders are well aware of this power of myth and use it effectively to 
support their cause. As Taylor asserts: 
Propaganda is about persuading people to do things which 
benefit those doing the persuading, either directly or indirectly. 
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In wartime that usually means getting them to fight or support 
the fight (Taylor, 1995: 6). 
As explored in Chapter Eight leaders in the DRC conflict also used the power 
of myth and 'magic' to their advantage in persuading their people to fight. 
This included the notorious Mai-Mai soldiers, a nationalist military reserve 
created to face rebellions and occupations by foreign armies too widespread 
and numerous for the army-proper to handle. 'Mai-Mai' literally means water 
- magic water, which, when applied, is said to protect a soldier from bullets. 
The soldiers were convinced not only by the 'magic' but also by their leaders 
that they would be invincible in battle, regardless of any physical evidence to 
the contrary. Similar stories are recounted by Bergner in his account of people 
affected by the civil war in Sierra Leone. He describes his introduction to the 
'power' of the hunting society priests . 
. . .I had been invited, one afternoon, to a display of power by a 
hunting society priest ... Artillery could not strike him, could not 
even fire in his direction, because of his whisk. The rounds 
would fly back towards the one who had shot them. Sometimes, 
he explained, he fought naked except for a headpiece (Bergner, 
2003: 57). 
Similar stories were relayed to me of the 'power' of the Traditional Kings' 
from DRC and their ability to 'transport themselves' to avoid bullets, or to use 
the 'magic water' to deflect them. 
The importance of 'magic' was recognised by Malinowski in his research with 
the Trobriand Islanders in the 1930s and 1940s. He asserted that 'magic' 
served to fill the void of the unknown, to reduce anxiety, particularly for those 
with low technological development. He claimed that 'magic' is to be found 
where there is a 'gap' in knowledge or understanding of the world, when 
undertaking an activity over which one has no control (Malinowski, 1948). 
Therefore, in order to reduce anxiety and sometimes abdicate responsibility for 
the outcome, one invokes 'magic'. Similar invocations of 'magic' of a 
different kind are to be found in modern Northern countries where the almost 
'magical' belief in the power of medicine and science suffers from a similar 
gap in understanding and knowledge. Although this gap is being narrowed by 
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the increasing amount of information on the internet, there is still a belief 
system that encourages patients to accept that the 'doctor is always right'. 
Belief systems including those that involve 'magical' elements are also 
buoyed up by myth, traditional story telling and name-calling. Thomson calls 
these 'tricks of the trade', which are frequently used by propagandists and the 
media to demonise or ridicule powerful figures in society. The chant of 'Hey, 
Hey, LBJ, how many kids have you killed today?' was familiar during anti-
Vietnam war demonstrations in the US and almost every nation has similar 
examples of name-calling and ritualised ridiculing of hate figures (Thomson, 
1999). In Rwanda, there was a reduction of Tutsis to insects and 'cockroaches' 
through name calling and propaganda, which distanced the perpetrators from 
their crime. They were expunging a pest and the radio reinforced this with a 
constant barrage of comments that cast Tutsis as inhuman and therefore easier 
to kill. 
The power of the media in this context of belief manufacture is significant as 
is the increasing role of the media in determining public thought and reaction. 
For example, the horror of the pictures of starving babies during the Ethiopian 
famine of 1984 produced an unprecedented outpouring of goodwill and funds 
across the world with Band Aid and then Live Aid. This was entirely because 
of television coverage. However as Taylor suggests while some politicians 
respond to media and television, this is not always the case. Often they only 
respond when the consequences affect their political position. The Rwandan 
genocide is a case in point. As Taylor points out, despite the horrific pictures 
... from Rwanda beginning in April and May 1994, including 
scores of bodies floating down rivers and the hacking to death 
of a woman, for twelve weeks 'of terrifying tribal genocide the 
Clinton administration and other western 
governments ... actively resisted the flow of horrific pictures 
that documented the mass slaughter' (Gowing). Nor was 
anything done about the particularly evil Radio Mille Collines 
in Rwanda which called for massacres of the Tutsis (Taylor, 
1995: 301). 
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Therefore, while propaganda through the media may often make a difference 
to public opinion, it does not always affect political opinion. The role of the 
media as an informal educative process is explored in more depth below. 
3.4.4 New technologies: the roles of different mediafor informal learning 
The role of the media both as weapons of war and as sources of information 
has long been recognised within various conflict situations. Radio has been 
used for decades as a mechanism for learning, for transmitting knowledge in 
many forms for both good and ill. The field research carried out for this thesis 
confirms this. Radio was significant not only in the genocide in Rwanda, but 
also in terms of Burundian and Congolese refugees learning about the current 
conflicts and the status of peace negotiations in their countries. Despite the 
increased use of internet and other media, radio is still a powerful medium 
through which people involved in this research access information. 
A wide body of literature exists that has already documented the role of Radio 
Milles Collines in Rwanda, and it is unnecessary to reiterate it in full here. 
This radio station was used by Hutu extremists to foment a culture of fear and 
hatred within the Hutu population against the Tutsi minority (Berkeley, 2001; 
Gourevitch, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Obura, 2003). It was this 
fear that Mamdani believes was one of the most powerful factors in allowing 
the Hutu extremists to prevail. It was not only about greed or the promise of 
more land, but also the fear promoted by extremists that if Hutus did not kill 
their Tutsi neighbours, 'the alternative would be to let the RPF take their land 
and return it to the Tutsi who had been expropriated after 1959' (Mamdani, 
2001: 191). This is not to suggest that the genocide would not have taken place 
if Radio Milles Collines had not existed, but that it made the job of the 
extremists easier to promote the culture of fear that was an important feature in 
the build up to the genocide. This culture of fear was enhanced by the rumours 
circulating about various plots by Tutsis to take over Hutu lands and to 
exterminate Hutu intellectuals. These rumours are referred to later in the thesis 
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and highlight the perception by many of the respondents of an ongoing Tutsi 
conspiracy to take overall control of the Great Lakes region. 
As a force for 'good', education, radio, television and more recently internet 
have been used as part of the expansion in distance learning. These media 
offer opportunities for learners to engage in a style of flexible learning that is 
more reflective of their needs and conditions than traditional formal education. 
Increasingly, development organisations recognise the potential of this form of 
learning and are investing funds in Southern countries to establish distance 
education and online networks. The research findings also highlight the 
importance of radio at the forefront of information acquisition. Refugee 
respondents almost universally cited radio as being one of the most important 
mechanisms for finding out trustworthy information. They depended on a 
certain number of reliable stations, particularly foreign stations for accurate 
and truthful information, which they then compared with other sources. 
A similar example of the need for verification from different media sources 
was related to me by an aid worker who had worked in Somalia in the 1980s: 
In Somalia, during Said Barre's era [1969-1991] the locals would 
get together in tea-shops every day at four o'clock to listen to the 
BBC Somali service. They discussed the general news items, but 
in the case of important news the listeners waited until the next 
morning to find out the reaction of the official government-
controlled radio. 'If the government strongly denies the item 
broadcast on the BBC then we know it must be true!' they said. 
'Items not denied are only rumours, so we do not believe them' . 
While print and radio based distance-learning has been in the forefront of new 
technology for learning in many Southern countries, the use of the internet 
particularly in situations of conflict has not been fully explored. Learners can 
get accurate and varied information, which can counteract the often biased 
national media coverage of the conflict. UNESCO have supported this 
viewpoint in their study on education in situations of emergency and crisis 
when they suggest that education for crisis-affected and post-conflict regions 
should be included in new international initiatives using electronic and 
satellite communication technologies (UNESCO, 2000). 
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An innovative project conducted in Camp M, a Burundi refugee camp in 
Tanzania, highlights the possibilities for populations affected by conflict to 
expand into the world of new technologies. Linking with the local Tanzanian 
community, Burundi and Congolese refugees access solar-powered computers 
and internet, allowing them to communicate with their fellow compatriots in 
Burundi and DRC. 
The use of mobile phones in these camps has also exploded exponentially, and 
after a feedback mission to the camps in March 2005, information 
transmission regarding the situation in Burundi and DRC was largely through 
mobile phones. Mobile phones have dramatically changed the nature of 
communication and the ability of families to be connected. As mentioned in 
3.4.2 above, this has also affected the role of mobile phone use in relation to 
gossip. In a study commissioned by BT Cellnet on the role of mobile phones 
and gossip, the researcher for the Social Issues Research Centre (SIRC), Kate 
Fox, investigated some of the ways in which mobile phones have replaced 
traditional mechanisms of gossiping. Fox suggests that: 
Mobile gossip restores our sense of connection and community, 
and provides an antidote to the pressures and alienation of 
modern life. Mobiles are a 'social lifeline' in a fragmented and 
isolating world (Fox, 2003). 
For refugees, mobile phones are less a means to gOSSIp, than literally a 
'lifeline'; determining the safety of their home countries and their decisions to 
return. However, despite the rapid explosion in technology and the desire of 
the popUlations of the South to access and be part of the technological 
revolution many development agencies are still reluctant to invest in the 
expansion of technology in Southern countries. This is despite recent examples 
such as India, which has demonstrated how technological transformation can 
convert a country formerly dependent on aid, into the status of business 
partner. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Fonnal education is now widely regarded as a 'right' and a force for positive 
change. A number of conventions, which promote the right of all children to a 
basic, quality education, support this. In conflict situations, schools are 
perceived by many emergency educators as places of 'safe haven' for children. 
However, many educators point to the apparent paradox of education as 
exemplified in its positive and negative aspects - its 'two faces'. The positive 
face of quality education can offer cumulative benefits for children in helping 
them understand the context of violence and provide coping strategies. 
Alternatively, the negative aspects of a poor, unequal education can preserve 
and increase difference, strengthen social injustices and manipulate the past 
and present through the biased teaching of history. 
Infonnal educative processes also have either the potential to act as malign or 
benign contributions to a life experience. Infonnal educative processes - by 
which we mean learning experiences outside of a fonnal institutional base -
fonn the largest part of a person's socialisation process through a variety of 
different mechanisms. The infonnal learning mechanisms identified in the 
literature review infonned the process of data collection and fonn the basis of 
the analysis of findings on infonnal educative processes in Chapter Seven. The 
most important of these mechanisms in the African context appear to be: 
a) oral tradition which is particularly strong in African culture, but receives 
limited recognition as a valuable contribution to knowledge acquisition. 
This is detennined by the way traditional knowledge is viewed within the 
development discourse. The control of both infonnal and fonnal 
mechanisms through often politically or socially biased media is part of the 
social construction of reality. 
b) gossip and rumour which are part of the oral tradition and are likewise 
largely ignored in the literature. There has been little recognition of the 
value of gossip as a societal bonding mechanism, which can define social 
networks at a local level through talk. 
c) new technologies for informal learning in particular radio, which has a 
powerful impact on societies in Africa; for example, the role of the 
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infamous Radio Milles Collines in the Rwandan genocide is well known. 
Similarly, internet and mobile phone use, which are becoming increasingly 
important components of African society and are likely to revolutionise 
information transmission. 
Learning therefore is seen to be multi-faceted and complex. This chapter has 
highlighted the sometimes conflicting sources of information that help - or 
hinder - people trying to make sense of the conflict in which they are 
embroiled. The types of educative processes people undergo and information 
they receive, influences the way their identities are eventually constructed, and 
this issue is examined in more depth in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ISSUES OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND 
SHIFTS 
4.1 Introduction 
By the very nature of the language we speak, we are defined, or define 
ourselves - the terms I, me or us define our personhood. However, post-
modernists might add that identity is in constant flux, changing according to 
circumstance, time and place. A name can be changed and an identity with it. 
This chapter highlights some of these key issues surrounding identity. Identity 
was a critical issue within the context of this research in terms of the conflicts 
between identity groups in Rwanda, DRC and Burundi. The warring factions 
identify and assert themselves because of a particular identity, that of a Hutu 
or Tutsi, or as a Banyamulenge or Congolese national. These claims to identity 
are based on a number of factors that are explored in this chapter in terms of 
the construction of identity, both individual and collective. It also explores the 
shifting of identity and how in situations of conflict, identities may be shifted 
through coercion or indoctrination. It investigates the relationship between 
identity and conflict in terms of how the acquisition, shifting and shedding of 
identities can affect peoples' perceptions of conflict and their engagement in 
it. 
4.2 Identity Construction 
A number of authors have struggled with the construction and acquisition of 
identity and all that is implied within 'the contextuality of social life and social 
institutions' (Giddens, 1984: 132). Giddens for example places the identity 
construction within the development of social structures, as part of a social 
identity that is constructed through the repetition of social action and inclusion 
of these actions as part of everyday social life and activities. This he suggests 
not only forms the basis for social identity but also for the larger structural 
systems of society. Giddens' 'structuration' theory provides a mechanism for 
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explaining social identity and the potential for social change, which is bound 
within the constraints of social action. These are in turn determined within the 
confines of 'time and space '. 
Similarly Rutherford places the acquisition of identity within a structural 
framework, where identity 
... marks the conjecture of our past with the social, cultural and 
economic relations we live within ... Making our identities can 
only be understood within the context of this articulation, in the 
intersection of our everyday lives with the economic and 
political relations of subordination and domination. There is no 
final deciding logic that masters and determines this complex 
structuring of identity (Rutherford, 1990: 19-20). 
The acquiring of an identity through social structuration is a consistent theme, 
and many authors explore the social context of identity. Within the research, 
the narratives of the respondents (highlighted in Chapters Six to Nine) indicate 
how their own social context and social structures have affected the 
construction of their identities largely through informal educative processes. 
In a similar way, Castells also suggests that identities are formed through 
social 'construction of meaning' and utilises Giddens' argument that these are 
'rooted' in a time and space dimension: 
... individuals, social groups, and SOCIetIes process all these 
materials, and rearrange their meaning, according to social 
determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their 
social structure, and in their space/time framework (Castells, 
1997: 7). 
While acknowledging that identities are formed through cultural and social 
processes, Castells distinguishes between 'roles' or 'role sets' and identity or 
plurality of identities. Roles, such as mother, churchgoer, smoker, etc, he 
suggests are not determinants of identities but roles that can be assumed or 
discarded at will. One may therefore playa number of roles at anyone time. 
Identities he suggests are 
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... sources of meaning for the actors themselves, and by 
themselves, constructed through a process of individuation ... In 
simple terms, identities organize the meaning while roles 
organize the functions (Castells, 1997: 7). 
Many authors link social/cultural identity with individual identity. Larrain for 
example perceives the two aspects of cultural identity and individual identity 
as closely related: 
The issue of cultural identity is closely related to the issue of 
personal identity in two senses. On the one hand culture is 
assumed to be one of the main determinants of personal 
identity. But on the other hand culture usually entails such a 
great variety of ways of life, such a rich diversity of social 
relations that one can speak of its continuity, unity and self-
awareness only by analogy with personal identity (Larrain, 
1994: 143). 
Cultural identity is particularly important in relation to the respondents of the 
research, perhaps more so than individual identity. The historical and cultural 
heritage passed down through the generations was extremely powerful, and 
certainly within their countries of origin formed the basis for much of the 
identity construction of the younger generations. The identity shifting that took 
place because of the respondents' lives of exile is explored in more depth in 
4.3 below. 
In contrast to the view that individual identity is determined by one's cultural 
heritage, Joseph distinguishes himself from other authors who he says 
... have explicitly or implicitly, viewed changing forms of 
subjectivity or identity as consequences of wider social and 
cultural transformations - modernity, late modernity, the risk 
society (Bauman, 1991; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Lash and 
Friedman, 1992) (Joseph, 2004: 130). 
Instead, he locates identity within a context of 'personhood' where identity is 
only one of the characteristics of 'personhood' that have been built up through 
genealogy and history. These he calls 
the diversity of languages of 'personhood' that have taken 
shape - character, personality, identity, reputation, honour, 
118 
cItizen, individual, normal, lunatic. Patient, client, husband, 
mother, daughter . .. - and the norms, techniques and relations of 
authority within which these have circulated in legal, domestic, 
industrial and other practices for acting upon the conduct of 
persons (Joseph, 2004: 131). 
One might argue that these characteristics of 'personhood' are the same 
manifestations of roles and identities presented by other authors. His argument 
differs slightly as his definition of construction of the characteristics of 
personhood suggests that language forms the basis for the different 
representations of identity. He argues that: 'an identity exists by virtue of the 
assertions of it people make' (Joseph 2004: 20). Therefore, an identity cannot 
exist if there is no language in which to describe, make sense of, or 
communicate it. As seen in the previous chapter, language in different forms 
can also define how a person is perceived and perceives himlherself. The 
'naming' of Tutsis by Hutu Power as 'snakes' or 'cockroaches' served not 
only to dehumanise the 'enemy', but was also a means of undermining the 
individual and collective identities of Tutsis as powerful people. 
A classification of identity acquisition that differs somewhat from those above 
is that of Jonathan Friedman, who identified three 'variants of the structure of 
civilised identity' in traditional, modern and post-modern structures. These are 
summarised in brief below. 
Friedman claims that traditional structures of identity are based on concrete 
social categories 'such as blood, age, sex etc'. Direct interpersonal relations 
characterise the formation of individual identity, which is dependent on the 
wider social group for its moral authority. In contrast, civilisation is perceived 
as an abstraction and the dissolution of primordial ties, which in turn presents 
a rationalised identity construction. 
Modern structures of identity he suggests are characterised by rationality as 
the dominant principle. Culture is perceived in terms of a bourgeois culture 
based on the code of individual liberty and the capacity for self-realization. 
Meaning lies in movement (as in progress) itself, the future of liberated self-
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fulfilment equated with the values of fairness, basic equality and democracy 
and the goal of self-fulfilment through development. Modernity is considered 
as the cultivation of the new, the sophisticated and the capacity to change. In 
contrast, traditionalism is seen as barbaric, inflexible and lacking in freedom 
for the individual (Friedman, 1994). 
Post-modern identity structure is based on a bourgeois culture of the 
individual in contrast to both traditional and modernist identity structures. This 
exists in independent spheres of social and cultural activity based on status and 
etiquette of impersonal relations. Individual boundaries within this context are 
blurred, and there is an absence of control and total freedom of expression. It 
becomes an identity free for all (Freidman, 1994). 
Friedman summarises by stating: 
Both traditionalist and post-modernist structures of identity are 
opposed to the modernist position, the classical definition of 
civilised identity. The abstract, the state and self-control are 
here resolved into the rational and progressive. Authentic 
culture tends to be seen as blockage and superstition, and is 
lumped together with the natural, irrational, savage and 
juvenile, also relegated to the spatial and temporal periphery of 
civilised identity (Friedman, 1994: 82). 
Although Friedman recognises an intermediary structure in terms of the level 
of technological engagement with the techno-economic world, he fails to 
consider the potential for ongoing transformation of identity within these 
structures. He underestimates the intermediary structure of identity that can be 
'authentic' in nature, but has leaped into the technological age, thereby 
transforming an identity into a modem and even post-modem world, but 
within a traditionalist framework. The identity formation for example in the 
case of the refugees in the research is based on traditional mechanisms, but a 
number of factors have transformed these: becoming a refugee; access to 
different thinking through national and international NGOs; provision of 
education at different levels; access to the internet and use of mobile phones. 
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These have radically altered the way individual and collective identities have 
formed because of conflict and its consequences. 
Friedman does however acknowledge the shifting nature of identity when he 
argues: 
The constitution of identity is an elaborate and deadly serious 
game of mirrors. It is a complex temporal interaction of 
multiple practices of identification external and internal to a 
subject or population (Friedman, 1994: .141). 
He further suggests that this temporal interaction also implies a negotiation 
with history, 
... since history is the discourse of identity, the question of who 
'owns' or appropriates the past is a question of who is able to 
identify him - or herself and the other at any given time and 
place ... Multiple identities imply multiple histories (Friedman, 
1994: 142). 
In terms of the research, this factor is critical, as the construction and 
'reconstruction' of history both through oral history and through formal 
schooling forms part of the social construction of reality for many of the 
respondents from the research. Listening to, reading and interpreting what 
Friedman calls 'objective history', the enemy stories, the rewriting of the 
'story' is, as Friedman indicates, ' ... just as much a social construct as any 
other history .. .' (Friedman, 1994: 143). 
By creating a shared history through the oral tradition mentioned in Chapter 
Three, individuals are linked through shared meaning and interpretation. As 
people share the historical stories of their communities so history is 
embellished, linking people in time and event as actors, tellers and audience. 
Stories are not merely chronicles of what happened; they represent and 
determine meaning. As people talk about the past in a SUbjective and 
embellished way, the past is continually reconstructed (Chaitin, 2003). This 
history is judged as true or false, not solely with respect to its adherence to 
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empirical fact, but with respect to narrative criteria such as believability and 
coherence. 
Malkki in her discussion of the 'mythico-historical' accounts of Burundian 
Hutu refugees in Tanzania, and their creation and recreation of the past, also 
suggests that history is reconstructed and invested with meaning through 
narrative. She suggests that, 
In this particular case, as with any other collective past, there 
exists "no God's-eye view" of history. The "worlds made" 
through narrations of the past are always historically situated 
and culturally constructed, and it is these that people act upon 
and riddle with meaning (Malkki, 1995: 104). 
The construction of history and events through narrative, applies equally to 
revenge or 'enemy stories' which as noted in Chapter Seven featured strongly 
in the narratives of the respondents. Davies indicates that 'Long historical 
'memories' are implicated in revenge' (Davies, 2004: 81) and I would suggest 
that these 'memories' are consistently reinforced by the oral tradition. 
While the literature points to the formation of identity through history, there is 
an apparent lack of literature on coercion as a mechanism for constructing or 
shifting identities. Little has been mentioned in the literature critiquing the 
notion that there is an automatic freedom to be 'oneself to build and retain 
one's own identity, albeit within the social construction of reality. In the 
context of some of the lives recounted by respondents in this research, one 
might question if this freedom and the choice to conduct one's life through 
one's own self-formation really exists. Where is the choice, the freedom to 
construct or shift identity for the child-soldier forced into combat and to kill 
his own parents as a sign of solidarity? What identity choice has the sex slave 
kidnapped by rebel soldiers? These young people have been plunged into new 
identities and had their former identities stripped from them in a brutal fashion 
that brooks no alternative. 
Although this form of coercion of identity acquisition has not been fully 
explored in the literature, the transformation of identity through religious 
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indoctrination has been examined by many authors. The relationship between 
religion/faith and identity formation has never been so apparent in the world of 
Al Qaeda and is explored in more depth below as part of the formation of 
collective identities. 
Similarly, an area less well explored in the literature is the identification of the 
different mechanisms by which identity is sustained and continued. In relation 
to this research, this applies in particular to the role of gossip as a social 
bonding mechanism and a means of sustaining group identities. This was 
discussed more fully in Chapter Three, where the function of gossip is 
recognised as a means of developing and maintaining social and cultural bonds 
that promote the formation of a collective identity. 
4.2.1 Formation of collective identities 
The collective cannot be seen without reference to the individual and vice 
versa, but Joseph suggests that 
Group identities would seem to be more abstract than 
individual ones, in the sense that 'Americanness' does not exist 
separately from the Americans who possess it, except as an 
abstract concept. Yet combinations of such abstractions are 
what our own individual identities are made up of ... The group 
identities we partake in nurture our individual sense of who we 
are, but can also smother it (Joseph, 2004: 5). 
The formation of individual identity through others, through 'partaking' of 
group identities, implies what Robins calls 'allegiances' to groups or certain 
characteristics such as religion, sexuality, gender etc. These assert the 
definition of an individual's identity as part of a group. It is through this 
'buying into' collective identities that a 'cultural identity' emerges. Robins 
suggests that cultural identity is ever changing, that 'there are always several 
'versions' of what constitutes the contents of a cultural identity.' Cultural 
identities constructed from different historical and social perspectives, often 
reflect individual, class or group interests (Robins, 1996: 162-164). 
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'Buying into' collective identity can arise either through fear, or through a 
desire to raise status and self-esteem. Even when the collective identity is 
'ascribed' rather than 'achieved' and is in effect part of one's inherited or 
genetic make up, there is still the potential for change. The strength of the 
collective identity therefore lies in its ability to maintain cohesion and belief of 
individuals in the values, rules and obligations associated with the group. 
The maintenance of cohesion and belief is particularly relevant when 
examining the construction of a collective identity through the identification 
with a religion or religious group. In conflict situations, this identification is 
particularly critical. Religion like other identity classifications can be 
exclusive and used as a mechanism for social determination by excluding 
other religions because of differences of social understanding (Reynal-Querol, 
2002). Although there might be a danger of confusing national identity with 
religious identity, it is evident that many supposedly 'ethnic' conflicts have 
religious overtones. As Little states: 
... why does the assertion of ethnic and national identity so 
frequently involve, as it obviously does, intolerance and 
discrimination in regard to religious and other forms of 
fundamental belief? (Little, 1995: introduction). 
Reynal-Querol asserts that 'religious divisions are more important than 
language divisions and natural resources to explain social ethnic conflicts' 
(Reynal-Querol, 2002: 29). In an attempt to define the relationship of religion 
and ethnicity in conflict situations, he argues that it is the 'polarization' of 
religions, combined with animist diversity, that are primarily responsible in 
explaining ethnic conflicts. He strongly links faith and identity as a core factor 
in determining people's willingness to engage in conflict, which he suggests is 
a prime motivating force, more than 'political ideology or economic interests.' 
Faith and family, blood and beliefs are the aspects with which 
people identify themselves, the characteristics for which they 
fight and die (Reynal-Querol, 2002: 31). 
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The actions of the suicide bombers in London during July 2005 have provided 
a grisly testament to the truth of this statement. 
Another example of how religion and identity have defined warring factions 
can be seen in the Sudan in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the North define 
themselves as Muslims, and the South along tribal lines and by default non-
Muslims (in fact most are Christian). The effective domination of the North 
over the South arising from a colonially imposed integration of the Bantus in 
the South with the Arabs in the North has resulted in a civil war that has been 
ongoing for decades (Little, 1995; Mbaku et aI, 2001). In early 2004, the 
simmering civil war exploded into what some have called genocide of the 
African Christian population by the Muslim Janjaweed rebel group in the 
Darfur region of Southern Sudan. 
For these religious groups to continue, maintaining the cohesiveness of a 
collective identity is critical to their success. For many groups this implies 
ensuring that group members adhere to the categories of group beliefs 
mentioned by Bar-Tal below, i.e. that the group is always more important than 
the individual. To maintain the 'edge' over other groups, Worchel suggests 
that: 
Groups strive for their independence from other groups, and 
they struggle with group members to keep the identity of the 
group equal to, if not more important than, individual identity 
(Worchel, 1998: 65). 
Being part of the 'group' enhances individual self-esteem and Bar-Tal 
suggests that in this respect: 
Of special importance is the assumption stating that individuals 
have a need to achieve positive social identity. Specifically, it is 
assumed that individuals strive for positive self-image and that 
in the course of identifying with a group this need translates 
into a tendency to view one's own group favourably. This view 
is achieved not necessarily through positive perception, but 
rather through comparison on appropriate dimensions. The 
comparison allows one to perceive the ingroup as 'better' than 
relevant outgroups (Bar-Tal, 1998: 93). 
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Bar-Tal describes the contents of group beliefs as having four categories, of 
group nonns (effective codes of conduct), values (ideals to which the group 
aspires to), goals (the raison d'etre for the group's future) and ideology (creed 
based on religious, political, social beliefs) (Bar-Tal, 1998). These are 
important in maintaining and developing the group culture, defming the 
'ingroups' and 'outgroups'. In relation to this research for example, being part 
of an 'ingroup' might be one way of explaining the participation of large 
numbers of people in the Rwandan genocide. It might have been safer - to be 
part of the collective 'madness' of killing - than to be part of the 'outgroup' 
and risk one's own death or that of one's family. In addition, the sense of 
'otherness' that is part of a collective identity implies a transcendence of 
individual identity and therefore of responsibility. Being part of a group 
abnegates culpability. 
Maintaining group networks has become easier (for example the maintenance 
of global networks by Al Qaeda) and in some cases more difficult by the 
effects of technology and global interaction. As Robins indicates: 
The increasing transnationalization of markets, the growth of 
global media and communications, the mobility of populations 
(tourism, migration), have all worked towards the dissolution of 
the old rigidities in the national culture (Robins, 1996: 72). 
Maintaining strong social control over a collective is more difficult when 
access to outside infonnation and ideologies becomes easier. In contrast, 
groups based on a loose transnational network can maintain their links and 
collectivity through internet and mobile phone. 
The implications of this broadening of communication networks for the 
'collective identity' of groups engaged in conflict are significant. In the past, 
the automatic adherence to the collective identity of the 'clan' or tribe, where 
leaders remained unquestioned, pennitled strong identity control. By access to 
opposing viewpoints through mobile phones, internet and radio, the traditional 
reasons for buying into the identity of conflict, as presented by leaders, can be 
undennined. Technology may also be responsible for encouraging shifts in 
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identity, for transforming beliefs and values according to new information or 
interaction via technology. The transformation of identities in different 
contexts is explored more fully below, through the examination of the 
potential of identities to shift. 
4.3 Identity Shifts 
Most authors writing about identity issues recognise that an identity shifts 
many times during a lifetime. There is an ongoing recursive nature to identity, 
which is bound up by the 'true self hiding in the many other' (Hall, 1996: 4). 
Hall suggests that these shifts in identity are inevitable within spatial and 
temporal dimensions and are complicated or influenced by power and 
difference. Hall argues that identity is constructed 'through' these differences, 
not 'outside' of them: 
Above all, and directly contrary to the form in which they are 
constantly invoked, identities are constructed through, not 
outside, difference ... Throughout their careers, identities can 
function as points of identification and attachment only because 
of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render 'outside' 
(Hall, 1996:.4-5). 
As Bauman aptly states there is less of an issue about assuming multiple 
identities in this fast changing world, where it is more problematic to maintain 
and keep an identity: 
And so the snag is no longer how to discover, invent, construct, 
assemble (even buy) an identity, but how to prevent it from 
sticking. Well constructed and durable identity turns an asset 
into a liability. The hub of post-modem life strategy is not 
identity building, but avoidance of fixation (Bauman, 1996: 
24). 
Malkki considers this aspect of retention versus malleable identities, in her 
interesting comparison between Hutu refugees in a camp setting, and those 
who stayed within the town. Her suggestion is that the retention of a 
collective, national identity was stronger in the camp situation, whereas in the 
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town, ' ... they tended to seek ways of assimilating and of inhabiting multiple, 
shifting identities - identities derived or "borrowed" from the township' 
(Malkki, 1995: 3). This was important for the township refugees to be able to 
'facilitate numerous routine activities of daily life; avoiding harassment by 
immigration agents and other officials; securing jobs; travelling; ... ' (Malkki, 
1995: 157). In contrast, for the refugees in Mishamo camp ( a permanent 
refugee settlement), 
Exile did not erode collective identity ... [instead, they] located 
their identities within their very displacement .. . The refugee 
camp had become the spatial and the politico-symbolic site for 
imagining a moral and political community' (Malkki, 1995: 
16). 
The fixing of identities within the camp setting could be related to the need for 
refugee leaders in the camps to retain a level of control not possible in the 
townships, where a defined collective did not exist in the same way. In 
situations of conflict for example, there is a need for leaders to fix or 
'essentialise' identity (Davies, 2004), in order to maintain the pressure of 
conformity to the collective, whether through fear, coercion, bribery or belief. 
Leaders need to ensure that there is no empathy with the 'Other', with the 
enemy, in order to justify their actions during the conflict. Bauman suggests 
that in modem society there has been a shift away from an individual moral 
identity towards a socially constructed morality, which derives from others, 
from the state or society or from the collective. Therefore, as mentioned above 
moral responsibility is abnegated. Constructed norms and values define moral 
behaviour. This also applies to traditional societies, where I would argue that 
within traditional African, patriarchal society, moral identity is defined by a 
set of bounded rules and societal pressures. These pressures of course can 
change over time and because of circumstance. For example, in conflict 
situations there are many identity shifts that individuals and groups undergo 
because of either their engagement in the conflict or as a victim of conflict. 
Malkki suggests however that exile and forced encampment do not necessarily 
result in a shift in identity, but more of an essentialisation of collective 
identity, 'that was drawn from an essentialized, collective unit, a people, and 
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personal identity was scarcely separable from the collective one' (Malkki, 
1995: 169). I would argue however, that the identities of refugees from 
Mishamo, had been 'essentialized' through the length of their stay in the 
camps, (over thirteen years by the time of Malkki's research). Identities were 
perceived by the relative newcomers (particularly Congolese refugees) into 
Tanzania as having changed as a result of exile, as suggested by the narratives, 
that from being 'someone' in their own country they were reduced to 'mere 
refugees' upon exile. Malkki also recognises the 'insult' considered by many. 
She gives an example of her research assistant's statement, that ' .. .if someone 
calls him a refugee, that hurts him in the head' (Malkki, 1995: 166). However, 
the 'refugeeness' and identification of the collective as 'refugees' is not at 
issue in this research, which looks more at the potential for shifts in identity 
arising out of conflict. 
For example, where Gergen suggests that these multiplicities of identities are 
in constant flux and are part of the post-modem world, I would suggest that 
they are part of a conflict-ridden world, where identities are challenged or 
changed many times. Gergen argues that identities formed through traditional 
societies are more fixed, and shift less than modem societies, but fails to 
consider the full effect of radio, internet and television in a traditional context. 
However, he does acknowledge that 
The technologies of social saturation have also enabled a range 
of new voices to be heard, voices daring to question the old and 
institutionalized truths (Gergen, 1991: 86). 
Gergen argues that in traditional life, there was less multiplicity, fewer 
demands and interconnections from outside sources that laid claim to divide 
our single self. With the approach of modernism, 'Increasingly we emerge as 
the possessors of many voices' (Gergen, 1991: 84). His argument focuses on 
the breakdown of a fixed, certain identity of self; everything is tenuous, 
formed according to changes and fluctuations in relationships. Identity thus 
becomes relational. He asserts that 'a firm sense of self' was only possible in 
traditional communities. In contrast, I would argue that conflict throws 
everything into flux and transformation, where influences from external 
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agencIes and events can also result in the reforming of different and 
fluctuating identities. However, Davies contends, 
Our view of the world is controlled by our internal model of it, 
not simply by incoming data. Data will at best cause a 
perturbation, but it will be ignored if the internal model is not 
interested (Davies, 2004: 78). 
She suggests that our identity construction is affected less by the noise of 
external influences, but through shifts in our internal model. The internal 
model of self is shifted by the very nature of conflict, but as Davies continues, 
'The key seems to be whether we acknowledge our own fluidity and self-
making' (Davies, 2004: 78). 
Gergen points to the need to recognIse the fluidity of identity when he 
suggests that in the modem world, because of the constant shifting of 'the firm 
sense of self, people start searching for something 'other'. Sometimes for a 
return to inner resources, to their own self or sometimes they are looking for 
strong group leadership, which replaces a need for individual self. In this way, 
individual self-identity is transitory and elusive, as Gergen proposes: 
Critical to my argument is the proposal that social saturation 
brings with it a general loss in our assumption of true and 
knowable selves. As we absorb multiple voices, we find that 
each "truth" is relativized by our simultaneous consciousness of 
compelling alternatives. We come to be aware that each truth 
about ourselves is a construction of the moment, true only for a 
given time and within certain relationships (Gergen, 1991: 16). 
This returns to Giddens' argument that identities are constructed and 
reconstructed because of social action and interaction; through the doing and 
redoing of routine activities. He states: 
Human social activities, like some self-reproducing items in 
nature, are recursive. That is to say, they are not brought 
into being by social actors but continually recreated by them 
via the very means whereby they express themselves as 
actors. In and through their activities agents reproduce the 
conditions that make these activities possible (Giddens, 
1984: 2). 
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Does this mean therefore that by merely undermining different routines, 
identities can shift? Perhaps under 'normal' circumstances one would assume 
not. However, the evidence from the research indicates that there has to be a 
very strong sense of inner identity to prevent identity shifting in situations 
where traditional social action and interaction are violently disturbed. This 
was observed particularly in the cases of child soldiers and sex slaves whose 
identities were forced to shift because of the conflict. 
Featherstone recognises the shifting nature of identity formation and 
reformation as part of what he terms 'the global situation' when he suggests 
that: 
It is the capacity to shift the frame, and move between varying 
range of foci, the capacity to handle a range of symbolic 
material out of which various identities can be formed and 
reformed in different situations, which is relevant in the 
contemporary global situation (Featherstone, 1995: 110). 
The 'contemporary global situation' has also defined identity shifts in terms of 
global and local perceptions of conflict and those perpetrating them. For 
example, Saddam Hussein, funded by the US in the 1980s to fight Iran, is the 
enemy in the 1990s; Nelson Mandela, ANC terrorist until 1992 and now Nobel 
Peace Prize-winner and international hero or Gerry Adams, terrorist in the 
1980s, Member of Parliament in the 1990s. The shift in identity in this 
instance, is not through a shift in individual or collective action (Hussein 
remained a dictator from beginning to end) but through expediency and/or 
perception. This type of shift is common during conflict situations and the 
nature of identity shift in terms of its relation to conflict and the ways in which 
conflict redefines individual and collective identities, both internally and 
externally is explored below. 
4.4 Identity, ethnicity and their relationship to conflict 
Much of the literature concernmg conflicts in Africa focuses on 'ethnic' 
elements. Ethnic conflict has been described as 'the most fashionable term and 
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last resort to explain contemporary social conflicts' (Jung et aI, 1996: 61), 
although Mbaku et al (2001), argue that ethnicity is frequently ignored in 
academic literature. It is therefore essential to consider the nature of ethnic 
conflict and its impact on conflicts past and present. This section of the thesis 
complements the earlier section in Chapter Two in order to present a more 
theoretical base for issues relating to ethnicity and conflict. Ethnicity here is 
defined as a social construct that an individual or group affiliate themselves to. 
It is not necessarily fixed but is based on subscription (whether ascribed or 
chosen) to a common culture, history and set of values. Ethnicity is therefore 
an element of identity construction that is vital in the consideration of conflict. 
Mbaku et al contend that one of the chief causes of the ongoing tensions in 
Africa is because of governments' weakness in dealing with diversity 
including ethnic differences (Mbaku et aI, 2001). These 'weak states' 
commonly contain ethnic, religious or economic tensions that limit their 
potential to deliver political stability. Similarly, Sambanis argues that 
... the protection of ethnic identity is much more closely 
associated with protecting political rights and supporting 
democracy than with economic gain (Sambanis, 2001: 267). 
He separates ethnic war from revolutionary/ideological war by suggesting that 
ethnic wars are primarily caused by political rather than economic grievances. 
Horowitz also suggests that analyses of conflict based on economic differences 
ignore the 'emotional' investment that ethnic conflict portrays. He defines 
ethnic groups by 
... ascriptive differences, whether the indicum is color, 
appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common 
origin, or some combination thereof ... (Horowitz, 1985: 17). 
In attempting to define what characterises 'ethnicity' Porto suggests that there 
is a negotiable level of fluidity that can cross over supposedly proscribed 
ethnic boundaries (Porto, 2002). As noted above in relation to shifting 
identities, ethnicity also possesses a flexible element through changes in 
economic or marital status for example. 
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Similarly, the respondents of this research cited examples of the blurring of 
ethnicity through inter-marriage and the acquisition of wealth, indicating the 
potential for fluidity across ethnic boundaries. Also there were indications that 
traditional clan kinships encompassed different ethnic groups. These had been 
important in the pre-colonial era but during the colonial period were subsumed 
by the exaggeration of difference along ethnic lines. This negotiable and 
contextual element of identity has been open to manipulation and subsequent 
politicisation of ethnicity. Bush and Saterelli assert that this is perhaps more 
the cause of conflict than ethnic identity per se (Bush and Salterelli, 2000). 
Bush and Salterelli also support the notion of ethnic fluidity in their argument 
that children are not born with ethnic hatred, they are taught it through a 
variety of formal and informal means. For children, the insidious socialisation 
process of ethnic differentiation and prejudice, via family, peers and school is 
the incipient cause of beliefs that gives rise to ethnic conflict. Prejudice and 
ethnicity are not automatically related, but evolve as part of the socialisation 
process, and are crucially related to time and place. The development of ethnic 
prejudice is within a specific context and is constructed within a relationship 
of power structures that maintain the appearance of ethnicity for their own 
ends (Bush and Salterelli, 2000). 
Ethnicity like all aspects of identity construction is rooted in time and place 
where the situational aspect of identity is 'bought into', and is often based on 
trust. An individual uses trust to decide which identity (that may have been 
ascribed or achieved) to buy into. Groups of ethnic minorities often cling 
together for protection wherever they are located and seek protection in 
neighbouring countries where their own ethnic groups are also residing. For 
example, the groups of Tutsis who are located in many different countries 
across East Africa, ally themselves to other Tutsis rather than to their country 
of asylum. Because of this communal cohesion, an individual enjoys the 
protection of the group. However, it can also lead to negative consequences, 
whereby an individual instead of being protected by the group identity 'comes 
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to be targeted because of his or her membership in a particular community' 
(Bush and Salterelli, 2000: 5). 
By buying into an identity, which carries with it certain obligations, rules and 
norms, individuals and groups therefore buy into an identity that mayor may 
not accept the engagement in conflict on behalf of that identity. For a conflict 
to be embarked upon, competing factions must 'buy into' or be coerced into 
the justification for engaging in acts of aggression, for example suggests that 
the intractability of some conflicts are determined by certain qualities of 
identities. How warring factions perceive themselves and the 'other' they are 
fighting has a direct bearing on the nature of the conflict they are engaged in 
(Kriesberg, 2003). 
In a similar vein, Bhabha also suggests that: 
We have entered an anxious age of identity, in which the 
attempt to memorialize lost time, and to reclaim lost territories, 
creates a culture of disparate 'interest groups' or social 
movements. Here affiliation may be antagonistic and 
ambivalent; solidarity may be only situational and strategic 
commonality is often negotiated through the 'contingency' of 
social interests and political claims (Bhabha, 1996: 59). 
Mallaquias also asserts that ethnicity is an important 'social and political 
force' in conflict but contends that it 'must be understood in conjunction with 
other equally essential and related notions like ethnic groups and nations.' 
Ethnicity therefore is not purely about identity but also about gaining power; 
where ethnic groups can claim nationhood and therefore gain a legitimacy and 
power over other groups (Mallaquias, 2000: 97). However, nationhood 
according to Kellas should be distinguished from ethnic groups, whereby 
nations 
... have 'objective' characteristics which may include a 
territory, a language, a religion, or common descent (though not 
all these are always present), and 'subjective' characteristics, 
essentially a people's awareness of its nationality and affection 
for it (Kellas, 1991 in Mallaquias, 2000: 97). 
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In African societies, the sense of 'nationhood' was imposed because of the 
colonial divisions that often disregarded traditional clan based boundaries. 
These traditional boundaries were critical in maintaining cultural and 
collective identities, which some authors suggest were not based along ethnic 
lines. Relationships were based on kinship ties and land occupation, and the 
colonial rulers failed to recognise the traditional and cultural ties between 
communities when they divided or formed 'nations' according to politically 
determined divisions. These often separated culturally similar groups into 
different nations (Reyntjens, 1995; Mallaquias, 2000). 
Kinship and 'clan' ties as part of an identity were presented by respondents as 
being possible 'entries for peace building'. The responses from the research 
support the notion that ethnicity should be considered within the context of 
identity rather than a specific focus suggestive of race or tribe. As outlined in 
Chapter 2.5 Obura points to the need to regard Rwandans less along ethnic 
lines but along what she terms 'socio-identity' groupings. The groupings she 
suggests were not traditionally considered ethnic, racial or caste groups but 
were based more on socio-economic groupings, which often had clan 
associations spanning different socio-identity groups (Obura, 2003). 
In this way, she would concur with Bowen who suggests that ethnicity is not 
sufficient to explain conflict. He argues against the notion that ethnic identity 
is ascribed and is traditional and unchanging. Instead, he suggests that: 
In speaking about local group conflicts we tend to make three 
assumptions: first, that ethnic identities are ancient and 
unchanging; second, that these identities motivate people to 
persecute and kill; and third, that ethnic diversity itself 
inevitably leads to violence. All three are mistaken (Bowen, 
1996: 3). 
In the context of this research, these three assumptions are common in terms 
of defining the nature of the conflict in the Great Lakes Region. In agreement 
with Bowen, there are an increasing number of authors such as Mamdani, 
Obura and others, who challenge these traditional assumptions. This research 
indicates that although identities might be flexible and shift according to 
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context, they are often one of the principle motivations behind violent and 
armed struggle. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Authors such as Giddens suggest that identity is formed through the repetition 
of social action and interaction, which is bound by time and space. Identity 
arises out of the structural framework of society through language, culture, 
history and adoption of the dominant values of that society. Collective identity 
construction similarly implies adoption of group values, norms and rules into 
which members of the 'ingroup' must buy, be coerced or indoctrinated. 
Maintenance of the collective identity implies ensuring the cohesiveness of an 
in-group which necessarily implies an 'outgroup'. This exacerbates difference 
by defining those who are in the 'outgroup' as 'other' and therefore the 
enemy. This is critical in terms of continuation of conflict where demonisation 
of the 'other' as enemy is commonplace. 
Identities can and do shift over time and space. They are recursive and 
flexible, which some authors suggest is the nature of modem and post-modem 
societies where life is not stable or fixed. I argue that this is true of conflict-
ridden societies where the life situation is in a continual state of flux and 
identities are challenged or shifted on a regular basis through either fear or 
coercion; a notion rarely examined in the literature. Many theorists highlight 
the element of choice in shifting identity, but the examples of the child soldier 
or sex slave indicate circumstances where individuals are forced into a 
different identity. 
The relationship between identity and conflict is complex as it is often 
associated with ethnicity, and quoted as a root cause of many conflicts in 
Africa. Ethnicity focuses on a narrower range of attributes, identified by other 
groups as more physical than cultural. Sambanis however suggests that 
ethnicity is more concerned with political supremacy than purely ethnic 
division where states are intolerant of diversity (Sambanis 2001). Educative 
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processes in this respect are significant in confirming identities. Identity is also 
associated with power and nationhood, the desire of one group to gain control 
over another and maintain their legitimacy through the state control of 
nationhood. Although some authors challenge the assumption that the conflicts 
in Africa are concerned with identity, the research indicates that it is still a 
prime motivating factor in the continuation of violent conflict. 
The issues relating to formation of collective identities and the factors that 
influence identity formation/shift, including the critical role that trust has to 
play, are reflected in the findings in Chapters Six to Nine. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ISSUES OF METHODOLOGY IN A REFUGEE 
CONTEXT 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the rationale behind adopting a 
qualitative stance and indicates the need for reflexivity within a refugee 
context that is complex and fluid. It outlines why searching for meaning in this 
context is more appropriate for the type of research conducted than collection 
of statistical data. Generalisability is not required or expected, although it is 
hoped the research might benefit practitioners and other researchers in similar 
environments. 
The rationale behind the selection of a case study approach is examined, 
whereby four refugee camps housing refugees from Burundi, Rwanda and 
DRC were selected. These are case studies of the populations within refugee 
camps not of refugee camps. The selection of refugee populations was made 
primarily for reasons of safety and access, and as a result, there is only limited 
explanation of the refugee context (although a description of the camps can be 
found in Chapter One). The sample groups were representative of a cross-
section of refugee society and the chapter explains in detail the mechanisms 
for selecting these various groups. The refugee camps represent spaces of 
transition for the refugees, who are not currently embroiled in the current 
conflicts in their countries, but because the conflicts are ongoing, feel unable 
to return. 
The chapter sets out the methods of data collection and exanunes the 
appropriateness of the methodology adopted. One of the primary methods of 
data collection was Focus Group Discussions and the chapter outlines the 
rationale behind this choice of method. Other methods such as drawing and 
essay writing with children are also examined alongside some of the 
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challenges of using such methods with inexperienced research assistants. The 
benefit of opportunistic data collection is also highlighted in this chapter. 
There were many constraints working in the difficult environment of a remote 
Tanzanian village. Not the least of these was how, as an observer, my status as 
'mzungu' (white person) inhibited responses and changed the dynamics of 
group discussions. In all aspects of the data collections, respect for the 
confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed. 
5.2 A reminder of the research questions 
The research questions below were fundamental to the process of data 
collection and analysis. They formed the basis for the training programme and 
the development of the questionnaires and topic guides. They stem from an 
overarching question, which asks: 
What factors in different educative processes affect information 
transmission and identity at different 'structural levels' and how do these 
influence the outcome of conflict? 
Educative Processes 
• What types of formal and informal educative processes exist? 
• 
• 
• 
Which of these are perceived as the most significant in the 
transmission of information in their countries? 
What factors within the most significant educative processes make 
them so? 
How do educative processes affect identity construction and shifts? 
• Which educative processes identified were perceived to influence 
conflict? 
Identity 
• Is identity as significant a feature of the Great Lakes conflicts as the 
literature suggests? 
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• How do identity construction and shifts in identity affect the outcome of 
conflict? 
• Is identity the locus between educative processes, information 
transmission and 'structural levels ' which influences conflict? 
N.B: In order not to pre-empt the responses on the issue of identity no direct 
questions were asked of respondents in the topic guides, on this issue. This 
was for two reasons, a) to ensure that respondents were not led into prioritising 
identity as the key issue in conflict development and b) to determine whether 
identity was in reality such a significant factor in conflict development as has 
been presented in much of the literature. 
'Structural levels ' 
• Do the 'structural levels ' identified in the Model B (cf 1.5.2 pp. 32-33) 
reflect the reality on the ground? 
• Which groups and power structures are perceived by respondents to 
exist? 
• How are they perceived in terms of information transmission? (i.e. in 
terms of the relative importance of different levels and groups) 
• Is there a gap between the levels and ifso whatform does it take? 
Conflict 
• What types of conflict have been experienced and what are people's 
perceptions of the conflict? 
• 
• 
How do communities resolve conflicts and how do they think conflict in 
their country might be resolved? 
How might educative processes used to learn about conflict be 
transformed into peace building mechanisms? 
NB: Conflict here is seen in the light of other processes that affect its 
likelihood. It is not the primary feature of the research to identify causalities of 
conflict, but to listen to the narratives of those most affected by it. 
5.3 Why a qualitative approach? 
A qualitative stance was taken in order to address the key research questions 
indicated above. This type of methodological approach was essential to 
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provide the reflexivity of response necessary to conduct research in countries 
where the unexpected is a daily occurrence. A quantitative or statistical 
approach would not provide the adaptability and opportunistic flexibility that 
was required to gather a variety of narratives through in-depth interviewing 
and focus group discussions. 
The following statements from Woodfield sum up concisely the reasoning 
behind the use of qualitative data collection and analysis for this thesis. 
• Qualitative Data (QD) are very varied and more complex than 
statistical quantitative data, which are already pre-structured 
according to defined codes. 
• Qualitative Analysis (QA) looks at the dense text of transcripts 
etc, to unpick and work out what is the meaning behind what 
has been said -looking for the nuggets. 
• QA seeks to understand perspectives, which are multiple and 
varied. It searches for variety and understanding diversity. It 
starts by managing the data provided and then provides 
explanations (Woodfield, 2004). 
Through the narratives of this research, 'nuggets' of meaning have been 
revealed that illuminate the process and understanding of conflict as perceived 
by those most affected by it. 
In the positivist arena this may raIse the question of how generalisable, 
objective and valid such data are compared to a more statistical, experimental 
and quantitative approach. Positivists argue that research is legitimated by 
science or the scientific method in its ability to be objective and rational (Scott 
and Usher, 1999). In the study of human behaviour and social reality, 
positivists suggest that the only way to advance the knowledge in this arena is 
by observation and experimentation. In this way the methods of natural 
science may be applied to social science where analyses are expressed in 
similar 'laws or law-like generalisations that have been established in relation 
to natural phenomena' (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000: 8-9). 
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Alternatively Morse et al argue that reliability and validity of qualitative data 
collection emerges from the skilful use of verification strategies (Morse et aI, 
2002). Such alternatives to the positivistic methodologies of experimental or 
even quasi-experimental design are now largely accepted as equal partners in 
the social science research arena. In this sense, 
... social science is ... seen as a subjective rather than objective 
undertaking, as a means of dealing with the direct experience of 
people in specific contexts (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 
2000: 20). 
Qualitative research necessarily uses a 'meaningful' approach where the focus 
is on interpretation of meaning, while quantitative methodology employs 
statistics that rigorously test hypotheses through experimental methods (Dey, 
1993). This highlights the ongoing debate of the past thirty years concerning 
the relative merits of quantitative versus qualitative approaches and the desire 
for meaning through numbers rather than numbers through meaning (Dey, 
1993). My research therefore investigates the meaning attached to individual 
and community understanding of the processes by which conflict is initiated, 
prolonged and resolved. It is concerned with perceptions of a potential 
dichotomy in situations of conflict between the rhetoric (of political 
peacemakers) and actuality of experience (of participants who have been 
involved in conflict - albeit retrospectively). The use of a qualitative 
methodology and analysis provide a sufficiently open and creative approach to 
determining the meaning and understanding behind the data collected. 
The research therefore while aiming for a rigorous approach does not focus on 
seeking of facts and certainty using the ontology of the positivists. Rather it 
engages in the investigation of a variety of possible meanings derived from 
interaction with the participants of the study. As Bryman suggests: 
... the emphasis must be on how the interviewee frames and 
understands issues and events - that is, what the interviewee 
views as important in explaining and understanding events, 
patterns, and forms of behaviour (Bryman, 2001: 314). 
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Through detailed narratives from individuals and groups, this research has 
investigated the perceptions of refugees on how they understand and learn 
about conflict. Because of the personal nature of the narratives gathered, the 
research does not provide broad generalisations about the nature of conflict. 
Rather it illuminates existing literature on issues of educative processes and 
identity, and their relationship to conflict. 
In addition to the arguments above in favour of using a qualitative approach, 
much of the educational research already conducted in developing countries 
has been statistical. This is particularly the case for those engaged in 
educational research on the access, management and funding of education 
provision in the South, which has largely focussed on gathering statistical 
information. As a result many studies have arisen that focus on the formal 
process, using large-scale surveys of schools (Shaeffer, 1986). My research 
has moved beyond statistics to the deeper levels of knowledge, attitudes and 
perceptions of people affected by conflict through informal as well as formal 
educative processes. 
The research is based on the selection of four refugee camps and utilises a case 
study approach to research the perspectives of the populations within those 
camps. These are not comparative case studies in the sense that they do not 
offer distinct or different insights into particular situations of conflict. Rather 
the findings offer an opportunity for triangulation that highlights the regional 
perspective of the conflicts from which the refugees have fled. Not only are 
there similarities between the case studies in terms of the identity issues 
involved in the conflict, but there are also similar economic (in particular land) 
factors which have also contributed to the conflicts. These along with 
historical and political elements have caused the recent conflicts to continue. 
The research therefore benefits from the complementarity of the different 
populations affected by these conflicts, which allows for greater depth of 
understanding of each. 
Although the case study approach used for this research sacrifices 
generalisation in favour of the possibility of detailed and accurate information 
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(Hammersley, 1992), generalisation in this sense is not the aIm of this 
research. It is more concerned with the investigation of the 'unique instances' 
of the populations of the three countries in the study that have been engaged in 
conflict (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000). The complexity of the conflicts 
in these countries requires an approach, that through an holistic investigation, 
accounts for the uniqueness of each, while recognising their similarities in 
ethnic, political and economic relationships (Stake, 1994). 
Case studies can also be seen as a form of 'condensed fieldwork' in the 
common-sense term of 'intensive study of one instance, person, institution or 
place' (Vuillamy, 1990: 14). For my own research, this implies intensive 
studies of three populations living in four different refugee camps. However, 
there is a distinct difference between case study and ethnography, which 
employs a similar notion of depth in terms of time and intensity (Vuillamy, 
1990). A case study is naturally much shorter in duration, more of a snapshot 
and an elaboration of a developmental process. A short detailed and 
descriptive analysis through a case study approach is appropriate and valuable 
for gaining insight into the 'lived experiences' of the participants (Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison, 2000). 
This research arises out of these 'lived experiences' and narratives from 
refugee populations in four refugee camps in North West Tanzania the 
selection of which is outlined in more depth below. A more detailed 
background to the camps, their location, numbers of refugees and 
environment, was provided in Chapter 1.2.2 pp. 18-21. 
5.4 The research process 
The research was undertaken in four refugee camps: Burundian Camp A, 
Congolese Camp B, and Camps C and D (for Rwandese respondents) over a 
period of four months from March to June 2004, during which time I 
conducted a number of training workshops to identify and train research 
assistants and develop topic guides, before conducting the final interviews. 
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Below is a summary of the broad chronological presentation of the research 
process, which is described more fully in the remainder of the chapter: 
• Interviewing Skills Workshops (see Annex II for the training notes for 
the workshop) were conducted in Camps A, B and C. This workshop 
was adapted from the Social Research Association training programme 
on interviewing skills. Each workshop lasted three days and fifteen 
people were trained. Selected from those fifteen were two research 
assistants to work with adults and two research assistants to work with 
children. These were equally male and female. 
• Development of Topic Guides (see Annex III for an example of a topic 
guide for adults, an adapted version was used for children). These were 
all translated into Kirundi or Kiswahili. The topic guides were 
developed during the training period, with the participants using an 
adapted version of the original research questions. The development of 
the social map also arose out of this process, examples of which can be 
found in Chapter Eight. 
• Finalisation, translation and distribution of questionnaires (see Annex 
IV). Questionnaires which were developed prior to data collection 
were translated and later distributed by the research assistants. The 
research assistants were requested to try to ensure random distribution 
to the different societal groups outlined in section 6.4 below. Seventy-
five questionnaires were delivered in all three locations. Fifty-five 
completed questionnaires were returned. 
• From the responses to the questionnaires, participants were identified 
who were willing to take part in the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
as outlined in the selection of respondents below in section 6.4. 
• FGDs were conducted with the societal groups identified below in 
section 6.4. Each FGD lasted approximately two hours. They were 
conducted in parallel to save time, so the two research assistants ran 
two FGDs concurrently. A total of twenty-two FGDs were conducted 
apart from the trial FGDs in the training sessions. No FGDs were 
conducted in Camp C, because there were insufficient numbers of 
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Rwandan respondents. All Rwandan respondents were interviewed 
individually. 
• Respondents for in-depth individual interviews were then identified 
from the FOD (see Annex V for the topic guide for individual 
interviews). These interviews were often conducted directly after the 
FOD unless as in the case of the Traditional Kings, they were being 
interviewed as individuals. Thirty individual interviews were 
conducted. These included twenty-two respondents from the FODs in 
Camps A and B, plus two Traditional Kings in Camp B, plus six 
Rwandans from Camps C and D. 
• All interviews with adults were recorded on digital recorders, except 
for three, which were hand written from notes. The data from children 
were often written or drawn. All data were transferred to computer and 
then to CD before being sent to Dar es Salaam for translation. 
Table 5.1: Composition of sample groups and data collection 
CampA CampB CampC CampD Total 
Burundian Congolese Rwandan Rwandan 
Population 35,000 46,000 100,000 56 181 ,056 
size (approx.) 
No. FGDs 11 11 0 0 22 
No. depth 11 l3 4 2 30 
interviews 
No. 25 25 25 0 75 (55 
questionnaires returned) 
5.5 Sampling 
The selection of the sample groups from refugee camps was based primarily 
on the need for safe access to the identified groups. With the assistance of 
UNICEF (my former employer in Tanzania) there was no difficulty in gaining 
access to the refugee camps. Similar access would not have been possible in 
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any of the three countries under study, primarily because of security concerns 
(war was still ongoing in both Burundi and DRC). Also without the support of 
an umbrella organisation, the sensitive nature of the research would have made 
access to the necessary range of groups almost impossible. Therefore the 
sample groups were chosen from the refugee camps in Western Tanzania, 
which house a cross section of populations from Burundi, and DRC, with few 
Rwandans remaining in only two camps. There are ten camps in Western 
Tanzania for these different populations (see Annex I for maps of refugee 
impacted areas in Tanzania). Four main camps were selected as representative 
of the population group involved in conflict in their countries of origin, 
namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Rwanda. 
These were Camp A, in K. district (Burundian), Camp B, also in K. district 
(Congolese), Camp C, in N. district (where the training of research assistants 
was conducted) and Camp D, also in N. district (where Rwandan refugees 
were held as protection cases in a transit camp). The basis for selection of the 
these camps was a) logistical reasons including access to transport for both the 
Congolese and Burundian camps and b) in the case of Camp D, in N. district, 
it was the only location where the few Rwandan refugees remaining were 
legitimately housed. 
In N. where Rwandan refugees were interviewed, it was not possible to 
interview the range of groups indicated below. In 1996, the Tanzanian army 
had forcibly returned (refouleli) the majority of Rwandan refugees who had 
fled to Tanzania after the genocide in 1994. Therefore, the number of 
Rwandan remaining refugees was very few, as the small population permitted 
to remain after 1996, had consistently been refouled to Rwanda by the 
Tanzanian authorities. A particularly severe incidence of this refoulement 
occurred in September 2003, when nine hundred people, mostly women and 
children, were forced from their homes in Camp C in the early hours of the 
morning and their houses burnt. This meant that the number of Rwandans who 
were interviewed was very small, six in total. There were some Rwandans 
hiding amongst the Burundian and Tanzanian populations but they were 
understandably reluctant to come forward for fear of refoulement. Many 
Rwandans were identified by the research assistants (one of whom was 
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Rwandan herself) but their fear was palpable when they were approached, 
"who told you I was a Rwandan, I'm not a Rwandan. Go away I don't want to 
talk to you." was the response of one man approached by the interviewer. 
Therefore, the Rwandan group is not comparable with the other two groups, 
although it has been essential to include Rwanda in the research because of its 
role in the Great Lakes conflicts over the last ten years. 
As explained above, the refugee camps were selected for a number of reasons, 
including ease of access and security. However, because of this, there is a 
strong degree of bias in the representation and narratives of conflict given by 
the respondents. The sample groups chosen represent a single perspective. 
This reflects a Hutu outlook for the Burundian and Rwandan respondents and 
predominantly Bembe perception for the Congolese (this group oppose the 
primarily Tutsi 'Banyamulenge' or Banyarwandans who have been involved 
in conflict in DRC). Although the groups may not be representative in terms of 
guaranteeing the different perspectives from various identity groups, it is the 
case that refugee stories are rarely told. There are many instances particularly 
in the case of Rwanda, that Tutsi viewpoints have been presented, and rightly 
so, but there are few stories offered by the literature that reflect an alternative 
perspective. 
The groups selected (as outlined below) were indicative of the grassroots level 
indicated in Model C, Chapter 1.5 (cf: p. 35). The sample groups from the 
Burundian and Congolese refugee camps were selected from different societal 
groups, and are considered a representative cross-section of refugee society. 
Although the original structure of the FGDs had intended that groups of six 
from each of the societal groups outlined below would be interviewed (1 x 6 
represents one focus group of six people from a single societal group), the 
reality and constraints of the camp situation sometimes prevented this. Often 
two groups would be combined together, for example, traditional healers and 
health workers worked together in one FGD. 
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Family 
Parents/guardians: lx6 
Elders lx6 
Children: 2x6 
(out of school and in school) 
Commerce 
Cross section: 
Professionals 
Teachers: 
Head teachers: 
lx6 
1 x 6 
1 x 6 
Health workers: 1 x 6 
Traditional healers: 1 x 6 
Civil Society 
Youth groups: lx6 
Women's groups: lx6 
Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs) 1 x 6 
Leaders 
Cross section lx6 
Religious leaders lx6 
Traditional Kings/ 
Influential people 1 x 3 
Media 
According to availability 
Internet users 
For these focus groups and later the in-depth interviews, the respondents were 
selected in the following way: 
1) Questionnaires were administered on a random basis to the identified 
groups mentioned above. Those who were not literate were assisted by 
the refugee interviewer to complete the questionnaire 
2) A box at the bottom of the questionnaire was checked if the respondent 
was willing to attend a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and 
respondents were then approached by the refugee research assistants to 
attend the FGD on a certain day 
3) Individual respondents were selected from the FGD for more in depth 
interviews after the FGD was completed 
4) Due to the nature of the camp life, such as food distribution, market 
days etc. some respondents were absent from the FGD. In this case, the 
Research Assistant (a refugee) selected alternative candidates from 
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personal contacts. The majority of respondents however were self-
selected through their participation in the questionnaires and the FGDs. 
There was difficulty finding sufficient female respondents for each of the 
groups in order to ensure some kind of gender parity. While many women 
responded positively to the questionnaire, sometimes their heavy domestic 
workload restricted their availability. In the case of some groups, for example 
religious leaders, there were no women respondents as no religious leaders 
were women. In order to ensure a perspective from women, a separate group 
for women involved in civil society groups was also conducted. 
5.6 Participants in the research 
The respondents came from a variety of backgrounds within their own 
countries. These included farmers, trades people, university lecturers, doctors 
and politicians. The refugee camp is a microcosm of life in the countries of 
origin, but with different administrative structures and very different living 
conditions. Life in the refugee camps is extremely harsh. Refugees are not 
permitted beyond four kilometres outside of the camp without a pass 
controlled by Tanzanian government authorities, often only provided in 
exchange for 'favours'. The restrictions of food, water, work and travel is 
difficult for many people used to working and living freely. The majority of 
the respondents from all three countries described life in the camp as 'a prison' 
or trapped like 'a bird in a cage' . 
The increasing lack of security, particularly in the Burundian camps, and the 
pressure from the Tanzanian authorities for the Burundian refugees to return, 
has resulted in the repatriation of some refugees to Burundi, even though the 
security situation is still unstable. Many respondents made statements similar 
to this Burundian teacher: "I would rather die in my motherland than here like 
some diseased dog." Almost all of the refugees wanted to return home. Apart 
from two Rwandan respondents, no other respondent expressed a wish to 
remain in the camp. As soon as their country is at peace, they insisted that they 
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would all leave. There is pressure from the Tanzanian government, before the 
presidential election of 2005, to push the Burundians back home, not by direct 
force, but by making life in the refugee camps increasingly intolerable and 
insecure. While Tanzania has been very generous towards refugees in the past, 
the issue of asylum seekers, as in many other countries, is a hot election topic. 
Except for some of the younger children who had been born in the camps, all 
of the respondents in the research had experienced the conflict, most of them 
in a very direct and brutal way. Congolese respondents recounted fewer 
violent experiences than Burundians, but the paintings by participants in the 
printmaking workshops described below, indicated that they had suffered 
equally from the effects of the conflict. 
5.7 Data Collection 
The focus of data collection concentrated on Level One (grassroots level) of 
the hypothetical model in Chapter One. Examination of the higher levels was 
derived from a limited number of individual interviews according to access 
and availability, alongside analysis of grey literature. It was not within the 
scope of the study to cover every group at every level by interview. 
While a basic questionnaire (see Annex IV) was administered to a cross-
section of groups, the primary method of data collection was through Focus 
Group Discussions (FGDs) with the groups identified above. The 
questionnaire assisted in the selection of individuals willing to participate in 
focus group discussions. Additional in depth semi-structured interviews with 
individuals selected from the FGDs were also conducted. 
5.7.1 Selection of research assistants 
Rather than using interpreters who could disrupt the flow of communication, 
research assistants were selected and trained to conduct the interviews on my 
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behalf. This proved to be less intrusive and intimidating for the respondents. I 
participated in the interviews by observing and on occasion asking additional 
questions. Training on interviewing skills was conducted for three days in 
each camp for up to fifteen participants. Four research assistants (two male 
and two female) were selected from the training based on their competency. In 
Camp C however, only three research assistants were selected for the 
Rwandan interviews, one of whom was Tanzanian. Competency was judged 
on their understanding of the training and techniques of interviewing, their 
alertness and willingness to engage fully with the respondents. They also 
needed a certain level of fluency in English. The training was open to a 
number of refugees and Tanzanian NGO staff who might benefit from the 
interviewing skills passed on through the training. The research assistants were 
also trained in the use of digital recorders. 
As mentioned above, two women and two men were selected as research 
assistants, not only to maintain gender parity, but also because of the cultural 
issues of male research assistants talking to women respondents. However, the 
women research assistants were less confident and frequently had domestic 
issues and employment responsibilities that interfered with the research 
schedule. They were also not as fluent in English, which sometimes caused 
misunderstandings. However, the benefits of having women research 
assistants outweighed these concerns. 
The capacity of the research assistants varied across the different camps, 
particularly in their ability to probe and prompt using the topic guides. They 
also found it difficult to avoid the domination of one person in the FGDs. It is 
in the respondents' cultures to listen and not interrupt, so the research 
assistants rarely stopped a respondent who had taken up much of the group 
time, even though they had been trained in how to do this. In the case of N. 
where Rwandan refugees were interviewed, there was significant difficulty 
with both research assistants and respondents. The selection of research 
assistants was not as successful as in the other camps. The male refugee 
research assistant was absent much of the time and the female research 
assistant was more interested in her own personal issues than those of the 
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respondents. Two constructive interviews were conducted in Camp D (the 
transit centre in N.) where the Tanzanian research assistant interviewed two 
women recently arrived from Rwanda. These women had refused to return to 
Rwanda despite the brutal tactics of the Tanzanian government to force them 
to do so. 
Two refugees translated the interviews into English. One translated the 
Burundian and Rwandan interviews, and the other translated the Congolese 
interviews. In order to determine the efficiency of the translators, back 
translation was used on a few randomly selected interviews. It was found that 
for the most part, the translations were accurate within the language 
constraints of the translators. The Congolese translator for example had a 
wider vocabulary and better grasp of English than the Burundian translator. 
The Burundian translator tried as far as possible to retain the language of the 
respondents, which he said was difficult to translate from Kirundi to English, 
because 'Burundians are not straight'; meaning that they took a circuitous 
route to explain a simple issue. 
5.7.2 Focus Group Discussions 
Focus Group Discussions were adopted in order to hold in depth discussions 
with a group of key informants (which was usually between 5-8 persons). It 
was felt that the interaction between members of the group would be more 
revealing in terms of data collection than conducting only individual 
interviews. A total of twenty-two FGDs were conducted, eleven in each camp. 
These do not include the additional data collected during the training sessions, 
which amounted to approximately eight additional FGDs per camp. The Focus 
Group format has a degree of flexibility that other methods don't necessarily 
capture (although one has to be aware of the possibility of facilitator bias), in 
that it allows the facilitator to explore wide ranging and potentially revealing 
issues by encouraging group participation. It also had an additional advantage 
of being a useful mechanism to identify respondents willing to undertake 
individual interviews. 
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The FGDs varied in length but typically took between one-two hours, 
including time for introductions and conclusions. A few discussions continued 
for three hours. The social mapping process took considerable time. Many 
respondents became quite involved with the process, which revealed 
significant information on the 'structural levels' of the camps and societal 
groups in Burundi and DRC. 
The typical format of the FGD was divided into three steps; firstly the 
explanation of the purpose of the group discussion, making introductions and 
trying to relax the atmosphere. Here the issue of confidentiality and anonymity 
was discussed and agreements on recording the interviews reached. The 
majority of the respondents were willing to state their real name to the 
recorder, but in some cases, they gave a nickname or false name. They were 
assured that no names would be used in the writing up of the findings. The 
second and fullest phase of the discussion concerned the themes and issues 
outlined in the topic guide used by the facilitator (see Annex III). Finally, the 
wrap up allowed for any further questions from the group, as well as thanks 
and an indication of how the data would be used. Most respondents were 
anxious to know about feedback from the research. They were assured that I 
would return before June 2005 to provide them with verbal and written 
feedback. As mentioned below, this feedback took place in March 2005 when 
I took advantage of my involvement in an art project supported by UNICEF to 
return to the camps. The respondents were also anxious that the issues raised 
from the research should be passed on to higher authorities. Here it was more 
difficult to provide assurances, but I suggested that perhaps through published 
articles or presentations their narratives may reach a wider audience. 
5.7.3 Interviewing skills training and development o/Topic Guides/or Focus 
Groups 
Finalisation of the topic guides used in both the FGDs and individual 
interviews for children and adults was achieved primarily during the training 
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programme. Key questions were provided to the participants of the training 
who were then asked to develop their own topic guides. The topic guides were 
revised and piloted as part of the training process, before their use in the final 
interviews. Although the process of developing the topic guides was difficult 
for the participants of the training, it helped them to grasp the questions more 
fully. It also increased the sense of ownership of the process and familiarity 
with the research. 
Most of the participants of the training found the methodology of conducting 
FGDs difficult. In some cases, it became an interview with six respondents 
rather than a group discussion. Fortunately in the final FGDs the research 
assistants had become more familiar with the techniques and their confidence 
in conducting FGDs increased over time. The process of developing the topic 
guides through the training programme had greatly assisted their 
understanding and led to the development of the 'social map' as a means of 
focusing the group on the information flow. 
The development of the 'social map' (examples of these can be found in 
Chapter Eight) arose from the initial pilots of FGDs which were not very 
successful or dynamic. Participants found the idea of 'social groups' very 
difficult to understand and placing of groups in any kind of hierarchy almost 
impossible without significant intervention by the research assistant. However, 
the introduction of a visual representation through the ' social map' (which 
initially included movable objects) helped respondents to grasp the concepts 
more fully and to participate with enthusiasm. 
On occasions, two FGDs were combined into one in order to have at least six 
participants. This occurred when for a variety of reasons some respondents 
were absent. This worked well in the Burundian camp, Camp A, where there 
were very lively discussions, but in the Congolese camp, the more dominant 
group took over the discussions. As one of the research assistants suggested: 
"one group moved the ideas in a certain direction." An example of this was the 
combination of leaders and commercial workers where primarily the religious 
leaders of the group dominated the FGD. This also applied to women who 
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were less vocal in most groups. This was particularly the case in the 
Congolese groups where it was difficult to get women to participate fully 
because of cultural restraints. 
5.7.4 In-depth interviews 
Arising from the FGDs, a number of individuals were selected from willing 
participants in the focus groups to participate in individual depth interviews. 
These totalled thirteen in the Congolese camp and included two 'Traditional 
Kings' (who were too few to include as a focus group), as well as some ad hoc 
interviews with individuals working on peace initiatives. 'Traditional Kings' 
in DRC were the equivalent of the Burundian respondents' 'influentials' i.e. in 
the eyes of the respondents, people who in their own country had considerable 
power and influence. However, when they fled to the refugee camp, although 
still respected, they held little if any administrative responsibility and were not 
considered powerful political leaders in the camp. 
Eleven individual interviews were conducted in the Burundian camp. These 
respondents were primarily 'self-selected' and included interested individuals 
who had additional comments on key issues such as the role of education. 
These guided semi-structured, exploratory interviews gave the flexibility and 
open-endedness required to allow the perceptions and understanding of the 
participants to fully emerge. As Oppenheim suggests, the 
... purpose of the exploratory interview is essentially heuristic: 
to develop ideas and research hypotheses rather than to gather 
facts and statistics. It is concerned with trying to understand 
how ordinary people think and feel about the topics of concern 
to the research (Oppenheim, 1992: 67). 
With the potentially traumatic recounting of experiences of conflict, it was 
essential to give the respondent the time to answer potentially difficult 
questions within a supportive framework. 
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5.7.5 Collection of data from children 
Although some of the data collected from children have been utilised in the 
subsequent chapters on findings and analysis, the responses from children 
were less successful than from other groups. This was due to the inexperience 
of the research assistants in talking to children. The main method of data 
collection was through analysis of children's drawings and writing. The most 
useful data collected came from the written material collected. However, this 
restricted the use of data to the narratives of literate respondents. Children 
from both in and out of school formed the groups, ranging from ages ten to 
eighteen years. The focus groups with children took a different format from 
the FGDs for adults as they utilised methods which allowed children to draw 
or write their experiences, as well as to voice them. In this way, the more 
introverted and marginalised children had an opportunity to gain confidence 
and to have their voices heard if not through speech, but through their drawing 
or writing (Johnson et al (eds), 1998). 
During the printmaking workshops described below, some of the paintings 
produced by children highlighted their experiences of conflict more 
graphically than those produced during the drawing sessions of the previous 
year. 
Illustration 5.1: 
An attack on a Congolese home 
The painting on the left, 
produced by a thirteen-
year-old Congolese boy, 
provides an example of 
this. It illustrates his 
story of the attack on his 
home by rebel soldiers. 
Perhaps because the 
children were gIVen 
ample time to express themselves in their own way, there was greater detail 
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-
and graphic representation of their stories, than those produced from the 
research data. They did not have to 'produce' results for an impatient research 
assistant. 
On reflection, although some interesting data were collected from children, 
insufficient time was given to training research assistants with the specific 
methods necessary to conduct participatory research with children. The 
paintings mentioned above were a more effective way of collecting data about 
children's experiences of conflict, which came from the opportunistic data 
collection described below. 
5.7.6 Ad hoc or opportunistic data collection 
Although the research was designed with a structure in mind, because of the 
nature of the environment, the need for flexibility has always been 
acknowledged. This implies the use of what Robson defines as a 'flexible 
design approach', which allows data to emerge and does not exclude 
opportunistic data collection (Robson, 2002). 
Therefore, additional data were collected on an informal basis, through ad hoc 
interviews with people working with NGOs in and around the camps, as aid 
workers for the UN, or employed by the Tanzanian government. In addition, 
secondary data were collected from newspaper articles, internet sites provided 
by refugees, and some reports and papers from NGOs and UN agencies. The 
UN and agencies reports were rarely relevant to the research as most focussed 
on narratives of monthly activities with limited critical analysis. Email 
correspondence with refugees and people who returned to their home country 
was another mechanism of obtaining additional data about returnee 
perceptions of the situation in Burundi and DRC. 
Taking advantage of an opportunity to work on a project supported by 
UNICEF Tanzania, that took me back to the camps in March 2005, I was able 
to conduct some further 'opportunistic' data collection and to give feedback on 
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my findings to the participants of the research conducted the previous year. 
The project involved me working with an internationally renowned artist to 
conduct a series of printmaking workshops. These provided a forum for elders 
and children from two refugee camps in K. district (Camp M and Camp B) to 
explore their common experiences of conflict and peace. These were then 
translated into images which have since been printed by UNICEF in a book 
'Voices for Peace'. These narrative illustrations reflect the experiences and 
childhood events of elders and children from Burundi and DRC. Many of them 
illustrate disturbing life stories, which are reflected in paintings similar to the 
one above. Some others are included in the remainder of this thesis. 
5.8 My role as researcher 
Although I had worked in the camps for many years and to some people was a 
familiar face, to the majority of the respondents, I was still a 'mzungu' (white 
person) and as such my presence in many cases was intimidating. 
Consequently, although I would have preferred to be part of the process of 
interviewing and sit with the research assistants, I chose to sit at the back as an 
observer. This also permitted two interviews to take place concurrently so I 
could observe both. On occasions, I would join the FGDs but not individual 
interviews. My presence however, would always change the dynamics of the 
group and the conversation would often switch from Kiswahili or Kirundi to 
French as soon as I participated. Also respondents would sometimes 'play up' 
to my presence. This was the case particularly with the Congolese 
respondents, who wanted to elicit a reaction to certain controversial statements 
or questions. These ranged from my marital status to blaming the US or the 
UK for funding and participating in the conflict in DRC. In order to try to 
remain objective and not get embroiled in personal or political debates with 
the respondents (during interviews) I tried to remain as unobtrusive as possible 
for the majority of interviews. 
My doubts as to the quality of the data collected and the use of research 
assistants continued throughout the data collection period. I wondered if I was 
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relinquishing too much control of the process to the research assistant. As I did 
not receive the translations in time to gauge the quality of the data, I was 
unable to judge the effectiveness of the research assistants on that basis. The 
few attempts I made at interviewing through an interpreter resulted in poorer 
interviews than those with a poor research assistant. A positive outcome of the 
relinquishing of control to the research assistants was their increasing 
confidence and sense that the research was becoming their own; that they were 
fully engaged in the process, and enlivened by it. If I had taken more control, 
something else would have been lost in the process. As noted in my research 
diary: 'There might have been something else lost - their own sense of what is 
right.' 
My objectivity as a researcher was severely compromised by the harrowing 
nature of some of the stories that emerged. People were surprisingly open 
about their experiences, some of which involved rape and torture, or 
witnessing the massacre of their children. It was humbling and disturbing to 
read and on occasions listen to these stories. It would often take time to bring 
some level of objectivity to what was being recounted. 
5.9 The process of analysis 
The findings of the thesis which from the basis for the following three chapters 
of the thesis initially started with a process of colour coding key data relevant 
to the original research questions. This process was followed by an initial 
matrix mapping (see Annex VI for an example of an early matrix) which 
enabled the themes to be displayed across all cases and data sets, and was 
hyperlinked between the matrices and transcripts in order to ensure 
connectivity. 
Arising from the initial matrices, Figure 5.1 below identified some of the main 
themes and ideas which would from the basis for the subsequent matrix 
mapping (as shown by the example in Annex VII). 
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Figure 5.1: Explanatory diagram arising from the initial matrix mapping 
process 
Each group 
sees itself as 
oppressed 
Mostly informal -
school only in terms of 
peer processes 
War is about 
ideas not just 
machetes 
-Writing is recent' -
oral transmission 
Experience of being witness - fleeing. 
Few signs before the elections and 
assassination of president 
Traditional stories about 
each group passed down Grassroots level Being in exile - hardships of 
refugee life - ' not at peace ' 
Know identity 
through others - but 
can get it wrong 
Current leaders 
responsible for 
massacres- Tutsi 
Relationships 
with Tutsi 
friends leads to 
reliable info 
Solution only from Burundians-
through self-sacrifice - 'begging 
pardon of each other' 
A senes of matrices for each of the FGDs and each of the individual 
interviews was produced arising from this identification of the main five 
themes in the diagram and is summarised in the table below: 
Table 5.2: Overview of the themes identified through matrix mapping. 
Information What are the different Who are seen as closest Who are the trusted 
Transmission mechanisms used - to the information and transmitters or most 
how did people why? truthfullbelieved and 
learn? why 
Educative Role of informal Role of formal Influence on conflict 
Processes educative processes educative processes or peace building 
and informal within 
formal (hidden 
curriculum, peer etc) 
'Structural What groups were Which groups are seen Are there any 
levels' identified as most powerful and identified gaps 
why or how is power between groups 
constructed 
Narratives on Experiences and Consequences of What can contribute 
conflict and ŸŤŲȘŤŮWÙŬŪVĚof conflict to resolution of 
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peace conflict conflict 
Issues of Identity issues Identity issues relating Identity issues 
identity relating to educative to information relating to 'structural 
processes transmission levels' 
Arising out of the matrices a number of key issues emerged and included the 
following: 
• Direct experience of conflict 
• Perceptions of conflict and its causes 
• Experiences of flight from conflict 
• Life in exile: the consequences of conflict 
• Ideas for peace building 
• The role of educated people 
• Identity - collective and individual 
• Trust - through 'own group' 
• 'Mouth to mouth' or oral transmission 
• Gossip and rumour 
• Arenas of learning 
• The role of technology and the internet 
• 'Small voices, big voices' and trusted transmitters of information 
• The perception of power relationship and the small voices and big 
voices. 
• The identification of gaps 
During the fmdings and analysis of the data as presented in Chapters Six -
Nine, there are both explicit and implicit assumptions made arising from the 
respondents' accounts. The implicit assumptions are made though an intuitive 
process, and therefore are more interpretive in nature than the direct quotations 
from respondents. However, despite the interpretation of the data, the spirit of 
the responses has been maintained and the integrity and honesty of the 
respondents' perceptions has been respected. In all respects, ethical 
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considerations have been maintained throughout the process of data collection 
and analysis, which are explored in section 5.11. 
5.10 Constraints 
A number of constraints affected the outcome and quality of the data collected. 
While these did not affect the overall outcome of the research, they constituted 
a series of challenges some of which caused delays in collecting, transcribing 
and translating data. 
5.10.1 Language and translation 
This was perhaps the principal concern for the success of the research, as I was 
almost totally reliant on the research assistants and translators. This increased 
the risk of misconceptions. There were instances when I believed the research 
assistant had understood something only to fmd out later that it was 
misinterpreted. I interviewed a few individuals using a mixture of French and 
English but the potential for misunderstanding was greater than if I had used 
an interpreter. Conversation was strained by language but also by my presence 
as a woman and as a 'mzungu' (white person). My presence was often 
intimidating and/or distracting for many respondents. Despite the constraints 
of using research assistants, the benefits of a free flowing and relatively 
relaxed interview outweighed the disadvantages. 
Similarly, with the transcribing and translation of interviews by translators, the 
time delay in sending the data (the first package took over a week to send and 
another month for the translations to come back) meant that it was difficult 
initially to determine the quality of the data collected. The sheer volume of the 
transcriptions implied considerable time and effort by both the Burundian and 
Congolese translators. During the analysis of the data however, it was evident 
that while much of the data related to narrative accounts of respondents' 
experiences of conflict, a significant quantity of data were linked to 
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information flow and educative processes. Therefore, my initial concerns 
about the quality ofthe data were largely unfounded. 
5.10.2 Research conditions 
Another key issue that affected my research was associated with the research 
conditions in which the data were collected. Much of the time I was living in 
accommodation without electricity or running water, which made it difficult 
not only from a technological standpoint (charging computers and batteries), 
but also meant that daily living was hard. This caused delays in typing up the 
translations, as any residual power was needed to transfer data from the digital 
recorders to the computer and from the computer to CD. 
Fortunately, the digital recorders were a very successful means of recording 
and transferring large quantities of data. There was only one occasion when I 
was unable to transfer the data from recorder to computer. The use of notes on 
this occasion was a very inefficient method of recording interviews. The note-
taker determined the speed of the discussion and made the group stop until he 
had written down what was said. Although at the outset of an interview, the 
digital recorder was sometimes an inhibitor, as the interviews progressed, 
respondents gained more confidence and ignored its presence. 
Insecurity in the camps also caused significant delays, as there had been rebel 
activity in Burundian camp the week before I arrived. This made respondents 
nervous and sometimes reluctant to talk to strangers. As I had worked in the 
camps previously, and knew many of the staff, it was easier to convince 
people of my genuine intentions. People were apprehensive talking to 
someone on an issue that was seen as politically contentious. The authorities 
had banned group gatherings in the camps, so respondents were afraid of being 
arrested if they were seen in groups of more than three. 
The reliance on logistical support from others often hindered the data 
collection process. If the transport from my accommodation to the camps was 
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not on time, I would arrive late, and interviews would be delayed. As the 
transport was offered as a favour by UNICEF and the Red Cross, I could not 
be other than appreciative of the daily trips to the camp that they provided. 
Some of the frequent deaths in the camps also affected the scheduling of 
interviews, which would be cancelled out of respect for the mourning family. 
Respondents also failed to attend on some occasions for other reasons, such as 
market day, or soap distribution, which frequently disrupted the research 
schedule. 
Some non-attendance by respondents was due to the lack of 'incentive' that 
respondents received. Previous researchers had created a demand culture 
whereby respondents expected something more substantial 'for their service'. 
Fortunately, my previous work in the camp was recognised and there was a 
perception that I was not just coming to 'take' but had already assisted the 
refugees in the past. In addition, we tried to encourage a sense that the research 
was also their contribution to a process that may help people build peace 
within the region. The value that was placed on their information helped to 
convince most people that it was worthwhile participating without financial 
incentives. 
5.11 Ethical Framework 
In terms of ethical consideration, the British Educational Research Association 
(BERA) guidelines of 1992 have been adopted and adapted as the basis for my 
ethical framework, with particular consideration for the cultural differences 
entailed in the overseas fieldwork undertaken (BERA, 1999). As there were no 
specific ethical guidelines available for the refugee context, the adaptation of 
BERA guidelines was felt to be sufficient. The guidelines are organised under 
the following seven headings which have been summarised and includes 
adaptation to my particular research situation: 
Responsibility to the research profession 
The research has been conducted in an atmosphere of respect for both the 
research profession and for the participants concerned. It has avoided any 
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fabrication or falsification of data or findings and will report all findings to 
relevant stakeholders. My professional conduct while undertaking the research 
ensured that the research was notjeopardised in any way. 
Responsibility to the participants 
Participants were respected and focus groups chosen were entirely voluntary 
and were not manipulated in any way. Participants (including children) were 
asked to give their informed consent to participate in the research and were 
encouraged to feel free to participate or not, or to leave the study at any time. 
The research was conducted in a manner that aimed at all times to respect the 
culture and customs of those involved. It provided many opportunities for 
discussion and questions concerning the research and for participants to feel 
they were part of a process. 
Responsibility to the public 
The research has been written in such a manner that the findings are clear and 
can be read by members of the public. The right to anonymity and 
confidentiality of the participants has been respected at this time. Some 
respondents were anxious to have their names included in any future 
publications and their role in the research acknowledged. 
Relationship with funding agencies 
As I have no relationship with a funding agency to undertake this research, 
this section of the guidelines is not applicable. The logistical assistance 
received from UNICEF Tanzania had no bearing on the outcome of the 
research and while the value of the assistance is fully acknowledged, they have 
placed me under no obligation. 
Publication 
This section of the guidelines will be respected if the research or parts of the 
research are published. 
Intellectual ownership 
No other significant creative contributors to the research were involved. Every 
effort will be made to feedback the research to those who participated, in a 
language and manner that will be understood in the cultural context. This 
feedback was conducted in March 2005 to the Burundian and Congolese 
participants. Unfortunately time and organisational restraints prevented me 
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from giving personal feedback to the Rwandan participants. This was provided 
through hard copies of a feedback paper. 
Relationship with host institution 
As there is no host institution involved, this section of the guidelines is not 
applicable. 
5.12 Ethical issues within the fieldwork context 
The main ethical consideration specific to the research context arose from the 
circumstances of the Rwandan respondents. As mentioned above, the 
Rwandan respondents were reluctant to come forward for security reasons. 
There was a concern that by its very nature the research could compromise the 
safety of Rwandans who were hiding amongst the Burundian population. 
However after talking to many of the UN and NGO staff working in the 
camps, it was clear that although numbers of Rwandan refugees in hiding was 
not known, they were tolerated within the Burundian camps, as long as they 
were not overt in their activities. 
There was complete anonymity of all respondents. Respondents could use any 
chosen name and this anonymity was rigorously observed particularly for the 
Rwandan respondents. 
The traumatic nature of some of the discussions and the revelation by some 
respondents of the harrowing experiences they had undergone raised an early 
concern about the psychological damage the interviews might have. However, 
as most respondents expressed relief that they were able to tell their stories 
these initial concerns were felt to be largely unfounded. 
5.13 Conclusion 
The justification for adopting a qualitative approach to the research takes into 
account the special circumstances in which it was conducted. The context of 
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the research and the sensitivity of the subject make flexibility a necessity 
where change and uncertainty is part of life as a refugee. In order to 
understand the issues relating to conflict and the refugees' perceptions of it, 
the research examines meanings attached to individual and community 
perceptions of conflict and peace. These highlight the gaps within the 
educative processes, where the rhetoric of peace negotiators at the national and 
international level is not always met by the reality at the grassroots level. 
The research therefore is an investigation of different perceptions and is not 
designed to seek out statistical facts. The personal narratives arising from the 
data collection have been taken from refugees in four camps. These camps 
represent sample groups from three case studies (Rwanda, Burundi and DRC) 
and while these are not comparative, they provide a triangulation of experience 
and offer different perspectives to illuminate the regional dimension of the 
conflicts in the Great Lakes. 
The respondents came from a cross section of different groups from Burundi, 
Rwanda and DRC and were considered as the grassroots level at Level One of 
the 'structural levels' model seen in Chapter One. Apart from the Rwandan 
refugees - who were too few to fonn focus groups - the remaining groups 
were interviewed within Focus Group Discussions. These were chosen as the 
primary method for data collection, after which depth interviews were held 
with selected individuals. The training and use of local research assistants, the 
direct use of local languages and the informal settings - helped to ensure a 
degree of integrity and genuineness which a more 'classical' approach, might 
not have achieved. The use of research assistants also ensured that my 
presence as a 'mzungu' (white person) would not significantly alter the 
dynamics of the FGDs and interviews. However, even though my principle 
role was that of observer, it was difficult to be totally objective given the 
research context and the harrowing stories of death, rape and torture that 
emerged from some narratives. 
Despite the considerable concerns relating to the design and methods used in 
the field work, the outcome of the data collection and analysis was positive in 
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terms of the amount of information, breadth of consultation, openness of 
response and high level of interest of respondents. The research provided a 
small, but critical opportunity for the respondents to assert their dignity as part 
of a process in which they were defining the content of the research with 
minimal guidance from me or the research assistants. 
This chapter also provided the basis for analysis of the data collected, out of 
which key themes were identified as the basis to analyse the data presented in 
Chapters Six to Nine. These focussed on: 
a) Narratives of conflict and perceptions of peace 
b) Educative processes and information transmission - primarily the role 
of educated people, oral tradition, rumour and gossip, use of new 
technology 
c) 'Structural levels' and the respondents perceptions of power structures 
both within the camps and within their own countries 
d) Identity and the link between educative processes and identity 
construction and shift 
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CHAPTER SIX: NARRATIVES OF CONFLICT AND PEACE 
BUILDING 
6.1 Introduction 
You understand that they had invented ways of catching people 
at every place possible. At that time when the war started, there 
were people (Hutu) who had found refuge at the mission with 
the priest. Then Micombero himself came in a helicopter 
pretending that he was coming to tell them that there was 
peace. All those people were told to get out of the houses where 
they were. When they came outside, they found themselves 
surrounded by soldiers. The soldiers caught them, and piled 
them in a lorry. They dug a big pit with caterpillars at a place 
that I know ... then they threw them in and covered them with 
earth while they were still alive. 
This recollection from a Burundian elder is one of many similar examples of 
atrocities committed in various forms. The stories of those who had 
experienced terror and fear before, during and after their arrival in exile are 
powerful and harrowing, and this chapter focuses largely on these narratives, 
with limited explanatory intervention. What is revealed is not only the horrific 
nature of the experiences but also how perceptions have guided the process of 
conflict. These have nurtured hatred and hostility which has fed into the next 
generation. This inevitably affects the potential for successful peace 
negotiations at any level. 
This chapter addresses the research questions raised at the outset of the thesis 
which ask: 
• What types of conflict have been experienced and what are people's 
perceptions of the conflict? 
• How do communities resolve conflicts and how do they think conflict in 
their country might be resolved? 
• How might educative processes used to learn about conflict be 
transformed into peace building mechanisms? 
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6.2 Perceptions of the conflict and its causes 
Many of the respondents were anxious to relate stories of the history of their 
country which they believed had a direct bearing on the conflict and its 
outcome. Many of the children also knew and recounted the 'history' of their 
country, mainly relating stories told by their parents rather than those learnt at 
school. The oral tradition in this context was significant, with many children's 
'experiences' of conflict in fact being second hand from parents (cf: 7.3: pp. 
197-201). These stories have been passed down through the generations and 
are explicit in their condemnation of the 'enemy' as this historical example 
from Burundian elders about life in Burundi indicates: 
Respondent 4: Let us come back to the past. When the 
Belgian defeated the German in our country, 
he allied himself to the Tutsi and they 
exchanged brides (married each other's 
women). The Tutsi went to school, the Hutu 
became farmers, who they would lash at will. 
They compared us to the machine that holds 
planks because we were workers. It is then that 
we were forced to look down. The Hutu was a 
house boy and the Tutsi would look after the 
cows. 
Respondent 5: The reason why the Hima [the tribe from 
which the Tutsis are said to have originated] 
were put aside, is that they learnt to own 
things. In the past, the Hima had no 
compound. They lived in bushes. If one had 
cows, they were kept in bushes. They had no 
house. Nothing. But after they had gone to 
school, after they had known how to build a 
house, how to own things and to get into the 
army, they got to the forefront. 
Education in this context was perceived in a negative light. There was a 
perception that until the Tutsi 'had gone to school' Hutu and Tutsi had lived 
peacefully. Respondents believed education and knowledge created the 
differences. 
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The Congolese respondents also recounted stories from DRC that portrayed a 
particular view of the history and origins of the conflict in their country. 
Stories such as the one below from the FGD for families were common: 
Respondent: Some years back we welcomed Tutsis who 
were fleeing their country because of inter 
ethnic war in Rwanda and many of them 
settled in South Kivu ... We lived peacefully 
with them in our country. To thank us for our 
hospitality, they ganged up with their Tutsi 
brothers now in power in Rwanda, Uganda and 
Burundi to take our land and rule ... When they 
launched their first war in 1996, the Congolese 
people, though upset with the rule of Mobutu, 
distanced themselves from the insurgents 
when they noticed that it was led by unnamed 
Banyamulenge who were alleging that they 
were denied the Congolese nationality. Seeing 
that they would not go far, they hired Laurent 
Kabila a well known former Congolese rebel 
against the Kinshasa Government to head the 
movement. The Banyarwanda motives are 
very well known to the people of Kivu. 
These stories provided by the respondents illustrate the Bembe view on the 
development of hostilities between the two sides, but a brief overview of 
the historical nature of the complex issues dividing the Bembe and 
'Banyamulenge' is covered in more detail in Chapter 2.4 (p. 59-60) from a 
more academically reconstructed perspective (ICG, 2005; Nzongola-
Ntalaja, 2004; Pottier, 2002). 
One of the Congolese Traditional Kings recounted a story that clearly 
illustrates the Bembe perception of how hostilities between the 
'Banyarwanda' and the Bembe developed in DRC. These are the stories 
that are recounted to children as 'history'. 
Respondent: According to the history we know, these 
people were coming to feed their animals on 
our mountains. When they entered in the 
Congo, they settled at Mulenge in the Territory 
of Uvira... and from here they went to 
Ngandja and in all Bembe territory always 
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feeding their herds of cattle where they noticed 
that their animals were doing very well... Since 
the indigenous people had no ill feelings with 
the newcomers we allowed them in our midst. 
Later we noticed changes I talked about. But 
before that they were as meek as the sheep. 
One could not suspect them of any evil nor 
think they would drastically change this way. 
When they started to call themselves 
Banyamulenge instead of Banyarwanda, they 
became very aggressive and ready to kill 
people who would dare call them 
Banyarwanda. They used to walk with long 
knives and sticks. 
It is not necessary to question the accuracy/inaccuracy of these stories. The 
critical issue is that these stories are consistently passed down to children as 
part of the oral history of their country. This potentially feeds the culture of 
violence and revenge that perpetuates through the generations. Children 
recount these stories as true and rarely have recourse to an alternative 
historical viewpoint. 
As this child from the FGD for children in the Congolese camp recounted: 
Interviewer: 
Respondent 2: 
Interviewer: 
Respondent 2: 
What is the origin of war in your country? 
We hear from our grandfathers that it is 
because the Banyamulenge like taking land 
by force and to impose that they be paid 
citizenship by force. 
Who gave you that information? 
It is my father. 
A similar explanation from a Burundian child about the conflict in his country 
is equally characteristic: 
Respondent 3: I do not know. What I know about it is 
(hesitation) I was not aware of the war we fled 
but I saw how the people were killed. For the 
rest. I was told by my parents. 
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Interviewer 1: What did they tell you? 
Respondent 3: They told me how it all happened. How 
people were killed, why they were killed and 
the source of their conflict. The parents told 
me. 
Interviewer 1: What did your parents tell you was the source of 
the conflict? 
Respondent 3: The source of the conflict that I heard them say 
was that for the Hutu in our village, they were 
being massacred because they had voted for a 
Hutu instead of a Tutsi. The Tutsi who lived in 
our village wanted to force the Hutu to elect a 
Tutsi instead of a Hutu but the Hutu voted for a 
Hutu. I was not there to be sure but I was told 
that by my parents. That's the reason why in 
matters of Burundi, I only saw how people were 
killed but much of it comes from my parents. 
When asked if parents should stop telling their children these stories, one 
woman respondent replied: 
Should I not tell my child when he asks "How was my father 
killed?" Should I not tell him the truth? 
For most respondents there was no recognition that telling children the truth 
was different from recounting tales that engender revenge and retaliation. This 
sense of deep-rooted anger was tangible within both groups and represented an 
almost unshakable certainty that the 'enemy' was responsible for the conflict, 
whether the enemy be Burundian Tutsi, or Congolese Banyarwanda. 
There were only two cases where there was admittance that 'maybe' their own 
side was also responsible for killing. This child's story was one of only two 
responses that admitted culpability of their own side: 
Respondent 3: What I would say is that the reason why we 
left was that, in our region, they came and 
massacred people in the whole house one by 
one until they killed the last. 
Interviewer: Who killed them? 
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Respondent 3: We saw a big group of men climbing the hill. 
They were armed with spears and sticks. They 
may have been Hutu who were coming to kill 
Tutsi. They massacred all the Tutsi in one 
house. Then the Tutsi came down to fight the 
Hutu. They fought and fought and fought. The 
Hutu were killed among whom were some of 
our neighbours. Those who survived the battle 
decided to go away. 
A Congolese respondent from the CBO group made a more generalised 
statement when he said: 
On this issue let me say that we should not keep blaming 
Banyarwanda or the so-called Banyamulenge. People in the 
government of the then Zaire were accomplices in the 
preparation and the evolution of the war up to the ousting of 
Mobutu. The country was left open to any adventurer. 
In contrast to these two perspectives the majority of respondents placed the 
blame on 'others'. The Congolese for example blamed the Banyarwanda, who 
were funded by Rwanda (in turn funded by the US and UK). The perception 
by the Congolese that US and UK are responsible for starting and perpetuating 
the conflict in DRC persists as noted in Chapter Eight. The gaps in structural 
levels in this sense apply not only to the gaps between the powerful and the 
not so powerful within DRC but also to the gap between nations, between rich 
and poor nations, between superpowers and countries that are being exploited 
by them. This exploitation was perceived by the respondents as taking many 
forms, but one common perception was that the US and UK were responsible 
for the much of the conflict and that the mercenaries that these countries sent 
in were interfering with the potential for peace in the country. This example 
from one of the FGDs for leaders highlights this: 
They are the ones [US and UK] who have the key to our peace. 
They have hired people to destroy us, we ask them to stop their 
henchmen [mercenaries] and return then to wherever they 
belong. They have this power. 
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Illustration 6.1 
The 'White General' - a mercenary as perceived in DRC 
Stories of 'white mercenaries' from the UK 
or US were common from many 
respondents. The presence of white 
mercenaries in DRC was conflrmed during 
an interview with a senior diplomat 
working in Tanzania who had extensive 
experience of former Zaire, Burundi and 
Rwanda. In addition to my own research, 
the painting of the 'White General' on the 
left indicates the strength of feeling in this 
regard, and confirms the overall response 
by Congolese refugees regarding the 
involvement of 'outsiders' in the conflict. This was a print made by a youth in 
a printmaking workshop in one of the Congolese camps (cf: 5.7 pp. 151-159) 
and was painted by one of the Congolese boys in the workshop to demonstrate 
how 'whites' were interfering in the conflict in his country. Although these 
workshops were not directly related to my research, as one of the facilitators I 
was struck by the number of drawings and paintings that depicted scenes of 
violence and ethnic tension. 
Although the Burundian respondents did not mention the role of US and UK 
as frequently as the Congolese, occasionally respondents discussed the role of 
'superpowers' who they believed had the ability but not the political will to 
end the conflict in the Great Lakes. This is covered in more depth in Chapter 
Eight (cf: 8.4 pp. 218-224). This example from one of the group of 
professionals however was typical: 
Respondent 5: There are countries which, if they want peace 
to be restored in that region, it would be 
restored. But because of interests they need us 
not to understand one another. They also 
contribute to create the conflicts. The 
superpowers like USA, France, England, 
because of the interests they have in Congo, 
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Burundi or Rwanda they see that if we 
continue with our conflicts, their interests 
would develop. . .. Those people who do not 
want us to have peace because of their 
interests should contribute their part to 
promote peace in the region. 
As will be seen below in section 6.5, the belief that 'Whites' or superpowers 
could end the conflicts in the region and bring peace dominated perceptions of 
how peace could be restored. 
6.3 Experiences and flight from conflict 
The expenences of conflict that respondents recounted during the data 
collection could be categorised in two ways: one of physical experience, and 
the other the fear of the expected. Typically the Burundian narratives 
described the fonner and the Congolese the latter. 
In the case of the Burundian narratives, many people witnessed the events of 
conflict which have been ongoing for decades. However what unified these 
experiences with those of the Congolese respondents was the aspect of flight. 
Many of the prints that emerged from the workshops mentioned above were of 
people fleeing from violence, particularly women and children who were often 
depicted carrying their belongings, as the painting below by a Congolese 
woman indicates. 
Illustration 6.2 
Woman and child 
jleeingDRC 
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Most of the Burundians interviewed (all of whom were Hutu) fled because of 
some personal experience or witnessing of the killing of family members or 
close neighbours. Congolese in contrast fled largely because of rumour. The 
story below from a professional Burundian woman relates her experience of 
escape from Burundi: 
When there was a head of the family, he was arrested. But if 
they happened to miss him, they arrested the wife and the 
children. I have been one of those families. My husband was 
not there having left before. Then I saw the soldiers come 
around my home as if they were just going around. Then they 
arrested my first born child and killed him. I took the remaining 
children and ran away from the area because if I had stayed 
there, they would have massacred me and my children because 
they had not found the one they wanted. That's what made me 
flee. 
Most of the Burundian or Rwandan respondents were witnesses to violence or 
murder which caused them to flee rather than hearing it from other sources. A 
young Burundian teacher explained some of the reasons why she had to leave 
her home: 
Interviewer: 
Respondent: 
Even though you were 12 years old you could 
see things. Can you tell us what happened? 
Can you tell us about the war? 
We saw the soldiers come. They came. 
Because at the time I fled as I was a still small 
child the soldiers came at our home, they 
knocked I saw my parents run. I myself ran 
and because it was at night I ran away naked. 
There was a fence at our home a fence made of 
cedars. I scrambled/crouched under the cedars. 
We then heard bullets as people were being 
killed. I stayed under the cedars till morning. 
The next day I saw other people who were 
running away, fleeing carrying their things. I 
came with them. We came to a certain place 
which was a camp. We stayed there. The 
soldiers attacked the camp and we crossed the 
border to Tanzania. 
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As an educative process, directly experiencing conflict for the Burundian and 
Rwandan respondents was one of the most primary forms of learning about the 
conflict. In the world of this twelve-year-old child, the immediacy of her 
response relates directly to the experience she had in witnessing soldiers 
entering her house. There was no process to analyse the truth of the situation. 
Neither did she question why soldiers were coming to the house. It was 
sufficient that she saw her parents running in order to take immediate action. 
Similarly a Rwandan nurse recounted how she saw the arrest of her fourteen 
year old son then discovered later that he had been killed: 
Meanwhile among the children I had left at home, they arrested 
my young boy child and they killed him. They took him and 
killed him. So when they told me to fetch water, I ran away. I 
escaped from them. 
This woman's story is a common one for men, women and children from 
Burundi and Rwanda. Many told stories of either killings that they had 
witnessed in Burundi or threats that they were in danger. The story below from 
a Burundian commercial worker reflects widespread narratives that reflect 
some of the violent experiences that some people underwent before they fled 
to Tanzania: 
Interviewer: Who killed them? [they had been talking about 
the massacre ofHutu intellectuals in 1993] 
Respondent 3: They were killed by the army and they killed 
them in the house of the Bishop. They did not 
stop there. They charged then at our commune 
of Butaganzwa. They massacred people, burnt 
houses and domestic animals in them, 
slaughtered people in the street. I was hiding 
somewhere in my house and I was stunned. It 
was like a river which had flooded. Blood was 
flooding the street so that I ran without 
knowing where I was heading to. I was 
staggered and I fled to safety. 
The trauma of the experiences the respondents have undergone before arriving 
in Tanzania, has stayed with them and many of the paintings from the 
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printmaking workshops produced by both Burundian and Congolese 
participants reflect these experiences. The paintings below depicting burning 
houses are only two of the many that were produced as examples of 
experiences the refugees had undergone before fleeing to Tanzania. 
Illustration 6.3 Illustration 6.4 
House buming - Burundi House buming - DRC 
Almost every person interviewed from the Burundian camps, recounted 
similar powerful and disturbing stories. Some were stories from the massacres 
of Hutus in 1972 and others were more recent from the 1990s. 
The case below of a young Rwandan woman who was raped at the age of 
eleven is personal and harrowing, but is an experience that is common both 
during and after conflict. Rape frequently occurs as part of conflict and post 
conflict (cf: section 6.4 pp. 184-1186) and is now largely recognised by the 
international community as a war crime. 
Respondent: At that woman' s home [the place she had been 
taken to after her parents had been killed] I 
found out that her husband was also a killer. 
He teamed with those people who were 
reaching for and killing other persons in 
Rwanda . . . The woman thought that I was 
stupid and left me at home. She went to the 
field or to do her other jobs while I stayed with 
her child. Then they came to do me evil. They 
raped me without me knowing . .. They raped 
me when I was eleven years old. 
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Rape is perpetrated by many men engaged in conflicts, for some it is seen as a 
'perk' of the job, for others as a means to abuse with impunity. The physical 
and sexual abuse of women is a common feature of war but until recently rape 
was not considered a war crime in its own right. It was after 1993 and 1994 
that the statutes from the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) were introduced to form the 
foundation upon which crimes of rape and sexual violence could be punished 
(Scheffer, 1999). 
During the three and a half months of conflict in Rwanda approximately eight 
thousand women were raped. For many in Rwanda rape not only exists as a 
continuing mental torture but many are also infected with HIV / AIDS by the 
rapist. They are not only stigmatised by their communities because of their 
'violation', but doubly labelled because of their infection. Amnesty 
International report that 
Sexual violence and forced marriage continue to be perpetrated 
by members of the current Rwandese military (Rwandan 
Defence Forces or RDF), security forces and unpaid militias. 
These assaults are sometimes reported but are again seldom 
prosecuted (Amnesty International, 2004: 2). 
In the printmaking workshops mentioned above, three out of the five women 
in one workshop told stories or drew pictures at some time during the 
workshop of their personal experience of rape in their home countries. 
Illustration 6.5 
Forced to walk at knife point before being raped 
The etching on 
the left is one 
such example, 
which depicts a 
story from a 
participant who 
as a child was 
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forced by a man 'to take a walk' after fetching water from the well. The artist 
cried as she related this story, embarrassed that she was still so affected more 
than thirty years later. These horrific experiences of rape for the respondents 
were not only confined to their home country but many women were subjected 
to rape also within the refugee camps (cf: 6.4 pp. 184-186). 
The fact that respondents wanted to tell these chilling stories and were 
anxious, even demanding in their right to be heard, indicates how strongly 
people have felt that their difficulties have largely been ignored by the 
international community. This is particularly the case for Rwandan Hutus who 
believe that their plight has been overshadowed by the Tutsi massacres in 
Rwanda in 1994. The story of this young Hutu woman highlights the other 
side of the genocide story, from the Rwandan Hutus who were also subjected 
to torture and death. 
Interviewer: 
Respondent: 
Respondent: 
How did you escape? What happened that 
made all your relatives die, your father and 
mother die and you survive? How did they kill 
them? What did you do to survive? 
They killed them with old hoes, Iron bars, 
machetes and gun. 
When I went home I was with my father and 
mother. They came and arrested my father and 
we separated with my mother, trying to hide 
from those people. They arrested him first, and 
then they took him and killed him. They rolled 
him in banana leaves, burnt him and he died. 
As for my mother and I, we tried to hide. She 
persuaded one of her friends to hide me. Then 
they arrested my mother and we were left. I 
and her friend. She [her mother] was taken by 
the people who were killers. They led her to 
their leader who was a counsellor. When they 
arrived and even though the wife of that 
counsellor was a friend of my mother'S, she 
did not protect her. They took my mother and 
threw her in the river, after a short time. 
The stories from the Congolese respondents revealed that the many had fled 
because of atrocities that they had heard about, rather than witnessed. In their 
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narratives about how the conflict started, many of the Congolese respondents 
expressed surprise, less that war was about to take place, but that their army 
was so easily defeated. A number of respondents described how they and their 
family were shocked by the outbreak of war because they were convinced that 
'their' army would be able to defeat the Banyarwanda without difficulty. The 
man from one Civil Society FGD group stated: 
We had no doubt on our victory. Banyarwanda as we knew 
them were not a threat at all. We had faith in our Government 
and the army. That is the reason why we were not planning to 
leave. We knew pretty well that the war was coming from 
Rwanda in connivance with Banyarwanda. 
They were surprised instead when the national army fled in the face of the 
rebel forces. As one man from the CBO group said: 'We understood that a big 
war was being prepared while we were asleep.' The rumours that were rife 
during that time were not taken seriously, despite their veracity. Information 
about the build up to the war was not sufficiently believed to make people flee. 
Those who fled usually had some direct experience of the war, or received 
information from a source that was totally trusted. This concurs with the 
suggestion in Chapter Three that for rumour to believed, it has to come from a 
trusted source as well as contain elements of truth. Many stories from both 
Congolese and Burundian respondents revealed that sometimes the most 
'trusted' information would come from the 'enemy' side. For example one 
respondent described how a Banyarwandan friend had warned him about the 
war: 
He said that we had been very good to them but powerful 
nations urged them to take our country and occupy it. We have 
accepted the offer and what is going to happen is massive 
killings of the Congolese indigenous tribes. He told me that 
they had taken an oath that each one was to kill his own friend. 
Whoever would not do that was to be killed by his fellow 
Banyarwanda through poison or anything else including guns. 
He added that High Officers in the National Army were also 
bribed and were not going to fight. On hearing this I left 
without delay. Members of my family who refused to leave 
were killed. I lost 48 of them. 
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There were many instances of people who warned neighbours and friends 
from the opposing side, who assisted each other, often at the risk of their own 
lives. The brief story below from a Burundian commercial worker is just one 
example: 
One Tutsi friend told me "Are you here? We have already made 
a list of all Hutu in Kirundo. You are going to be exterminated" 
So we left our beer and we saw a helicopter fly over us. It 
massacred people in Ntega-Marangara [a province of Burundi]. 
That is how we came to flee. 
6.4 Life in exile: the consequences of conflict 
Despite the horrors of the conflict and the terror of fleeing their country, the 
majority of respondents related negative experiences about their life in exile in 
Tanzania. Feelings of humiliation, loss of freedom, indignity and in some 
cases abuse were common in the descriptions of life as a refugee in the camps. 
There were many examples that compared life in the camp to 'being in 
prison', or living 'like an animal in a park' or a 'bird in a cage.' There were 
variations in their descriptions of the type of prison they felt it to be, but all 
felt the confinement, their lack of freedom and lack of rights to be the most 
important issue. The example from one member of a leaders group in the 
Congolese camp highlights this feeling: 
We don't know our rights, if we ever have any. We are insulted 
by those who are supposed to take care of us. We are 
humiliated before our siblings' eyes. 
A major consequence of the confinement and close proximity of residents in 
the camps was the issue of security; personal security was of considerable 
concern to girls and women. An informal interview with a Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MHA) official suggested that possibly up to fifty percent of women in 
the camps had been subjected to some from of sexual abuse, although the 
majority of cases remain unreported. In 1997 the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) conducted a study into the high incidences of rape in the 
Burundian camps in Tanzania and reported that: 
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... approximately 26% of the 3,803 Burundi refugee women 
between the ages of 12-49 in the established camp of 
Kanembwa have experienced sexual violence since becoming a 
refugee. Refugees have been subject to such violence at every 
stage of their quest for safety: in the conflict situation in 
Burundi, along the Tanzanian border, between the border and 
the refugee camps, and within and around the camps. 
Perpetrators have included soldiers, policemen, Burundi and 
Tanzanian nationals, fellow refugees, relatives, husbands, and 
one reported case of a rape by a NGO security staff member 
(who has since been fired for another offence) (IRe, 1997). 
Similarly a Burundian woman from the FGD for family expressed her general 
concern about the situation in the camp and the feelings of insecurity that were 
common among many women and girls: 
The fact of being gathered here in the camp, the moral 
behaviour of our children has been very much affected, 
especially our girls. Women and girls are not spared. Those 
who venture to go to fetch water or firewood are raped. Cases 
of rape are plenty. We don't feel secure at all. You cannot be 
sure of the health state of the rapist. He may be already a 
HIV / AIDS victim. AIDS has been spread among us at a scaring 
speed. Many marriages are falling apart because of this wind of 
rapes. Husbands suspect their wives of having willingly 
consented to do the act. There are many cases of divorce now. 
Women, we have no peace of mind at all. 
It is a travesty that victims of conflict - fleeing from some of the most horrific 
experiences - are then subject to further violence in supposedly peaceful 
places of refuge. 
The issue of security was only one of long lists of hardships and complaints 
against the organisations running the camps or providing services. This story 
from a young Rwandan woman highlights the perceptions of many 
respondents. Although glad to be out of the direct conflict, she finds life very 
hard in the camp: 
Respondent: I find that I had no pleasure in the country 
[Rwanda] because I was only able to sit in 
solitude and in despair wondering how I would 
grow up or the way I would live, without 
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anybody from by family around me. However, 
I was glad when I arrived here [in the camp] 
even though life is not good either because it is 
in a camp ... I also found that there was no 
security when I arrived. There were guns -
there was banditry. I heard people cry out 
because they had cut one another with 
machetes ... People came to attack us at our 
house with the aim to do us evil, they stole 
everything we had in the house, and they 
wanted also to kill us. It may be 
understandable when one is killed where there 
is no peace, but here our things have been 
stolen in a situation where there was supposed 
to be peace. 
The situation in many of the camps during the data collection period was 
considered highly insecure. Prior to my arrival in March 2004, there had been 
rebel insurgents entering into the Burundian camps who had killed several 
people. Rwandan rebels were also said to have entered the camps in N. region 
to force Rwandans hiding amongst the Burundian refugees, to join them. I was 
told of one case where several girls had been taken by the rebels, 'as slaves'. 
One of the girls escaped and returned to tell her tale, but spent the rest of her 
time moving from house to house in fear of her life. It is inexcusable that in a 
supposedly protected environment after escaping from one form of abuse in 
their own country, refugees experience further abuse in their country of 
asylum. 
6.5 Ideas for peace building 
The majority of respondents saw little opportunity to engage personally in 
peace building mechanisms. Despite the fact that there were several peace 
initiatives taking place within the camps, there was little recognition that these 
had any bearing on the peace process in their countries. As noted in Chapter 
Eight many narratives suggest that peace could only be brokered by the most 
powerful of their country or by the 'superpowers' such as UK and US (cf: 8.4 
pp. 218-224). This highlights the power relationships referred to in the models 
of structural levels identified in Chapter One (cf: 1.5 pp. 28-36). Perhaps this 
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perception comes from the fact that community initiatives for peace building 
are not regarded either internationally or nationally as a significant part of the 
process and only those peace initiatives brokered at the highest level are 
considered relevant. If the profile of the community voice for peace was raised 
and recognised internationally, it may provide more lasting and sustainable 
peace initiatives when combined with national/international treaties or 
agreements (cf: 10.5 pp. 269-322). 
Respondents provided many examples of how they perceived the higher 
'structural levels' , as well as more powerful nations could bring peace. A few 
of these examples are provided below: 
A Congolese family member stated that: 
Politicians are the ones to bring peace, but in these high 
positions, they forget themselves and are serving only their own 
interests. For peace to be found, they must forget their own 
interests. 
Similarly a Burundian teacher suggests that peace is dependent on the 
abandonment of self-interest: 
Leaders should not defend their own interests but be concerned 
with the interest of others. Different groups should sit together 
to settle differences. 
The example below from a Congolese man, a respondent in the FGD for 
CBOs is indicative of many narratives from both Burundian and Congolese 
respondents concerning the role of West em influences in their countries: 
Today the US are the sole superpower in the world. These 
people covet the wealth Congo is endowed with and they want 
to exploit our country by using a proxy whose name is Rwanda. 
Why can't they look for puppets in the DRC the way they did 
with Mobutu instead of bringing us the Rwandese? The 
sentiment of being under Rwanda, a small country which 
doesn't have the might of Congo cannot and will not be 
stomached by the Congolese people. 
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Few respondents regarded the lower hierarchical levels as having an 
opportunity to assist the peace process, but one Congolese English teacher 
suggested: 
For peace messages it is necessary for mobilisation before and 
after peace building through different groups, where each group 
is trained separately. Radio is a very good way of passing 
information and could be used to start a peace building 
programme. 
In a slightly different way, a Burundian teacher suggested that it is not for 
others to solve the problem of the conflict in Burundi: 
The conflict needs to be solved by Burundians themselves, not 
by outsiders. Each person must admit what wrong they have 
done. Until each has 'begged pardon' of the other there is no 
hope for peace. The past has to be put aside. 
This particular response is redolent of the assertion by the FNL in Burundi that 
until culpability is admitted on both sides, through a peace and reconciliation 
process, then they will not participate in the peace process in Burundi (cf: 2.3 
pp.54-58). 
These responses reflect the apparent powerlessness of the groups at this level, 
despite the existence of several peace groups in the camps, some of which 
were part of a network, others which worked independently. All however, 
were working together with community members to try and facilitate dialogue 
and peaceful resolution of domestic and local conflicts. Despite this, the 
majority of respondents failed to recognise these initiatives as significant in 
the overall process of peace building. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The narratives outlined in this chapter highlighted a number of key issues 
relating to the respondents' perceptions of the origins and outcomes of 
conflict. Firstly there was an overwhelming sense that respondents' 
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consistently blamed the ' enemy'. Their perceptions of the historical 
background to the conflict and how the conflict started were prejudiced by the 
deep-rooted revenge mentality that pervaded the narratives collected. This 
highlights one of the problematic issues for this research in terms of finding 
effective peace building mechanisms, i.e. how to break the cycle of revenge? 
The negative stories highlighted by the narratives in this chapter were passed 
down through the generations and serve only to fuel the conflict, whether in 
the short or long term. 
Secondly, despite the horrific tales that people recounted of their flight from 
their home countries, many respondents felt that life in the camp was only 
marginally better than enduring the conflict. Feelings of indignity, 
imprisonment, and lack of security were commonplace. There were rare stories 
of positive experiences arising from life in the camp. 
Lastly, the community saw themselves as impotent in terms of their effect on 
peace building. This confirms the gaps suggested at the beginning of the 
thesis, between different 'structural levels' , within societies and between 
societies and relate to the models outlined in Chapter One Ccf: 1.5 pp. 28-36). 
There was a sense that peace could only be brought by 'superpowers' such as 
the UK and the US or by high level politicians within the country. This is 
perhaps because of a) a failure to recognise the potential of the peace 
initiatives already in existence at a local level, and b) a denial of the effect that 
the negative narratives might have on the younger generation. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: INSIDE OUTSIDE SCHOOL - THE ROLE OF 
EDUCATIVE PROCESSES 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates how different educative processes were perceived by 
respondents as being effective mechanisms for information transmission on 
conflict issues in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. Emerging from the questions 
presented below, topic guides were developed which aimed to elicit responses 
to identify different mechanisms used to transmit information which form the 
basis for educative processes. The findings from the data collection therefore 
address the following research questions (see Chapter 1.4, pp. 26-28): 
• What types of formal and informal educative processes exist? 
• Which of these are perceived as the most significant in the 
transmission of information in their countries? 
• What factors within the most significant educative processes make 
them so? 
• How do educative processes affect identity construction and shifts? 
• Which educative processes identified were perceived to influence 
conflict? 
The main thrust of this chapter focuses on the role of educative processes in 
formal and informal ways, first through the paradoxical role that 'educated 
people' were perceived to have played in the conflict, and secondly through a 
variety of informal educative processes ranging from rumour, gossip and other 
forms of oral transmission, to radio and internet. In addition arenas for 
learning and personal experiences of conflict also emerged from the data 
analysis as issues that addressed the above research questions. The greater 
emphasis on informal mechanisms arose because formal educative processes 
were rarely identified by respondents as a source of learning about the conflict, 
even though informal learning within formal educational settings was 
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acknowledged. This was the case for both the Burundian and Congolese 
respondents. This was unforeseen given the traditional perception of formal 
education as a potent change agent. The limited role of formal education as 
perceived by respondents is surprising given the fact that in the Rwandan 
genocide many teachers were identified as perpetrators in the conflict and 
were said to promote an enemy culture (Mamdani, 2001; Obura, 2003). 
7.2 Formal educative processes 
Formal educative processes had significance chiefly in terms of producing 
'educated people' (those with a university education). These were identified 
by some as having culpability in the conflict but paradoxically also having the 
potential to promote peace. Schools along with other 'arenas of learning' were 
identified among the Burundian refugees as places where students would 
gather to discuss their engagement in the conflict - or to train for it. However 
teachers were not identified as teaching hate messages or teaching directly 
about the conflict. This does not mean to say that this did not exist, but that it 
was not identified by the respondents as forming a significant part of their 
experIence. 
7.2.1 The role of 'educated people ' 
There was an important distinction made between 'education institutions' and 
'educated people'. The role of education institutions as considered above was 
less important for most respondents than that of 'educated people' or 
'intellectuals' who were perceived as 'part of the problem'. It was suggested 
that they possessed a degree of responsibility for influencing and even 
contributing to the conflict. One of the Congolese youth interviewed 
summarised some of the sentiments about intellectuals that were voiced by 
several of the respondents: 
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The educated people can be easily corrupted and hence sell 
us ... They cannot be trusted ' kabisa' [completely]. 
He suggested that educated people were 'closer' to 'Whites' who were seen by 
the majority of Congolese as being at the heart of the conflict. Whites were 
perceived in this way by many Congolese respondents because of the funding 
given to Uganda and Rwanda which it was suggested was used to support 
Rwandan rebels and disrupt DRC. There was a belief that the increased 
interactions between 'Whites' and 'educated people' resulted in the corruption 
and ultimate deception of the 'intellectuals'. As one Congolese youth said 'The 
Whites interact with the learned people and deceive them. ' 
There was a contradictory element in the perception of many respondents to 
' intellectuals' as many considered 'educated people' to be closer to the 
information source. The paradox of education as either the benign or malign 
force that was discussed in Chapter Three (cf: 3.3 pp. 87-91) is reflected also 
in the perceptions of respondents towards ' educated people' . While they were 
not necessarily trusted, it was known that they could gain better access to and 
understand the information better than people with less education. They were 
also perceived by some as having the potential to 'bring the light' , but often 
did not live up to that potential. They were seen as easy to manipulate because 
of their close interaction with Whites. This challenges the common perception 
that ' educated people' make more informed choices and are therefore less 
likely to be susceptible to manipulation which was discussed in more depth in 
Chapter Three. 
A group of Burundian parents saw ' intellectuals' as being close to the 
information and able to gather additional information not always available to 
others. One respondent stated: 
I too think that the group of intellectuals [are close to the 
information] because he can even give you information that has 
not been given in the country. They listen to many radios. 
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Intellectuals therefore were seen as powerful people who could influence the 
outcome of conflict. 'Educated people' were seen as powerful in two ways: 
firstly that they were 'closer to the Whites' and therefore close to the 
perceived seat of power, and secondly because they had a greater ability to 
gain access to and interpret the information they received regarding the 
conflict. This power however, made them less trusted than those with little or 
no education who were perceived as more likely to tell the truth. They were 
distrusted not only because of their education but also because of the power it 
invested on them. 
Similarly, 'educated people' were seen by one Congolese respondent as 
having 'failed' their nation. The expectation was that 'educated people' would 
have helped the situation and 'shown the way to others', but this was not the 
case. Others too stated that 'intellectuals' should be 'the light'. A traditional 
healer for example stated: 'The educated have totally failed, as the light of the 
society they have not shone the way as they should.' In this way 'educated 
people' are seen as having the potential to bring about peace, but they have 
failed to do so. A commercial worker from DRC was asked: 
Interviewer: Do you think that educated people can be 
instrumental in bringing peace in your country? 
Respondent: Yes and no. Yes because they are called to lead 
and people are inclined to listen to the learned 
ones. No, because they are the main 
troublemakers. They start to fight against others 
and bring people into their disputes on 
ideologies. 
Some respondents indicated that educated people could also become the 
targets of war as well as be part of the problem. This was particularly the case 
for Burundian teachers who had witnessed the massacre of Hutu intellectuals 
in 1972 in Burundi: 
Respondent 3: I have something to add because I left my 
country in 1972. What was frightening was 
that when the war started, there came soldiers 
to arrest everyone who had been educated. 
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Every Hutu who had sat on a school desk, 
every businessman (Hutu) was arrested with 
the reason that he was said to be a criminal. 
When it came to the end of April, at the 
beginning of May, in order to arrest all the 
workers, at that time, we received our salaries 
from CADEBU at Bujumbura where we all 
were. They called the workers to go and get 
their salaries. All those who went the first day 
were caught and massacred on the spot. When 
we saw that, we told ourselves "should go and 
die like the first?" We said no and we went 
away. 
Teachers and university students as 'educated people' perceived themselves in 
this context as victims. It is well documented that 'educated people' were not 
only perpetrators of mass killings during the genocide in Rwanda, but had also 
been victims during earlier pogroms (Mamdani, 2001). 
The Burundian respondents in Malkki' s research in Mishamo refugee camp in 
Tanzania, similarly identified how 'educated people' had been targets during 
the 1972 massacres: 
They wanted to kill my clan because my clan was educated. 
The clans which were educated, cultivated, they were killed. In 
my clan, there were school-teachers, medical assistants, 
agronomists ... All have been exterminated (Malkki, 1995: 98). 
What is evident from these responses is that there was a contradictory 
perception of 'educated people', both as 'part of the problem', but also having 
the potential for bringing about social improvement, by providing the 'light' 
for others to follow. This contradiction stemmed from the particular role that 
'educated people' played in refugee camp life. The fact that educated youth for 
example were adopting greater responsibilities in refugee camp administration 
- often as 'spokespeople' for NGOs and international agencies - caused some 
resentment from elders who felt increasingly marginalised. 
Because of the shifting roles, education provision in the refugee camps has 
altered the dynamics of relationships, not only between elders and youth, but 
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also between educated elites and 'ordinary people'. The availability of 
education Katunzi and Ndalichako suggest 
... started as a temporary measure to address the interruptions in 
education and to facilitate children's possible reintegration into 
schools in their home countries when they went back home. 
Nonetheless, with a prolonged stay of refugees, provision of 
quality education in the camps has become increasingly 
important (Katunzi and Ndalichako, 2004: 1). 
Due to this prolonged stay of refugees in the camps and the fact that education 
up to primary level is provided free and available to all, the potential for this to 
undennine the traditional educated elites has been dramatically increased. 
However, until the refugees return to their countries of origin, it will not be 
evident if the shift in power structures resulting from greater access to 
education in the camps will be maintained on return to their home countries; or 
whether traditional power structures will reassert themselves. This issue is 
discussed more fully in Chapter Eight. 
7.2.2 'Arenas of learning' 
As mentioned above education institutions were rarely identified as places 
where fonnal educative processes for learning about the conflict were utilised. 
This was particularly the case for Congolese respondents who felt that 
education institutions had no influence on the conflict - except in producing 
intellectuals. However, it emerged from the Burundian respondents that 
secondary schools and universities were places where 'planning' and 
discussions on 'how to fight' took place. One respondent identified what he 
called the 'Ie Carrefour des idees' or ' the marketplace of ideas' where he said 
that Tutsi students would discuss issues relating to the conflict and make plans 
on 'how to fight'. Other respondents also suggested that these students were 
protected by soldiers who would assist them to bring weapons into the school. 
There was no admission that Hutu children had access to weapons or that they 
were recruited into armed groups through any similar arenas. Hutu students 
were typically presented as victims - the fleers, rather than perpetrators of -
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violence. The example from a teacher below when he described how he 
escaped from Burundi highlights this: 
... Then we split into two gangs (the students) a group of Hutus 
and Tutsis. The group of Tutsi students joined the Tutsi 
population [those who were said to be killing Hutus].When I 
saw that I ran away to Rwanda. 
Although schools were identified as places where weapons would be 
smuggled in, they were not directly identified as teaching about the conflict. 
Instead they were seen as places where militant students would gather and 
learn about fighting techniques. School was recognised as a potential training 
ground for violence but not as the source of the conflict. It was the 'arena of 
learning' , the place for social gathering that was more important than the 
educational context of the institution. 
Religious institutions were also given credence as arenas of learning because 
the religious leaders were generally considered as one of the trusted groups in 
society. Religious leaders play a significant role in both Burundian and 
Congolese society and would often be sources of information for the 
congregation. Various Christian denominations (as well as Shi'ite and Sunni 
Muslim groups) form the majority of the refugees from both Burundi and 
DRC. However, there was no sense amongst the respondents that religious 
leaders had any culpability in the conflict. This contrasts with the stories from 
some of the Rwandan refugees I worked with in 1994-6. Although there was 
denial on the part of the religious leaders themselves - particularly the 
Catholic leaders - about involvement in the genocide, some of the refugees 
recounted stories that illustrated the high level of involvement of the churches, 
which they suggested either perpetrated crimes or ignored pleas for sanctuary. 
For the Burundian and Congolese populations however, there is more a sense 
that the religious leaders are ' the light'. This statement from a Burundian 
teacher is representative of many responses in both Burundian and Congolese 
camps: 
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When the church leaders hear the truth, they tell their followers 
that they should avoid the information which may be 
circulating. They tell them how to behave and to try to love one 
another. That's mainly the message from churches. No one 
teaches about conflicts. They tell their followers to avoid the 
troubles. 
For the Congolese the informal arenas of learning such as the street, market 
place and religious institutions were also regarded as more effective than 
education institutions as conduits for information transmission. School as an 
institution was not regarded as an important arena for educative processes by 
the Congolese, and in the words of one teacher, 'schools should be left out as 
they only endure the events that unfold.' This meant that they felt schools 
should be ignored as sources of information as they are the victims of events, 
not the perpetrators. Another member of a civil society group suggested that: 
Information in the camp is in the street. People are not 
informed at schools. What people know is from the street. 
This perspective belies some of the stories that emerged after the Rwandan 
genocide about the role of education institutions in fomenting violence and 
hate messages (Bird, 2003b; Mamdani; 2001; Obura, 2003). In contrast the 
narratives of the respondents indicate that the informal mechanisms of gossip 
and talk that is a feature of 'the street' interaction, appeared to be more 
effective for passing on information about the conflict. This is discussed in 
more depth below. 
7.3 'Mouth to mouth' and the tradition of oral transmission 
An oral tradition was identified by both Burundian and Congolese 
respondents, who recounted traditional stories concerning the history of the 
conflict passed down through the generations. This included the historical 
basis for divisions in both countries as well as the foundations for the current 
conflicts. For example one Burundian respondent explained his perception of 
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how the 'injustice' between Hutu and Tutsi first arose and then suggested that 
these accounts are not written but are passed down from father to son: 
Respondent: 
Interviewer: 
Respondent: 
So if you consider the problem of injustice 
between Tutsi and Hutu it is a long story. So 
someone would say that this began in 
Micombero's regime [a former ruler in the 20th 
Century] he would be mistaken. This began a 
long time ago. 
You say that these things began a long time 
ago how did you know them? Who told you? 
You know that here in Africa the writing is 
recent. We received information by oral 
transmission. You were told information by 
one who has witnessed it. My father has a 
father. My father's father told my father the 
story. My father told the story to me and when 
I get my child I shall tell him the story. 
Such an oral tradition is a powerful educative process that carries credibility 
with the recipient, because of the close relationship he/she has with the 
transmitter. Perhaps also because of the belief that parents are always right, 
there was little questioning of stories from parents. There was limited critical 
awareness of alternative viewpoints to history. When some respondents were 
asked if they thought that 'their own side' was also culpable, the answer was 
often yes, but no details or stories were provided. Although culpability was not 
directly admitted, the Burundian respondents identified one of most critical 
issues in the conflict as 'lies'. One of the 'influential' people in the camp 
stated: 
All that makes Burundi to be in such a mess is 'lies and fear.' 
In order for those things to end, the people must be given a say 
again. When the community will get back the word that has 
been taken from them, the fear will also end. 
The implication is that the lies and therefore fear is passed from the top - that 
'the people' have no voice in their own destiny. As a result there is still an 
abnegation of their own role in the conflict, the fault always lies with others, 
whether this refers either their own political leaders, or to the 'enemy' (cf: 8.4 
pp.218-224). 
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The downplaying of their own side in conflict is reflected throughout the 
transcripts. A blame culture exists on both sides. For example, a Tutsi website 
suggesting that there will be another genocide, recounts almost exactly the 
same 'hate' stories as those told by Hutu respondents from Burundi and 
Rwanda4• 
The oral transmission of stories was considered by all groups to be one of the 
most significant educative processes for passing information. Information was 
passed on through family and friends who were trusted sources of information. 
Parents for example were automatically trusted by children: 'My father cannot 
cheat me.' said one Congolese child. This child believes all that her father tells 
her in the same way as the adult quoted above believed the stories that had 
been passed down from generation to generation. One child learnt about the 
war entirely through stories that her parents told her. She stated very clearly 
that the Banyamulenge wanted to 'take over our country' and to 'exploit our 
wealth' and when asked where she learned this, she said: 'My parents tell me 
this every day.' The parental transmission of information was perceived as one 
of the most powerful educative processes and most people learned about the 
identity differences between themselves and their 'enemies' from these 
parental stories. As one mother explained: 
Our fathers told us "these houses belonged to people you could 
call now district commissioners. They died while you were still 
very young in 1965. It was then that their houses were burnt 
because they were Hutu." As our parents told us the stories, we 
would cry as we looked at these houses as they stood empty. 
Then came the year 1972. Then I was old enough to see what 
happened. They [Tutsis] came and took people to their death. 
Learning from her parents this second hand knowledge was transformed into 
first hand knowledge as she grew up and witnessed events that were resonant 
of those recounted by her father. In this way, the oral tradition from her 
parents was confirmed by her own witnessing of events. 
199 
These informal educative processes were recognised by most respondents as 
being the primary and most significant mechanisms for receiving and giving 
information. If someone received news, it would be passed around informally. 
A group from the Congolese CBOs stated that: 'The way information 
circulates among refugees is informal. Therefore there is nobody responsible 
for news.' 
The educative process by which this informal transmission was most 
commonly identified was by word of mouth. When information came from 
people who had witnessed events this information was identified as 
particularly valid. A family man from DRC stated: 'It is difficult to doubt 
somebody who claims to have witnessed an event or has heard from someone 
who saw it happening.' In the camp, information received from people who 
had travelled back to their country and reported on the situation was regarded 
as an important and reliable source. As one Congolese teacher stated: 
There are people who sneak out of the camp and who even go 
to Congo to see how life is there in order to return if possible. 
These people bring reports of the evolution and restoration of 
the peace process in DRC. 
Word of mouth was seen as more trustworthy in the volatile and insecure 
situation of recent times in DRC and Burundi, although sometimes letters were 
also used as this Burundian teacher indicated: 
Respondent: 
Interviewer: 
Respondent: 
Interviewer: 
Respondent: 
Or we can use the means of letters, writing 
letters. 
When you write a letter to somebody he 
answers you immediately, he tells you ... 
Yes. 
How is it done with letters? 
If you write to a person, you can ask himfher 
how the situation is where he/she lives. Or 
how the situation is in the country, and he/she 
answers you. 
200 
However for other respondents, letters were not always the best means of 
sending information, chiefly because of security reasons. One of the elders 
from the Congolese FGD highlighted how letters could add to danger: 
In general it used to be passed onto people by way of mouth to 
mouth. Sometimes friends or kin would send letters to their 
relatives, but this way was avoided because if such letters were 
intercepted, the recipient or the sender would land in serious 
trouble with the security agents. 
Word of mouth, also through the telephone, where communication was with 
those who were witnessing events at home was considered more effective. As 
this Burundian restaurant worker suggested: 'The most accurate information 
now is from people who talk on telephones. Not everybody has left.' The use 
of mobile phones has revolutionised the way many people receive information 
from their home countries. It has brought the possibility of direct 
communication with eye witnesses who are generally considered to have the 
most accurate information. During a visit to the camps in 2005, I was struck 
by the rapid increase in the use of mobile telephones in the camps after a new 
network was introduced. Most information regarding the situation in both 
Burundi and DRC was being received by those with mobile phones, and then 
passed on to other members of the community by 'mouth to mouth '. 
7.4 Rumour 
Rumour, which was often passed on through gossip was considered a different 
mechanism from 'mouth to mouth' even though it was another form of oral 
transmission. Rumour 'was rife' before, during and after the conflict. Before 
the conflict started in DRC many rumours were not 'taken seriously' which is 
why they were treated as different from information passed between trusted 
friends and family members. There were many Congolese for example who 
believed strongly that their army would defeat the 'invaders', so the rumours 
concerning the possible take over of their region were ignored until the 
evidence was overwhelming that the national army had been defeated. Many 
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respondents were shocked at their national army could just 'run away' in the 
face of the 'enemy'. As this Congolese leader stated: 
When the war begun we started wondering how the Rwandese 
could dare attack us and let alone beat us on a battleground. It 
was unthinkable and unacceptable in the mind of the Congolese 
people. The fact is that the enemy was not stronger than us but 
the enemy bought influential people in the Government and in 
the National Army. In reality, our army didn't fight. 
Rumours such as 'the Banyamulenge have killed a Pastor at Tulambo and 
given his meat to dogs.' were commonly cited as scaring people but still not 
sufficient for them to flee the country. It was not until they started witnessing 
events and seeing 'troops of Banyarwanda growing in numbers', hearing 
gunfire and seeing wounded, that people started to believe that their army had 
'run away' and were leaving them to their fate. A Traditional King from DRC 
said: 
A lot of rumours were circulating. We got them [rumours] from 
themselves [Banyamulenge] and especially from the queer 
behaviour all during those years of their preparations. I think it 
was one of their tactics to scare people by telling them their 
plan. But first signs were the arrogance and insubordination 
displayed by that community in prelude of the war: 
a. They refused to be counted during the Scientific Census. 
b. They forbid all Administration officials to step in their 
villages 
c. They started to send their sons to Rwanda for military 
training in order to come and launch their war of conquest. 
When they begun to refuse to submit themselves to local 
authorities and revolt against indigenous Chiefs we felt that 
their threat was real. 
The build up to the conflict was noted by the supposed changing behaviour of 
the Banyamulenge, and accounts of which were then noted and passed on 
through rumour and gossip. Rumour in this way was used as a mechanism to 
incite fear against the enemy and therefore was important from a transmission 
point of view. 
For Burundians, rumour was equally important and as for the Congolese was 
often passed on through gossip at the market place, at water collection points, 
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food distribution sites etc. However, as mentioned above, much of the 
information was not taken at face value especially if it was known to be 
rumour. As one of the Burundian youth interviewed said: 
When we hear rumours, we wait for some time to see if they 
have some truth and we listen to radios to verify them. No one 
can give me information that I will accept on the spot. 
However, rumour was still a powerful mechanism and much of the 
information that people initially received about the conflict was through 
rumour, whether they believed it or not. Although rumour was accepted as part 
of normal life and as the way information was transmitted, few Burundian 
respondents admitted to acting on rumours because they felt that people would 
tell lies. A young woman, when asked who spread information, said: 
Ordinary people. The ordinary people walk around. When I 
hear information I tell a person, that person tells another one ... 
and the news spreads. However, most of the time individuals 
lie. 
This was a common theme amongst Burundians, who frequently said that the 
Burundian population tells lies; particularly those at the top. They suggested 
that this was one of the causes of conflict because people were not willing to 
admit the truth. This statement from a Commercial Worker was representative 
of many similar statements by the Burundian respondents: 
I find that the war comes from the fact that they lie to one other 
on everything they do. Since they have begun talks, they have 
never told the truth to one another. 
Rumour in this context is associated with lying, as indicated in Chapter Three 
(cf: 3.4.2, pp.101-106). Rumour more than the 'street talk' of gossip was 
associated with the circulation of lies. The importance of trustworthiness of 
information was a consistent factor throughout the data collection process, and 
it was important for the respondents that information they received by 
whichever educative process, was from a trusted source. The role of trust is 
examined more fully in Chapters Nine and Ten, but the element of trust 
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features in the way respondents sought trusted information from different 
media as described below. 
7.5 The role of technology: radio, internet and mobile phones 
Radio featured strongly for both Congolese and Burundian respondents as one 
of the most important educative processes for obtaining trusted information. 
The majority of Congolese and Burundian respondents from both focus groups 
and in-depth interviews cited radio as being one of the most significant 
sources of information. In contrast, the few Rwandan refugees interviewed, 
suggested that radio was not important in learning news of their country. One 
of these respondents said that she would rather die than go back to Rwanda, so 
hearing news of her country did not interest her and in fact she positively 
avoided it. She said: 
I do everything not to hear about it .. .I listen to radio Tanzania. 
From Tanzania. I do not want to hear about Rwanda. Because 
simply to hear that a person has died or fled from politics, it 
shows me things that may result in something which is worse. 
Radio, more so than any other form of media, such as newspapers or 
television, was important for the Burundian and Congolese refugees chiefly 
because of the availability of radio in remote rural areas. Very few people 
except the urban rich would have access to television. In DRC, Burundi and in 
the camps in Tanzania, radio was a lifeline for information. This is not to say 
that all radio stations were trusted. Typically 'national' i.e. government led 
radio stations were not trusted, so any information from these stations had to 
be verified by using other sources. Trusted radio stations were cited by 
respondents from both countries and these were typically international stations 
such as the BBC, Voice of America (VOA) and Radio France International 
(RFI). As one Congolese family man indicated: 
The first source of information is radio, especially foreign 
stations. To us this is the trustworthy source especially when 
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many stations broadcast the same news items stemming from 
different reporters. 
The Burundian respondents also mentioned a radio station called Radio 
Isanganiro which was trusted because it presented balanced reports and was 
managed by both Hutu and Tutsi correspondents. As one of the Burundian 
Elders said 
There is information in French, Swahili, Kirundi from different 
radios. If you follow them, all that is said on FM is said on 
Isanganiro. The first radio to tell information as it has received 
it is Isanganiro. 
Respondents also stated that they compared stories between radio stations and 
other sources to determine the most truthful information. Information was 
rarely taken at face value and was verified by a number of different 
mechanisms. Both Burundian and Congolese respondents were deeply 
mistrustful of much of the information they received and often referred to their 
own populations as 'liars' or 'not straight'. 
Radio announcements before the conflicts arose, were also recognised as being 
important factors in encouraging people to flee. Most respondents would place 
journalists close to the information even if they were not regarded as powerful. 
One elder from Burundi stated: 'The information given by the journalist is the 
grassroots information.' Radio therefore was important for respondents before, 
during and after the conflict. 
As an educative process, radio made a significant contribution to how 
respondents reacted, before the war started, during the conflict - sometimes 
determining the decision when to flee - and after the conflict in finding out 
information on the possibilities for peace and for repatriation. If they believed 
the source of information on the radio was a trusted one then it acted as a very 
powerful mechanism for change. It also had a social and psychological 
function in linking people in exile with those at home, and had the potential to 
influence the perpetuation or cessation of the conflicts. 
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News is central to the life of most of the refugees who offered similar 
statements to the one below provided by a Congolese man from a CBO: 
We listen to BBC, VOA, Oeutche Welle and even local radios. 
We are like all other refugees eager to know what is happening 
here and in the ORC ... thanks to this link they can know about 
unfolding events in ORC and here in the camp; 
Internet was a relatively new phenomenon for most refugees, but despite this, 
even though an internet centre was located in the Burundian Camp M, the 
Congolese who had funds would travel the two hours from their own camp to 
use the internet. Two internet centres were established in 2001 by Global 
Catalyst Foundation, an American charitable organisation to serve both 
refugees and the local Tanzanian population in K. district. One of the centres 
in Camp M was used by the majority of users to contact friends and family in 
Burundi (this had an important social function and had a direct bearing on 
their readiness to repatriate). The centre was primarily a training centre for 
computers, with only ten refugees being trained at anyone time. It was open 
for the general population for only a few hours per day for internet use, 
although secondary school students had greater access. 
The overall demand for internet was very high, with people queuing for up to 
two hours to gain access. However the cost was prohibitive for most refugees 
who were not working, so few respondents would use the internet other than 
for email, although some used it to access broader and wider information 
about the situation in Burundi and the dynamics of the peace process. The 
internet manager of the centre stated that these were mainly 'politicians' who 
would use the internet for access to news: 
Beside all these, there are politicians who come to read 
information on Arib.Abarundi.org, umukeknyezi.org, Umuco ... 
they learn about different news about the country. 
The information gleaned from the internet would be passed on to the rest of 
the community, and on occasions those who were not literate would ask to 
have information read to them by the staff at the centre. The internet manager 
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saw the internet as a 'source of democracy' because no-one could lie. 
Questions can be asked and answers always found. It was seen as a great 
source of education as well as information. 
However, there was little sense of a critical awareness about the type of 
information that could be found on the internet. The 'computer cannot lie' 
attitude of many of the respondents did not take into account the possible 
biases of people who were posting the information on the internet. The 
technology was too new to use it in the same critical way they used radio. 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, mobile phone use in the camps exploded 
exponentially in the year between undertaking my research in 2004 and 
conducting feedback in 2005. There was remarkable interaction taking place 
because of mobile phones, not only between refugees within Tanzania, but 
also between the refugees and their compatriots at home. It affected the 
decision of many of them to repatriate. 
As this article from The Guardian highlights with an example from Kenya, 
mobile phones allow the marginalised to communicate: 
In a culture where people travel long distances to find work, the 
mobile has become the most useful and ubiquitous piece of 
technology since the bicycle. Just as bicycles are used in rural 
Africa to transport bananas or paying passengers, the mobile is 
changing lives in ways unimagined in the developed world. It 
links distant families and allows the poor to communicate. (The 
Guardian, 2005) 
The description of mobile phone use in Kenya is similar to that found in many 
of the refugee camps in Western Tanzania. The educative processes that take 
place because of radio, internet and mobile phone should not be 
underestimated. As mentioned in Chapter Ten, radio soap operas are fast 
becoming one of the main mechanisms in Africa for promoting behaviour 
change in relation to HIV/AIDS. Computer based learning is already 
mainstreamed in Northern countries. As the rapid introduction of computer 
technology into formal education institutions increases in Southern countries, 
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it is important to recogmse that computers and internet will become a 
significant feature of the education landscape. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter explored to what extent formal and informal educative processes 
affected a) people's perceptions of the conflict and b) how they received 
information before, during and after the conflict. Formal educative processes 
proved to be less significant, except in the production of 'educated people'. It 
would appear that 'school learning' had little to do with the harsh reality of 
conflict. The paradox of formal education that was highlighted in Chapter 
Three extends to the role of 'educated people' in the context of the conflict 
scenario. 'Educated people' were perceived to be more powerful in terms of 
their access to information and proximity to 'Whites' as the seat of power, but 
were perceived as a result to be less trusted and therefore less effective as a 
tool for educative processes. 
The role of informal educative processes, through oral or aural information 
acquisition proved to be more significant for many of the respondents than 
formal educative processes. For example traditional stories or news of the 
conflict, particularly from those within one's 'own group' were perceived as 
important mechanisms for receiving information, although the information that 
was believed and acted upon, depended on the level of trust accorded to a 
particular source. Trust was an important element in this context, determining 
whether an educative process was successful or not in transmitting information 
that would make a difference to perceptions or to actions. 
The narratives outlined in this chapter revealed - in concurrence with literature 
indicating how education can sometimes compromise peace - that 'educated 
people' are perceived as less trustworthy and ipso facto less successful 
conduits for information transmission. 
208 
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE 'COOKING' OF POLITICS AND THE 
IDENTIFICATION OF 'STRUCTURAL LEVELS' 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates how the different 'structural levels' identified might 
have influenced conflict. 'Structural levels', as identified in the hypothetical 
model outlined in Chapter One exist in every community and most 
respondents identified the relationship between the different structural levels 
and how conflict is influenced or peace is brokered. Although the levels and 
groups identified in the hypothetical model may not necessarily exist in the 
same way within the refugee situation, there are marginalised groups within 
every community that have little or no access to infonnation or power. The 
Congolese, Rwandan and Burundian societies are no exception. The findings 
indicate that respondents saw a clear relationship between power, proximity to 
infonnation and the exacerbation or mitigation of conflict. They felt that as a 
community they had no role in either conflict or peace building - they were 
mere victims of circumstance. The gap between themselves and the decision 
makers was perceived as too wide for them to influence the course of events. 
The process by which respondents came to identify these gaps was through a 
'social mapping' exercise. This allowed the focus group participants to discuss 
and identify the various groups within both the refugee camps and their home 
countries and map out the proximity of each group to the source of 
infonnation about conflict. The gaps between the decision makers (the 'big 
voices') and the 'small voices' was often bridged by mediators who were seen 
as trusted members of the community. 
The fmdings arising from the 'social maps' aimed to address the following 
research questions as outlined in Chapter Five: 
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• Do the 'structural levels' identified in Model B (see Chapter One) 
reflect the reality on the ground? 
• Which groups and power structures are perceived by respondents to 
exist? 
• How are they perceived in terms of information transmission? (i.e. in 
terms of the relative importance of different levels and groups) 
• Is there a gap between the levels and if so what form does it take? 
Through the discussion of the fmdings below, there is an attempt to answer 
some of these key research questions. 
8.2 The identification of 'structural levels ' 
'Structural levels' were identified by the respondents through a social mapping 
process. An example of one of the social mapping process in terms of 
proximity to information is seen below in Figure 8.1 and the majority of social 
maps were similar in format. During this process, the terms 'small voices' and 
'big voices' were coined by the refugees during their attempt to identify 
groups at different levels of the community and the power relationships 
between groups. 'Small voices' were generally seen as 'being outside the 
circle' i.e. far away from the information source and 'big voices' were those 
closest to the information, and were often seen as the most powerful. 
The 'social maps' that were developed during the data collection process 
indicated clearly that the respondents identified various ' structural levels ' as 
depicted in the hypothetical model in Chapter One. Respondents were free to 
draw the social maps as they wished and many highlighted their perception of 
the different layers of society. Most respondents felt that the hierarchies 
associated with proximity to information applied not only to conflict but also 
to other aspects of politics and governance. The example below is a clear 
indication of the refugee perceptions of societal stratification. 
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Figure 8.1: Social Map of FGD Professionals N. (Training) 24.03.04 
Street children 
This social map highlighted the various levels (if not all the groups) that 
respondents felt represented the basic stratification of their society in Burundi. 
The subsequent social maps - similar to the above - which were developed 
during the training session in N. were used as models for the remaining FGDs 
in other camps. The respondents were able to place the different groups within 
their own social maps corresponding to their own perceptions and style. The 
subsequent discussions that emerged through the social mapping process 
focussed on where these different groups were placed in terms of access to 
information and power. 
Maps similar to the one below in Figure 8.2 highlight how government, 
military or party leaders were not usually trusted but were regarded as the 
most powerful and therefore closest to the information about the conflict. 
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Schools here were seen as a mechanism for passing information, but on an 
informal basis similar to the way information would be passed in the street. 
Figure 8.2: Social Map of DRC taken from FGD Head teachers 25.05.04 
Traditional 
Kings M 
ŸUÙŨTŲŤŌĚ
M=Mediator 6. = Powerful 0 = Trusted 
After the social mapping process, the model (Model D), originally devised to 
represent structural levels in the respondents own countries was revised, and a 
clearer picture of 'structural levels' emerged. Leaders, politicians, 
intellectuals, for example were all easily identified at the top levels, and 
families (women and children), farmers, people with disabilities and many 
others were identified at Levels One and Two. These were perceived as being 
'outside the circle' i.e. possessing no power or access to information. 
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Model D: Revised model of&structural levels' of society based on 
respondents' perceptions of proximity to infonnation 
Religiou 
Leaders 
US and UK 
International 
Leaders 
Politicians 
Religious 
Military 
Party 
Leaders 
Religious 
Traditional Kings 
' lnfluentials' 
Media 
International 
Radio: BBC, 
YOA, RFI 
Media 
National 
newspapers 
National radio e.g. 
Radio Isanganiro 
Commerce 
Business 
Community 
Professionals 
Teachers 
Doctors 
' Intellectuals' 
Commerce 
Petty traders 
Bar owners 
Civil society Professionals Family 
Women's groups Health workers Women 
Youth groups Traditional healers Children 
People with disabilities, the very sick, very young children, the very elderly, 
the Batwa (pygmy tribes) 
Level Three 
8.3 Small voices, big voices: trusted transmitters in relation to their 
proximity to information 
The majority of groups interviewed placed politicians close to the information 
but were clear that most were not to be trusted. One member of a focus group 
from the CBOs alleged that politicians 'all consider Congo's politics and 
leadership like their profit making project.' There were many references to 
leaders 'cooking politics' and serving their own interests. A 'Traditional King' 
from DRC said 
Politicians are known to be selfish, whatever they preach 
conceals their real motives: to enrich themselves to the 
detriment of the society. 
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This traditional leader saw his own group of Traditional Kings as being the 
most trusted because he felt that they work 'first for the benefit of the people 
under [their] authority.' Only one other group from Civil Society also 
identified Traditional Kings as being 'people's representatives and custodians' 
which identified them as trusted transmitters of information. As noted in 
Chapter 5.7.4 (p. 150), although the Traditional Kings were respected, they 
were not perceived in the camp as particularly influential or powerful. 
The most trusted transmitters tended to be the mediators between the powerful 
and the community. Although not powerful, youth had a particular role to play 
as mediators as they were considered by different groups, both in the 
Burundian and Congolese camps, to have a particular mediation role. A 
respondent from the Burundian Civil Society FGD indicated that 'youth are 
very instrumental because politicians need them to attain their objectives. This 
is the cradle of activists.' The youth were seen as dynamic and able to 
negotiate between the politicians and the community and as a result to pass on 
important information. An example of this was provided by the Congolese 
FGD Civil Society group, who cited how the youth who had been involved in 
a peace initiative in the camp might act as effective mediators. In particular 
they noted that the leader of the association, 
. .. was a good mediator - he can go to both leaders and the 
community. He effectively forces the situation in the camp by 
holding meetings, announcing them without asking permission 
first from MHA [Ministry of Home Affairs - the Tanzanian 
government administrative body in the camps]. 
In contrast, the Burundian sense of 'mediation' took a more passive role, 
where youth would work alongside camp level administrators and then pass 
information gained onto the rest of the community. Burundian respondents 
noted that particularly 'educated youth' who were typically employed by 
NGOs and UN agencies and therefore often had access to 'insider 
information', had greater access to information. These educated youth were 
considered more self-aware and therefore trusted as mediators (although 
paradoxically as noted in Chapter 7.2.1: 212 were not trusted in other 
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respects), and given 'the word' i.e. trusted. As this Burundian head teacher 
suggested: 
Respondent 5: the youth of this group make their auto-
criticism. It is a group that criticizes itself. 
And when you meet someone who does his 
own criticism he becomes a real man in the 
future and he is given the word. 
The contrast between knowing the information and being trusted enough or 
powerful enough to use it was indicated by the relationship of prostitutes to 
information. For several of the FGDs in the Congolese camp, prostitutes were 
considered to be close to the information source, by virtue of sleeping with 
powerful people. Although in many ways a 'small voice', prostitutes could 
obtain information before many others; but in terms of the power structures of 
society, their level was still low. Similarly the wives of politicians were seen 
as being close to the information (but not powerful), while women in general 
were typically seen as 'outside the circle' and therefore a 'small voice'. The 
relationship between information and influence in this context therefore, is 
blurred, as the typical power structures that placed the 'powerful' close to the 
information, did not apply to prostitutes and wives of powerful men. 
Similarly there were contradictory responses regarding the role of women as 
trusted transmitters. Some respondents felt that women were not trusted by 
men because they were seen as being unable to 'keep a secret', while others 
felt that women were more trustworthy because they had less self-interest, and 
less to gain. One Congolese woman summed up the general attitude of 
Congolese men towards women: 
Women are not trusted. A child may be more trusted than a 
woman. Men think that women cannot comprehend things and 
convey the message as it is sent. 
An Elder later confirmed this negative stereotype of women: 
Women and children were knowingly left out. According to 
Congolese traditions, women and children cannot keep a secret. 
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So men try to hide from them any sensitive information in order 
to avoid any leakage that can send panic within the community. 
But in the end husbands do inform their spouses in due course. 
By the same way children can superficially get to know some 
news. 
This is perhaps a traditional stereotype of how women were perceived by men, 
and contradicted the very strong and positive roles that I personally witnessed 
women taking in both Congolese and Burundian camps. 
Regardless of whether it came from women or men, trusted information 
needed to be verified from different sources before it was fully believed. As 
was mentioned above regarding the perception that the population were ' liars' 
one Burundian traditional healer stated: 
Truthful information needs investigation. People are liars. They 
can give false information so you don't trust it unless you check 
it first. 
There were few exceptions to this, the most notable being those who had 
travelled back home, were eye witnesses to the situation and therefore 
automatically trusted. A Burundian Head Teacher particularly trusted 
information that came from 'fighters': 
In general, the person whose information most people believe is 
the fighter. When a fighter comes from Burundi and tells you 
information, you usually don't doubt about it. 
Other respondents in the group felt that the trust in this case was associated 
less with the person as a 'fighter' and more because he had arrived directly 
from Burundi. Witnessing conflict therefore was sufficient to guarantee trust, 
and there was little attempt to verify stories that came from people who had 
arrived from Burundi. 
For the Congolese many of the different religious leaders were seen as trusted 
transmitters because of 'their spiritual status' and the respect they held in the 
community. It was not thought by the community that a preacher could lie. In 
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contrast some respondents from Burundi argued that preachers were just as 
guilty of lying about information as politicians, and one respondent from the 
Civil Society FGD suggested that preachers often 
... speak politics while pretending that they are preaching the 
Gospel. When he is preaching you hear him insert some things 
like "Watch out there is this or this ... " 
The Burundian respondents indicated that 'wise men' were considered more 
reliable as trusted leaders, although the 'wise men' they trusted came from 
those men 'who had swallowed the stone' i.e. 'who have experience'. 
Traditionally these would have been elders in the village. A head teacher from 
Burundi stated: 
People that one can trust as mediators are these wise men 
because what made them so [i.e. were elected as 'wise men'], 
was because they could be trusted. As I hear, everyone agrees 
on them being selected as wise men. 
These particular trusted 'wise men' are distinguished from those who are 
considered as bogus because they are educated. In the words of a Civil Society 
respondent: 
... the 'wise men' today consider education. They consider 
ethnics. If someone has studied two or three years post primary, 
he is considered as a wise man. The elders as such are no 
longer respected, no longer considered. And this has 
contributed to make Burundi as it IS. Only those who are 
educated are considered to be wise. 
This reverts again to the suspicion and resentment that elders had for the 
educated. They were not considered by elders either to be wise or trusted. 
Trust was a particular feature of relationships within the community, and was 
dependent on whose information was believed or acted upon. For information 
to be significant it either had to come directly from a trusted source, or through 
a trusted mediator. Therefore in terms of peace building strategies - as will be 
seen in Chapter Ten - it is important to identify and utilise these trusted 
sources in order to maximise the potential for peace building. 
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8.4 The perception of power relationships 
As mentioned above, most of the respondents identified themselves with 
marginalised groups, groups who had no power and who were the 'small 
voices'. For example, this elderly traditional healer from Burundi when asked 
about what information was trusted or 'truthful' stated that for him: 
The truth has lost value because the old people have been put 
aside. In the past, the king needed advisors. They were chosen 
among the old people. Today, the intellectuals do not want to 
listen to old people. The old people tell the truth because they 
have no interests. They tell the truth for the truth. 
Truth was rarely equated with power or proximity to information, with the 
exception perhaps of the religious leaders who for most respondents, 
particularly the Congolese, were considered to give truthful information. Lies 
were generally associated with power. 
As noted in the model above, the 'small voices' tended to be the most 
marginalised. However in a camp situation respondents highlighted the fact 
that the marginalised sometimes became more powerful because of the 
conflict and the previous 'powerful people' became the marginalised. The 
identity shift was recognisable although not directly stated. The shift was also 
observed in terms of power relations, where 'educated people' were typically 
selected to assist the INGOs and UN agencies run the camps. Therefore some 
traditional roles were usurped by young educated youth who could speak 
several languages. The mere fact of speaking English in some cases resulted in 
certain youth being appointed by an INGO, regardless of their competency to 
do the job. Youth, and in particular educated youth who spoke English, played 
an increasingly important role in refugee society. Their paradoxical role 
echoed that of other 'educated people' (cf: 7.2.1 pp. 191-195) in thatthey were 
of necessity mediators between the powerful and the community, but this did 
not make them liked or necessarily trusted. They were perhaps mere couriers 
of information that could not be obtained by other means. 
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The educated were often despised but were seen as powerful in the camp 
because of their relationship with NGOs and UNHCR. This sometimes led to 
resentment, particularly by older people with less education. For example 
these health workers from Burundi when asked which groups were excluded 
suggested that: 
Respondent 2: 
Respondent 3: 
The unheard are the illiterate. The illiterate can 
not join other groups because they have 
nothing to say. 
The problem of illiterates is very important 
because you can't do any job without having at 
least a certificate of 6 years. 
In the case of the Congolese, the Traditional Kings had a strong power base in 
their home country and commanded great respect. As one respondent from the 
civil society group suggested: 'They had an ability to reach the masses.' This 
power (according to the Traditional Kings themselves) was lost to them on 
arrival at the camp and the Traditional Kings positioned themselves 'outside 
the circle' when drawing their own location on the social map. This referred 
not only to their power within the community, but also what they perceived as 
'magical' powers that enabled them to 'see things at great distances' and to 
'transport' themselves across the country. According to one Traditional King 
this 'magical' power was only possible in his own country. He believed that 
when he was outside of the 'magic zone' his power was lost. In their own eyes 
(not necessarily the eyes of the rest of the community who still held great 
respect for the Traditional Kings), Traditional Kings had in effect become one 
of the 'small voices'. This identity shift from powerful member of the 
community as an administrative ruler, to an 'ordinary' member of the 
community was only temporary as there was a clear statement that Traditional 
Kings, unlike other administrative leaders, would regain their 'powers' on 
return back to DRC. Their construction of identity in terms of their power 
relationship to others was determined by location. This notion of identity 
shifting according to time and space is explored in more depth in Chapters 
F our and Ten. 
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The change in power of the traditional kings - and this equally applied to 
'influentials' in the Burundian society - also meant a change in identity, from 
being a powerful member of the society, to what they perceived as 'nothing'. 
One Congolese Traditional King explained: 
Here I am nothing but a mere refugee like all the others. We are 
all under the authority of the Tanzanians who are attached to 
administration of the camps and at a certain extent the elected 
leaders. 
The formal leadership structures that existed in DRC and Burundi beforehand 
were no longer recognised. People 'close' to the NGOs and to UNHCR (who 
were the de facto government) were now seen to be in power. As one 
Traditional King explained: 
The camp has its own administration in which we are 
automatically excluded; so the refugees were asked to elect their 
representatives on a condition that they must be neutral, people 
who were not leaders in DRC. Now we have a camp committee. 
While the Traditional Kings had slipped from their power base to become 
'small voices' other groups were perceived as always being 'small voices' and 
not able to change their role. The marginalised groups of society were obvious 
'small voices' such as people with mental health problems, small children, the 
very sick and the very old. The main group that stood out for all groups 
including the Rwandan group was the Batwa, the pigmy ethnic group. This 
group is said to be indigenous to the region, and comprises only one percent of 
the population in each of the countries. All FGDs identified the Batwa as 
'small voices' who were perceived as one of the most marginalised groups in 
their communities. 
By far the largest group of 'small voices' were women. Although women were 
said to have more voice than in the past, they were still regarded by many 
respondents alongside children as 'small voices'. This also applied to the full 
social spectrum of different groups of women. Prostitutes and even wives of 
influential men were still 'small voices' despite being close to the information 
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by virtue of their proximity to powerful men. Being close to the information in 
this case did not make them powerful enough to become a 'big voice'. 
Gaps were identified between politicians and those 'outside the circle' like 
women, children, elderly and people with disabilities as these people were 
'caught unawares' and were unable to do anything. This situation, some felt, 
was the same for women and children globally. As this respondent from the 
Congolese FGD for CBOs stated: 
All over the world, women, children and the old are the people 
who suffer the most during violent conflicts. One of the reasons 
is that they don't know what has been happening in the 
community where they live. So they are caught unawares. 
The 'not knowing' in this case - the 'being caught unawares' appears to be a 
critical factor according to this respondent. Similarly many other women 
complained that as 'small voices' they were 'out of circle' and therefore did 
not 'know'. Would greater access to information improve their 'knowing'? 
Does bringing the marginalised 'into the circle' in terms of information access 
elevate them to the status of a 'big voice'? One suspects that in the case of 
women and children, it would merely allow them a better place to hear the 'big 
voices' and be termed 'participation'. Given the cultural constraints of these 
countries, it will be some time before the marginalised will become 'big 
voices', whether inside or outside the circle. 
The 'loudest' of the 'big voices' were naturally the politicians who were seen 
as the most powerful group by all respondents. While powerful, the politicians 
were not trusted because they did not serve the interests of their people. The 
statement by a Burundian traditional healer was typical of many made by 
different groups interviewed: 
Respondent 3: Since 1993, the politicians have taken the word 
and refused it to the people. They went after 
money and wealth. The word should be given 
back to the people ... Political leaders are fighting 
for posts while they deceive us that they are 
fighting for us. 
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Many similar examples were found in the responses of Burundian, Congolese 
and Rwandan respondents. Leaders were seen as taking their country to war, 
without the mandate of the people who felt they were mere pawns. As this 
Rwandan nurse suggested: 
I am small. I am down. I am under their feet, of the leaders' 
feet. If it is their politics, I do not know. 
In DRC politicians were seen as the most important group at the higher level, 
in terms of both conflict and peace making, because they are the ones who 'are 
in the kitchen of politics.' It was different however in the camps where 
politicians were not able to operate as they had in DRC. As . one Congolese 
elder stated: 
... we don't have politicians here [in the camp]. They know they 
are the ones who brought this hell on us all and they cannot be 
welcomed in the camp. 
Politicians were perceived as benefiting greatly out of the conflict both 
financially and politically, so were anxious to maintain their positions by 
doing little to broker an effective and lasting peace. This self interest was seen 
as a barrier to peace, but despite this respondents felt that politicians had - and 
still have - an important role in the peace process. A Congolese family man 
said: 
The role of politicians in the peace process is very important. 
They are the ones on the helm of the country. That is why they 
are called leaders because they have a following. But in many 
cases once they are elevated, they forget the stairs that helped 
them ascend to the leadership and start to serve themselves. 
Politicians should put the interests of the nation before anything 
as the people don't like wars. A solution can be found. 
There was a recognition that people in power do not care for the community, 
even though they may have been elected to that role. A Congolese English 
teacher suggested that 'people in power don't like to listen to those in a down 
position.' The selfishness of the politicians was often referred to as the main 
reason why they were not trusted to pass on truthful information. Similarly 
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they were not trusted to engage in political strategies that would benefit the 
people rather than themselves. A Congolese traditional healer mentioned: 
Our politicians are too selfish. They never consider to know what 
they must do for the country and not the other way around. If 
they can start to think of the people and to put the interests of the 
nation first, I am persuaded that Congo can be a prosperous 
country in Africa. They should know that their boss is the nation, 
the people. In addition they must know where they came from; 
they were mere citizens before ascending to the positions they 
have now and one day they will go back to that citizenship. 
The few Rwandan respondents equally blamed politicians for lying and 
cheating the population for their own interest. As this Rwandan teacher 
explained: 
They lie to you in order for them to get their interests satisfied 
and to progress ... So you find the country sinking in problems 
because of politicians who lie to the population and do not tell the 
truth. And if they want, all the wars can end, because they only 
have to abandon the habit of struggling for power and to tell the 
truth, to work for community. 
Not only do they see politicians as a barrier to peace, but they also regard rich 
nations, particularly the US and UK as 'meddling' in their countries. The 
involvement of the US and UK was mentioned by the majority of Congolese 
respondents, as they were regarded as interfering in DRC politics in order to 
exploit its rich mineral wealth. This issue was referred to in greater depth in 
Chapter 2.4 (p.62), but clear links have been established between the conflict 
in DRC and international interests, including the US and UK (Duffield, 2001 ; 
HRW, 2005; Mills, 2002; Pottier, 2002). These economic interests are 
considered by some as ' ... a stronger driving force than political power for the 
continuation of conflict in DRC' (WCAC, 2003: 8). It appears that from the 
narratives outlined in this chapter, many ofthe respondents would agree. 
The involvement of foreign actors and the fact that they are perceived to 
supply arms to Rwanda and Uganda, also constitutes a barrier to peace. They 
are seen as the ones who are 'pulling the strings' and have the power to stop 
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the war if they chose to do so. This perception is held by the majority of 
Congolese respondents, even the children. One Congolese child said: 
They are able to stop the war if they want, because these 
countries are powerful. People fear orders from those who are 
stronger. When adults intervene when we are quarrelling or 
fighting, we stop and obey because we don't want to be beaten. 
The same applies with big and small countries I guess. 
Similarly Burundian respondents saw the powerful nations as participating in 
the conflict from behind the scenes. As a Burundian leader stated: 
Most of them [politicians] think of and work for their own 
enrichment and for the benefit of their masters who hire them. 
Here I mean the economic powers of the world. 
The respondents' perceptions of the involvement of 'big nations' are explored 
in more depth below. 
8.5 The identification of gaps 
The gaps referred to here are numerous and constitute gaps not only between 
the 'small voices' and 'big voices' but also between 'big nations' and 'small 
nations'; between educated and those with little education, between 'structural 
levels' and within 'structural levels'. 
In terms of 'structural levels' and power relations the main gap that emerged 
from respondents - particularly the Congolese - was between big nations and 
small nations. Both Burundian and Congolese respondents felt that they were 
part of 'small nations' who were being dominated, exploited and manipulated 
by rich and powerful nations. They could see the translation of power from 
leaders who were corrupt and wanting to be close to 'whites' and the 
manipulation of the small nations by the big nations to get resources. 
The majority of respondents felt that as a community they were not able to 
achieve peace on their own. The gap between themselves and not only their 
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own leaders but leaders of powerful nations was too big. This statement from a 
Congolese youth sums up the perceptions of many of the respondents 
regarding the role of the US and the UK in the DRC conflict: 
Congo is a rich country, maybe they want to exploit our country 
to our detriment. They now hire Banyarwanda to wreak havoc. 
The Banyarwanda on their own cannot dislodge us, but since 
Americans and the British are backing them, we are now in this 
trouble. 
Many groups and individuals, particularly respondents from DRC, suggested 
that US and UK exacerbated the conflict. They were perceived as destabilising 
the country in order to gain wealth and exploit mineral resources. Respondents 
suggested that the US and UK used the Banyarwanda to assist them by 
'buying them, promising to help them attain their goals.' One of the 
respondents for the FGD of CBOs angrily insisted that: 
Today the US is the sole superpower in the world. These people 
covet the wealth Congo is endowed with and they want to 
exploit our country by using a proxy whose name is Rwanda. 
Burundian respondents see the manipulation of their country less for wealth 
but as part of the colonial past and the power of 'whites' to exacerbate or 
ameliorate conflict. This Burundian head teacher highlights the perception of 
many respondents: 
Some of us continue believing that we cannot do anything that 
that the White does not approve. The white man helps us 
quarrel and he should also help us find peace. 
Similarly the Congolese also perceive this gap between 'Whites' and their own 
nation as at the root of the problem both historically and more recently. A 
Congolese man from the FGD for CBOs stated: 
I fail to see how wars can be ended as long as guns are being 
made in their factories and sold to people or countries. The 
Whites are the main cause of our misery. 
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The majority of Congolese respondents presented similar accounts about the 
role of other nations in 'corrupting' their national leaders. This statement from 
a respondent from the women' s groups is typical: 
Let the Whites leave Congo alone and our politicians should 
learn to love our country. A nationalist cannot take bribes from 
capitalist multinationals to destroy our own Motherland. 
Only one respondent from the Congolese group of CBOs accepted that the 
Congolese needed to take some responsibility for the involvement of the 
'Whites' when he stated: 
On this issue let me say that we should not keep on blaming 
Banyarwanda or the so-called Banyamulenge; people in the 
Government of the then Zaire were accomplices in the 
preparation and the evolution of the war up to the ousting of 
Mobutu. The country was left open to any adventurer. 
This refers to the historical complicity between Mobutu and the Banyarwanda 
during the 1970s and 1980s, which extended to the war in the 1990s. This 
statement by another respondent from the Congolese CBO group highlights 
this perception: 
When the war begun we started wondering how the R wandese 
could dare attack us and let alone beat us on a battleground. It 
was unthinkable and unacceptable in the mind of the Congolese 
people. The fact is that the enemy was not stronger than us but 
the enemy bought influential people in the Government and in 
the National Army. In reality, our army didn't fight. 
As mentioned in Chapter Six it was rare for respondents to accept any level of 
responsibility for the conflicts, which they regarded as caused by 'others' . The 
majority of respondents were engaged in story telling which consistently 
blamed the 'enemy' either for direct intervention or 'corrupting' their people, 
as stated by this Zone leader: 
Once they accept to be corrupted by capitalist nations which 
covet our wealth, they become their slaves and fear to betray 
their powerful masters who literally bought them and owned 
them as their tools. 
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Another gap that was highlighted by respondents was between 'educated 
people' and the 'ordinary people'. As was seen in Chapter Seven 'educated 
people' were not trusted and there was a distinct gap between those who were 
perceived as educated (therefore possessing more power and information) and 
others without education. During the social mapping process, people with little 
education were typically placed 'outside the circle'. One young man from the 
FGD for youth said that 'educated people are corrupt and sell us to the 
Whites.' By this he meant the US and UK who he claimed were responsible 
for 'hiring the killers.' 
A young Rwandan woman who had undergone horrific experiences during the 
genocide also suggested that the educated people were the most culpable: 
1 find that the most involved are intelligent people who are 
educated and who are very intelligent. It is these who are most 
involved. 
She went on to explain that typically these educated people were the ones 'at 
the top' and it was through a chain of orders from the top that instructions for 
the massacres reached the 'ordinary people'. Her statement indicates how a 
provincial leader in Rwanda might come to order the massacre of 'ordinary 
people': 
The Administration says "I was given order by the counsellor." 
The counsellor talks about the district officers, the district 
officer says that he received order from a province, the 
province from a Minister. So that you understand that it was a 
chain among the leaders. 
The social maps highlight the various gaps between different groups; between 
those 'inside' and those at the edge of the circle. Most groups and individuals 
were very clear that they were rarely placed within the inner circles. There was 
recognition by most respondents that as a community they were powerless to 
effect change. An example is provided by this Zone Leader (one of the 
different categories of leader in the camp) when he was asked 'What can a 
community contribute to bringing peace?' and he replied: 
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They have not been given that opportunity. I don't think that 
they will even get that chance. Those who manipulate things 
and power will not let this occasion to happen. 
As mentioned previously there were 'mediators' amongst the 'ordinary 
people' who were responsible for acting as intermediaries between the 
powerful and the 'community'. These people were not necessarily powerful 
themselves, but had respect and status, or possessed certain skills to act as 
effective mediators. Typically religious leaders were cited as being mediators, 
as were journalists or certain radio stations. Some groups also cited 'wise men' 
as being a trusted group, but these sometimes had less access to important 
information. 
As mentioned above, one group which was unusually selected as mediators 
taking information from one group to another in the camps was the youth, 
particularly youth who had some kind of education. As this exchange from the 
FGD of commercial workers highlights: 
Respondent 4: I believe that the youth will be able to transmit 
information because they are strong enough. 
They pass information to parents and to 
ordinary people. 
Interviewer: Anyone else to contribute? 
Respondent 1: The youth are the most active and they are 
many. There are also youth who listen to 
radios. Youths who are grown up. They take 
the information to the parents. 
This paradoxical role of youth who were tolerated because of their proximity 
to camp authorities and were perceived as ' active' was touched upon in 8.2.1. 
It is particularly paradoxical because other mediators were perceived as 
achieving their status as mediator through trust. The youth gained theirs 
merely because of expediency. They were strong, active and had access to 
information from different sources. This still did not make them liked or 
trusted. This role of mediators is a critical one if the community base of peace 
building is to be strengthened and is explored in more depth in Chapter Ten. 
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8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter illustrated the ways in which people identified the power brokers 
of events and the 'structural levels' posited in the research questions m 
Chapter One. The gaps between the top and bottom levels in terms of 
information transmission and perceptions of conflict were also evident from 
the findings presented in this chapter. The concepts of 'big voices' and 'little 
voices' highlighted this aspect, and explored perceptions of who had greatest 
access to information ('big voice') and those who were marginalised ('small 
voice'). As a refugee even if they possessed a power base within the camp, 
few respondents identified themselves as being anything other than 
marginalised. The mere fact of being a refugee rendered them powerless. 
This loss of political/social power and dignity was further revealed during the 
process of social mapping which was undertaken as part of the FGDs. This 
process encouraged respondents to represent in a visual way, the different 
groups of their societies, both in the camp and in their home countries. The 
differences in the two maps revealed the refugees' perceptions of conflict and 
the consequence of becoming a refugee. Most felt that the camp life stripped 
them of their dignity and their roles in life. For some, particularly elders and 
traditional leaders, the loss of respect had a profound affect on their sense of 
self worth. The artificially created camp administrative structures which 
replaced structures traditionally based on respect for age and wisdom, 
frequently created tension between the educated (most of whom were 
employed by various agencies) and the non-educated, who may well have 
been powerful figures in their own country. 
This gap between the educated and non-educated people (cf: 7.2, pp.191-197) 
was perceived by many respondents as 'part of the problem'. There was 
resentment and dislike of educated youth in their role as mediators between 
the powerful and the community. But this did not stop the community using 
them as mediators as a matter of expediency. The identification of gaps 
therefore can be seen not only in terms of gaps between 'structural levels' in 
their own country but also at personal level in their present lives as refugees. 
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This indicates the lateral relationship between groups within the same 
'structural levels'. Although there are clear hierarchies within the 'structural 
levels' of the refugee camp as well as in their home countries, respondents felt 
bound together in terms of powerlessness by virtue of their identity as a 
refugee. This issue of identity both as a refugee and as a victim embroiled in 
conflict is explored in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE: THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
EDUCATIVE PROCESSES, IDENTITY AND TRUST 
9.1 Introduction 
Identity emerged as a major issue affecting conflict in the Great Lakes. This 
was despite the fact that the issue was not posited as a question in the topic 
guides, for reasons explained in Chapter Five and below. The findings from 
the research regarding issues of identity are presented here in the context of 
the theoretical perspectives identified in Chapter Four. They are examined 
within the relationship between identity and educative processes, as it is 
evident that the educative processes used to define, form and reform identity 
are key in revealing the educative processes that might be effective in peace 
building. The element of trust has been added as it often defines whether 
educative processes are successful or not. Trust influences the formation and 
maintenance of identities. 
Identity was deliberately omitted when framing the topic guides for data 
collection. This was to avoid pre-judging or pre-empting the responses 
regarding identity. As identity is often considered a key issue in the conflicts 
in the Great Lakes, I wanted to ensure that if it emerged, it resulted from the 
respondents' perceptions not because of prompting. However as indicated 
below, the issue of identity was of prime importance in terms of the 
perceptions respondents possessed about the conflict and how they thought it 
could be resolved. It became clear through the process of data collection and 
analysis that educative processes were profoundly influenced by identity and 
vice versa. As will be discussed in depth below, the issues of educative 
processes, identity and trust are key elements in identifying effective 
mechanisms for peace building. 
Figure 9.1 below aims to link some of the different mechanisms by which 
identities are constructed and shift. It indicates the intersection between 
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educative processes, identity construction/shifts and trust that provides the 
potential for peace or conflict to occur within different 'structural levels' . For 
an identity to be constructed or to shift there have to be elements of trust 
involved within the process. The synergy that relates to the elements of 
educative processes, identity and trust is presented within the framework of 
structural levels, as indicated by the pyramid. 
Figure 9.1: Visual representation of the synergy between educative 
processes, identity and trust 
Structural Levels 
9.2 Synergising educative processes, identity and trust 
Level Five 
Through the process of data collection and analysis, issues of educative 
processes, the construction of identity, shifting identities and the issue of trust 
were synthesised into the model above. Some of the issues relating to identity 
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Level One 
construction and shift are mentioned in Chapter Four which covers different 
theoretical perspectives on identity. However, this chapter focuses on how 
identity issues affected the respondents in the research and the implications of 
that for conflict. 
9.2.1 Educative processes in the construction and shifting of identities 
ducative Processes 
and identity 
construction 
Oral tradition 
Myths 
Propaganda 
Gossip 
Media 
Formal education 
(positive/negative) 
Construction of identities 
- social, cultural, 
political, religious, ethnic 
The data and literature both suggest that educative processes, both informal 
and formal have significant roles to play in the development, preservation and 
shifting of identities. Cultural and group identities are formed and maintained 
through talk, from traditional and cultural traditions that have been passed 
down through generations. As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, various 
forms of informal educative processes and mechanisms for the transmission of 
information have been identified as influencing the formation and reformation 
of identities. 
This section of the chapter therefore links the theoretical elements of identity 
construction and educative processes within the frame of evidence collected 
through the data sets examined in this research. It examines how identities can 
be constructed and shift through different educative mechanisms. 
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The role of education in its broadest sense, in terms of the development of 
individual and collective identities is neatly summarised by Beach when he 
suggests that: 
Education, whether it be in the school, the family, the 
community or the workplace, prepares people to adapt to 
existing society, thereby maintaining a degree of continuity in 
our collective knowledge, values and beliefs across generations. 
It must also prepare individuals to participate in the 
transformation of society. It is this second concern to which 
consequential transition is directed, though it necessarily 
presupposes the existence and legitimacy of the first ... 
Consequential transition is the conscious reflective struggle to 
propagate knowledge linked with identity in ways that are 
consequential to the individual becoming someone or 
something new, and in ways that contribute to socio-genesis: 
the creation and metamorphosis of social activity and 
ultimately, society (Beach, 2003: 57 in Granville, 2004: 5). 
It is the production of collective knowledge allowing 'the individual [to 
become] someone or something new' that is at the heart of the construction of 
identity through educative processes. The importance of the oral tradition in 
this regard cannot be overemphasised. Children are not born with an identity, 
they learn it. The data suggest that they learn through the process of 
interaction with parents, neighbours and peers; through 'talk' and gossip. 
Their identities are formed and confirmed by this talk and as they grow older, 
through interaction with other adults. The response from this Burundian 
Teacher indicates how some people learn from respected elders: 
Respondent: 
Interviewer: 
Respondent: 
You understand that the role of education, 
education from parents is very necessary. 
Because before a child comes to the (formal) 
teacher, he has had parent education. 
So ... 
You must hear such matters from parents. 
However, I can't say it is only my parents who 
know that. Any person knows, who is older 
than I am, knows how things began in 
Burundi. As for me I didn't often sit in the 
group of youth, but I liked to sit together with 
grown up men who were respectful, who were 
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sharing ideas. There are proverbs that they 
sometimes used and you could learn from 
them even if you did not ask for an 
explanation at the time, but found out the 
meaning later. 
As mentioned in Chapter Six this kind of social gossiping and story telling, 
acts as a mechanism for social bonding and inclusion through talk. The nature 
of oral tradition, through myth or gossip leads to a socialisation process that is 
facilitated, or hindered by outside influences such as media or propaganda. 
There is not an automatic belief that the media listened to is correct unless it 
has been verified from other sources, and these are typically sources that 
include 'talk' and interaction with peers and family members. 
The role of formal education as perceived by the respondents was less 
influential in the formation of identities. Its chief influence was perceived to 
be in terms of the informal structures within the formal system, i.e. the hidden 
curriculum, student gossip, etc. Very few stories were recounted that indicated 
direct teaching that affected identity formation. This is not to say that it did not 
happen, but it was not identified by respondents. The majority of respondents 
when questioned directly on the role of schools in the conflict responded in a 
similar way as this Burundian Restaurant Worker: 
Respondent: Here in the camp, there is no school which can 
teach matters of information about the war. 
Similarly this Burundian teacher suggests: 
Such information about the war in Burundi cannot be taught in 
schools because at school, they are learning other things like 
mathematics, languages ... 
The most common reaction from respondents corresponded to this response 
from the FGD for Commercial Workers: 
Respondent 2: As the gentlemen said, we are still young, but 
as we grew up, we were told that our 
grandfathers had been massacred under 
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Micombero' s rule. That we learnt even though 
we were still very young. 
Interviewer: Who told you so? 
Respondent 2: Our fathers told us because at that time we 
were still very young, too young to know it 
and some of us were not born yet. 
Therefore, even at an early age, the stories of 'massacre' were being told and 
passed on to very young children. The children did not learn information about 
the history of the conflict directly through school. There was also very limited 
mention of the 'hidden curriculum' or the informal peer gossip within the 
school environment as contributing significantly to information acquisition, 
even though it was evident from some responses that it did occur. The 
perception was that formal schooling was not significant in terms of 
inculcating messages. This is contrary to the popular belief that formal 
educational institutions not only reflect the institutionalised values of societies 
but also are able to significantly inculcate those values and 'control the 
"content" of thought' (Bashiriyeh, 2005). Schooling is often presented as an 
agent for change, for trying to influence the morality of children as future 
adults through programmes such as 'citizenship' education, peace education or 
life skills education. However, there is little evidence to suggest that such 
programmes presented within a formal school environment have a significant 
or lasting impact. 
What appeared to have more effect particularly in the case of the Rwandan 
genocide was the propaganda fed via the radio to influence people's mindset 
by feeding on their fears and anxieties. The notorious pirate radio station 
'Radio Milles Collines' was instrumental in inciting ethnic hatred by pushing 
an ideology that portrayed Tutsis as 'snakes' or 'inyenzi' (cockroaches) that 
should be exterminated. An excerpt from a radio programme broadcast by the 
United Nations highlights the critical role this radio station played in the 
genocide: 
Narrator: 
The role played by one particular radio station - Radio 
Television Milles Collines - in fuelling hatred against Tutsis 
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was something that bothered the UN Force Commander m 
Kigali at the time, Canadian General Romeo Dallaire. 
ROMEO-R: General Dallaire 
In a nation that is radio bound, that in some villages the radio or 
the voice of the radio is nearly the voice of God, the impact of 
that station is incalculable. It educated people on how to kill 
and how to disembowel and how to pull out foetuses and how 
to cut them in half and how to rape, how to mutilate (UN, 
2004). 
Much has been documented elsewhere on the propaganda machine of the 
Rwandan genocide through radio, so it is sufficient here to recognise that it 
was one element of the escalation of hatred in Rwanda. 
The construction of identity as discussed above relates to the interaction with, 
and acceptance of, social norms and values of society through a variety of 
educative processes, the most significant of which were perceived to be 
informal. However as explored below there were other forms of identity 
construction identified in the research, both individual and collective which 
imply force or indoctrination. The section below highlights how identities are 
constructed, and shift according to context, but also how some identities are 
shifted through group pressure or indoctrination. 
9.2.2 Construction of collective identities: learning through group networks 
As seen in Chapter Four, the formation of collective identities occurs through 
a number of processes, some of the most significant of which are through 
informal educative processes. For many respondents this was often by learning 
through group networks which was an important educative process ranking 
highly among respondents, particularly Burundians and by which many 
respondents learned about and acted upon their collective identities. Being part 
of a 'group' whether that meant a student group, an ethnic group or family 
group was critical to what and how respondents learnt about the conflict and 
whether they trusted the information they received. Learning from their 'own 
group' was an important component in determining the level of trust or belief 
they ascribed to the information provided. One of the Burundian teachers 
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suggested that if someone is thought to be from the same ethnic group they are 
more likely to reveal information or plans: 
Interviewer: How is it known? [they were talking about the 
spread of the Hima empire] 
Respondent: Anything that happens among people must be 
known. How is it known? It may happen that a 
given person when you live close to him, that he 
thinks that you are of hislher ethnic group. He 
can then tell you about what he/she is planning. 
This type of educative process through group networks was an important 
component of the conflict not only in terms of trusting information that was 
passed, but also in terms of the speed and spread of information through 
different educative processes. Where word of mouth was considered a more 
reliable process to give information, spreading that information through group 
networks was seen as the most effective educative process. Information spread 
within ones own identity group was perceived as trustworthy. 
While 'own group networks' (Hutu or Bembe groups for example) were 
trusted, some individuals from the opposite group (Tutsi or Banyarwanda) 
who were considered friends were also sometimes believed to provide reliable 
information. The association of Tutsi or Banyarwanda individuals/friends with 
trusted and reliable information was observed by many respondents. 
Friendship networks transcended the identity clashes that were perceived by 
both the Congolese and Burundians as central to the conflict. For example a 
Congolese trader told a story of how her husband was approached by a 
'Munyamulenge' friend: 
... to warn him of an imminent war. He said he was told to kill 
his best friend who was none else than my husband. So he 
decided to inform my husband of that secret so that we could 
get out of the area before it was too late. 
Similar stories emerged from the Burundian respondents who recounted many 
instances where their Tutsi friends had warned them about imminent danger. 
For example this respondent from the commercial workers FGD stated: 
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One Tutsi friend told me "Are you here? We have already made 
a list of all Hutu in Kirundo. You are going to be 
exterminated" . 
Friendship on an individual level transcended group hatred and enmity. It was 
not evident however, whether this transcendence could be extended to a 
collective or group level. 
One wonders if it is the collective element that turns individuals into 
genocidaires; the 'mob' aspect that is common for example to British football 
hooliganism. Or is it more systematic group indoctrination - a 'buying into' a 
collective identity that is then controlled and manipulated by the leaders of a 
particular group - where collective violence promotes a greater 'sense of 
belonging' among the group? In his attempt to explain how genocide occurs, 
Dan Stone for example points to 
... a heightening of community feeling, to the point at which 
this ecstatic sense of belonging permits, indeed demands, a 
normally forbidden act of transgression in order to 'safeguard' 
the community by killing the designated 'threatening' group 
(Stone, 2004: 45). 
He further suggests that 
This aspect of collective, orgiastic participation in no way 
ignores the question of individual violence. But it does 
recognize that, unlike the exceptional psychopaths who commit 
violent crimes in society, in time of psychic stress in war and 
genocide, 'ordinary people' are able to take part in collective 
acts of extreme violence of which they would otherwise never 
have suspected themselves capable (Stone, 2004: 57). 
Does individual friendship however transcend this 'orgiastic participation'? 
What Stone fails to consider is the level of individual bravery and acts of 
heroism that go against the collective; that fight group identity in small ways 
in order to save the 'other' for no other reason than the fact they can. Stone 
asks 
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... how it is that individuals who lead otherwise normal lives 
can turn on their neighbours, throwing aside all norms of 
civilized behaviour, and engage in massive acts of transgression 
(Stone, 2004: 58-59). 
Although Stone asks how individuals commit acts of transgression, he fails to 
ask how individuals can transcend similar group acts of transgression to rescue 
their neighbours or even total strangers, putting their own lives in danger to 
save 'others'. This surely has significant implications for peace building. 
An example of this kind of transcendence came from one of the few Rwandan 
respondents, a nurse who recounted how a Tutsi helped to save her and her 
children: 
It was one Tutsi who saved my children. He paid money to 
those soldiers (military) [these were known as Inkotanyi which 
was the derogatory term for the RPF]. He went to my house and 
took all my children. He took them first and brought them to 
the border, at the customs. When they arrived at the customs, 
he paid some more money and he came back to see me at the 
hospital. When he came to see me at the hospital, he told me "I 
must go with you. I give you this money so that we take it 
while the people [the customs officials who were bribed] are 
still there." It is that money that brought me to the customs and 
1 continued until 1 arrived here [N.]. 
Such accounts of bravery and assistance by individuals towards people from 
their opposing group have been recounted frequently on both sides. An 
example of this was highlighted in the internationally acclaimed film Hotel 
Rwanda which told the true story of a Hutu hotel manager who saved the lives 
of over a thousand Tutsis and Hutus who had taken refuge in the hotel. He 
only just managed to escape with his own life. Capturing and building upon 
these individual acts of courage, that have transcended hatred of the 'other', is 
the first step towards encouraging collective or group transcendence of 
prejudice and hatred. 
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9.2.3 Shifting identities 
As seen above, the construction of identities is based on power relationships 
between oneself and individuals, groups or societal institutions. These power 
relations Giddens would say are based on the structures and social actions of 
society. 
Identity Shifting 
e.g. Group subscription/ 
Forced sUbscription 
Through formal and informal 
social actions/interactions and 
institutions 
Social action and interaction as 'tacitly enacted practices' become 'institutions 
or routines' and 'reproduce familiar forms of social life' (Giddens, 1984: 94). 
Baker in quoting Derrida suggests that: 'there are no cultural practices that are 
not defined by frameworks that are 'caught up in conflicting networks of 
power, violence, and domination' (Baker cited in Lather, 2004: 4). 
Such power relations that define cultural and societal practices, and thereby 
identity are not necessarily only based on routine, tacit acceptance of 
institutionalised social interaction. They can also be based on force or 
indoctrination. Identities might be shifted because of the coercion that 
individuals, groups or organisations, exert over others. The nature of coerced 
identity shifting is demonstrated below by the example of children or young 
women forced into becoming sexual slaves for militia frequently suffering 
many years of abuse as indicated by the example below: 
In 1998, I was leaving for boarding school in Gisenyi. Just 
before reaching the town ... we were ambushed by the 
abacengezi [insurgents] ... The taxi rolled over, and as the 
passengers fled the vehicle, the abacengezi chopped them with 
machetes. I managed to hide under corpses but heard the rebels 
saying they would get fuel to bum the bodies. I cried out, and 
they stabbed me ... and carried me into the forest .. . There were 
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other women and girls there too, from different parts of the 
country who were kidnapped under similar circumstances. . .. 
Members of the militia came each night to rape me, until one 
night a militia member announced that I was his, that he was 
my "husband". I only thought of escaping to my family ... 
(Amnesty, 2004: 1). 
Not only was this young girl forced into a life of constant abuse, she was also 
forced to change her identity from that of schoolgirl - to prostitute - to 'wife'. 
All she could think about was escape. The competing 'voices' within her 
identity construction and also for those in similar circumstances, must have 
caused intolerable confusion. The reconstruction of yet another identity on 
return to a community that stigmatises and shuns those who have been 
sexually abused would prove to be equally traumatic. 
Thompson highlights this shift in identities by what he tenns 'appropriation'. 
This implies the acquisition of different identities within the context of how 
individuals make sense of the world and themselves. He suggests that the 
. .. contextualized and creative process of interpretation in which 
individuals draw on the resources available to them in order to 
make sense of the messages they receive ... calls our attention to 
the fact that the activity of 'appropriation' is part of an 
extended process of self-fonnation through which individuals 
develop a sense of themselves and others, of their history, their 
place in the world and the social groups to which they belong 
(Thompson, 1994: 29). 
In this way there is a negotiable and contextual element to identity whereby 
identities can and do change, either over time or because of a certain event in 
the life of a person. This was highlighted by the change in identity for some 
people when they became 'a refugee' with its subsequent loss of status. 
Becoming a refugee - where loss of power and dignity affected large numbers 
of people - forced many to reconsider their own identities. The changes in the 
power structures that were observed in the Congolese camps, particularly for 
traditional power holders such as Traditional Kings, resulted in a consequent 
change in identity from powerful leader to 'a mere refugee'. As seen in 
Chapter 8.4, the shift in identity that the Traditional Kings underwent by 
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becoming a refugee was contingent upon location. As soon as they returned to 
their own country, their 'power would return' . This contextual element of 
identity allows it to be manipulated by external forces, whether through 
conflict or through force, which can strip or invest identity depending on the 
time and space. 
Some theorists point to similar constructions and deconstructions that define 
and alter identity. Garrison for example states that: 
Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is at one 
with 'I am what I am' [but] is not possible anymore in the 
discourse of subjectivity where 'I' is constructed from a myriad 
influences and relationships, from parents to teachers, to media 
and propaganda (Garrison, 2004: 45). 
The data also revealed some examples where individuals changed an ascribed 
identity e.g. ethnicity. In Burundi supposedly 'fixed' ethnic identities can be 
changed through the acquisition of wealth and ritualised ceremonies, which 
indicates that ethnic identities are malleable. The shift from Hutu to Tutsi in 
the past is demonstrated by the Burundian elder below: 
Respondent: 
Interviewer: 
Respondent: 
Interviewer: 
Respondent: 
Yes, That's how it was. This means that the 
word Hutu has its origin in the fact that in 
order to get a piece of land or cattle, he would 
work for Tutsi for twelve days. He was then 
called a 'Hutu' of that person who had given 
him he cow or the land. 
Were there Hutu who changed to be Tutsi? 
They changed their ethnie [ethnicity] when 
they had cattle, a big land and wealth. They 
would give cows and they were accepted as 
Tutsi. 
Was there any ceremony organised for that? 
Because he would be rich and wealthy, there 
was a ceremony that was held and he would 
leave his land to come close to the Tutsi. Then 
he would change ethnie. This was done mainly 
by those who had a good shape of body like 
that of Tutsi. He would choose one group of 
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princes or of Tutsi that he wanted to join for 
example: Batare, Benengwer, Bezi .... 
The fact that 'ethnie' could be changed, is acquired not inherent, implies that 
perhaps there might be hope for the resolution of identity based conflicts 
(however it should be noted that this finding was only found among the 
Burundian respondents and may not be the case for Rwandan ethnic groups). 
The issue is that for an identity to change there has to be a basis for that 
change, a desire or will to renounce a particular ethnicity or identity in favour 
of an alternative. 
For many respondents, the process of acquiring an 'ethnic' identity as opposed 
to a religious or political one was largely determined by what in the data 
analysis was called, 'learning through group networks'. The data implied that 
the most trusted and therefore the most effective learning mechanisms were 
contained within one's own identity group. The communal element to identity 
construction within a group can sometimes either protect or expose a group to 
violence. People feel safe within their own group, but the preservation of that 
group to the exclusion of others can also expose them to jealousy, ridicule and 
even violence because of the difference that brings them together as a group in 
the first place. The preservation of the 'ingroup' as Salazar terms it, is all 
important but it can jeopardise individual safety as a consequence (Salazar, 
1998). 
The extreme of this is reflected in totalitarian states where power and control 
of a communal group is based on subscription to a single identity and 
suppression of all others. This can include, at a 'softer' level, a desire for 
'nationhood' in the sense of land ownership. Religion can also be exclusive 
where polarisation of religious views excludes tolerance and diversity in order 
to succeed in exerting religious control. While religion in theory should be 
exempt from the promotion of violence, in practice it is often embroiled in 
dogma used to justify violence in a 'holy' or 'just war'. 
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In order to identify how to break the potential for violence associated with 
exclusive and authoritarian control of identity groups, it is necessary to 
consider the possibilities available to individuals to transcend their identity 
group. Is the only possibility for transcending this group identity through 
individual friendship? Or could the transcendence of difference through 
individual friendship be utilised beyond an individual level? Is transcendence 
of group identity the route to a positive identity shift? As noted in Chapter One 
(p.32), 'positive identity' shift here refers to the adoption or shift towards an 
identity that transcends a vengeful mentality, i.e. an identity that encourages 
negative and stereotypical presentations of 'the other'. The most important 
question here is who decides what is promoted within any particular 
culture/group as positive or negative. Al Qaeda is a clear example of a group 
that decides and promotes an ideology where murder and terrorism are 
considered as justified attacks. They suggest that 'God has sanctioned such 
punishment, that they have the 'right' to attack and destroy not just villages 
and cities, but 'the economy of those who have robbed our wealth and to kill 
civilians of the country which has killed ours' ... a convenient justification for 
revenge' (Davies, 2004: 81). 
More positively many respondents narrated stories demonstrating the potential 
for transcendence of this negative identity adoption, particularly at an 
individual level, whereby individuals were able to empathise with the 'other 
side' and ignore difference. Another example is provided by Mamdani, when 
he talks of a 'retired soldier-turned-policeman' embroiled in the Rwanda 
genocide. This man 
... hid eleven people in different locations: from ceilings up 
above to pits down below. When I asked him whether he knew 
of anyone else who had helped people by hiding them, he said 
"no". When I asked why he thought there had not been others 
like him in the area, he simply said: "People don't have the 
same mind." (Mamdani, 2002: 220). 
The transcendence of identity and the ability to empathise with the 'other'; to 
increase the potential for individuals such as the 'soldier-turned-policeman', 
leads one to examine the potential of internet technology to support the 
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transcendence of negative or positive identity construction. Through the 
internet and consistent access to alternative viewpoints, could there be an 
impact on identity construction, reconstruction? Can the mindset of hatred be 
overcome by being in contact with so many other links to the outside world? 
Does technology allow that potential merely through the offering of choice, or 
are we still governed in our choices by cultural, political and social influences? 
Perhaps formal education can play more of a role in this context, in providing 
a quality education that allows for critical thinking and problem solving, that 
encourages tolerance and a diversity that offers alternative views of history. 
Internet in this instance can be used as a critical tool to verify or discount 
certain viewpoints of history. 
9.2.4 Identity, trust and social capital 
Trust is an element that binds the social fabric of group identities. Without 
trust within the group members, the group falls apart. The types of educative 
processes that are trusted and adopted lead to a set of conditions that influence 
conflict and/or peace. The positive implies good governance, an open and free 
press, a fair and democratic election process leading to a cohesive and 
peaceful build up of social fabric of society. The negative implies an 
authoritarian state, state controlled media, and suppression of opposition 
leading to (if the country is at peace) a forced cohesion, or (if the country is in 
conflict) a breakdown in cohesion. 
e.g. Free/Controlled 
press 
Open democratic ŸĚ
government! ŸĚ
authoritarian 
governance 
Freedom to express/ 
Culture of fear 
As Colletta and Cullen indicate: 
Trust 
e.g. of government 
of media 
of family 
of communal 
groups 
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Unlike interstate conflict, which often mobilizes national unity 
and strengthens societal cohesiveness, violent conflict within a 
state weakens its social fabric (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 3-4). 
In these circumstances, what Pottier terms the agency of 'reality' implies 
acceptance or rejection of the 'dominant narrative.' He suggests that there is 
often a fundamental contradiction between those who perceive and make 
judgements on the reality e.g. outside actors who fund arms deals) and those 
who live it and know its true implications but have no control over changing it 
(victims of war). Pottier cites the example of the role of the UN, Britain and 
US in Eastern Zaire as an illustration of this. The narrative of Eastern Zaire 
Pottier suggests, ascribes a 'single cause' to the conflict, which Rwanda's 
President Kagame, used in 2004 as the excuse for invading DRC i.e. that Hutu 
extremists residing as refugees in the East of the country were a security threat 
to Rwanda (Pottier, 2003). This narrative, which has largely been accepted by 
the UN, Britain and the US who continue to support Rwanda, implies a 'single 
solution' to expel the 'extremists' by any means, including arming the 
Banyamulenge, 'the self-created Tutsi group'. 
The 'narrative' that was acknowledged by the respondents reflects Pottier's 
argument in relation to the contradiction between the local and international 
versions of events. Recognition of the 'local' was an important feature of the 
trust that was invested in certain information or knowledge, something that 
was of particular concern to most respondents. There was little trust invested 
in their leaders, who they felt had 'betrayed' them, and through their lies 
(which could be said to fuel the 'dominant narrative') had 'sold them to the 
'whites'. 
The following statement by this Burundian youth could come from any citizen 
of any country in conflict who wants to trust his/her leaders to tell the truth: 
Respondent 3: I find that the war comes from the fact that 
they [politicians] lie to one another over 
everything they do. Since they have began 
talks they have never told the truth to one 
another. More over no one wants to leave 
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anything to the other while each wants to have 
everything for himself. 
This was a common theme amongst the respondents that most politicians are 
regarded as being self-interested liars and cheats. 
While trust of politicians and leaders was largely lacking, the majority of 
respondents believed in and trusted religious leaders as this Congolese head 
teacher stated: 
Religious leaders by virtue of their mission and their social 
status are very much trusted. They are obliged to tell the truth 
to the followers. 
Similarly a sixteen year old Burundian boy said: 
I would believe information that I would get from the church 
leaders because they are God's servants and they tell the truth. 
Only religious leaders were consistently trusted in this manner. It is possible 
that the unity of faith within a particular identity group makes all religious 
leaders automatically one of the respondents' trusted 'ingroups'. Salazar for 
example suggests: 
In defining the ingroup, there exists an implicit definition of 
outgroup. Yet these definitions are not static. In emphasizing 
one level of the nation-related identities, a group that shares the 
same identity at another concentric level could be defined as an 
external group (Salazar, 1998: 122). 
Religious leaders are at the same concentric level as their congregation 
because of faith, regardless of other identity groups they belong to. The 
identification with a certain faith, makes them part of the ingroup. Yet as 
Salazar indicates there is a switch in identity at different concentric levels. For 
example, the Burundian respondents could be seen on two concentric levels as 
a Hutu (using ethnic identity to form the ingroup) or as Burundian (using 
national identity to form the ingroup). Similarly Davies points to the fragility 
of 'multiple loyalties' some of which she suggests can be 
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... easily nested - supporting a local football team and then the 
national one; but the usual test is the 'cricket test' - if you are 
of Pakistani origin living pennanently in the UK, which team 
do you support? (Davies, 2004: 79). 
This type of question was asked of some of the respondents - how they would 
define themselves, as a Hutu or a Burundian? Primarily most respondents said 
they would always define themselves first as Burundian. They see that the 
Hutu ethnicity has been 'given'; it is not necessarily the fundament of their 
identity. However, when further investigated, it was revealed that their initial 
response came from their identity as a Burundian living outside Burundi. 
When living inside Burundi, they define themselves first as a Hutu. 
Such questions surrounding the subscription to an identity in tenns of such 
markers as nationality, ethnicity or religion, are critical in understanding how 
violence is perpetrated. For example Mohammed Sadique Khan, one of the 
suicide bombers responsible for the terrorist attacks in London on 7th July 
2005, defined himself entirely according to his religion - Islam: 
I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we 
believe. Our drive and motivation doesn't come from tangible 
commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is 
Islam ... Your democratically elected governments continuously 
perpetuate atrocities against my people allover the world. And 
your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I 
am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim 
brothers and sisters (BBC, 2005). 
Khan's 'people' are fellow Muslims, not fellow Britons. His identity was 
constructed entirely as part of the religion to which he belongs and as part of 
the ingroup with which he identifies. 
The respondents were conscious of ingroups and who was to be trusted. As 
this Burundian head teacher indicates: 
But if he is one who considers ethnic, political ideology or 
religion, he may not tell you the truth if you do not belong to 
the same group as his. However when you belong to the same 
group, he can tell you for example that even if you are told by 
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someone else that the Hutu do not die, they die. The 
information in that case is truthful and you trust it. 
Similarly a Congolese professional stated that: 
We Congolese learnt from the conflict in Congo that to live 
with a person with whom you do not share the same tradition 
( culture) is a very bad thing. 
This could be identified as what Bar-Tal terms the 'we-ness' of a group, the 
social bond that defines the cohesion of a group or network (Bar-Tal, 1998). 
This is similar in nature to what social capital theorists define as the 
trustworthiness of group networks that promotes social cohesion and support 
collective action. Colletta and Cullen suggest that the breakdown of this form 
of social capital between ethnic groups contributed to the genocide: 
Within Hutu extremism, state-driven vertical social capital 
fueled the success of communal-level Hutu groups through 
excellent information networks, reinvented past traditions, and 
a sense of solidarity, obligation, and civic duty (Prunier 1997). 
Social capital within the groups increased, as links between 
them waned, further splitting society. The bridging social 
capital that had existed, even though in a weak form, between 
diverse communal groups was now rapidly transformed into 
purely bonding social capital founded on fear and survival as 
Hutu and Tutsi groups coalesced on each side of the divide 
(Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 41-42). 
The issue of trust in building and cementing social capital ties is a central 
theme among much of the literature on social capital. For example Sullivan 
draws the element of trust in her paper on social exclusion, social identity and 
social capital. She suggests that: 
The notion of social capital draws upon ideas of trust and 
reciprocity among social groups to explain how, among other 
things, social cooperation and citizenship contribute to 
coherent, prosperous (relatively speaking) and healthy social 
groups who play a full part in society - socially included 
groups. There is some evidence that individuals and groups 
high in social capital can tackle incipient social deprivation, 
social isolation and exclusion with greater effect that those 
where there is little or no social capital (Sullivan, 2002: 3). 
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Similarly, the features of social capital that Putnam defines as 'networks, 
norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual 
benefit' could also said to be features that bind social identity groups together 
(Putnam, 1993: 35-36). However, much of the literature referring to social 
capital focuses on the positive aspects of collective norms and values, rather 
than the negative; where for example the high social capital of groups like Al 
Qaeda may have devastating consequences. 
We have seen the examples from the findings that trust is maximised within 
one's own identity group, yet have also seen examples of the potential for 
extraordinary cross-identity acts of heroism. This however is usually on an 
individual basis. So can the factors of individual trust be translated within the 
social capital framework, to increase the level of trust between opposing 
groups? This again raises the question of how to break down the 'enemy' 
culture and the negative aspects of group cohesion in order to establish more 
effective peace building mechanisms. The section below attempts to highlight 
this issue before Chapter Ten presents some suggestions as to how it might be 
addressed more fully 
9.3 The potential for conflict and/or peace 
We say that it is the mouse inside which shows the way and 
welcomes the mouse that lives outside. The Banyamulenge are 
those who went to bring their brothers Banyarwanda to kill our 
people. The aim was not only the quest for power, they have a 
bigger agenda. One is to implant Tutsis in the Congo and you 
cannot implement such a plan without wiping out the 
indigenous people the way you cannot start a plantation in a 
forest without clearing undesirable trees. The same way, they 
came with a genocide agenda to perpetrate against our 
populations. In Fizi, the Bembe are the target. 
This statement from a Congolese teacher is typical of those from many 
respondents that highlight the promulgation of an 'enemy culture' as 
mentioned above. The majority of respondents expressed these stereotypical 
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views and failed to recognise the culpability of their own side. This statement 
by a Congolese respondent from the CBO group is another typical example: 
Rumors on the war that sent us to Tanzania were plenty. One 
day I was going from Baraka to Bukavu with a fellow 
Catechist. On our way I saw him reading a booklet "FUTUR 
RW ANDAlS" (Rwandese Future) . At the page 5 the sub-title 
was: Creation de l'Empire Hima (Creation of the Hima 
Empire) this on how they were going to conquer and establish 
their Hima Empire. When he noticed that I was so curious to 
look at his book and pictures he was annoyed and asked me 
why I was so interested in his book instead of reading mine.(I 
had a book in my hands). What are you looking at? Don't you 
Bembe have a future? This is the future of Banyarwanda. I was 
astounded to see how he reacted that way as we were all in the 
same faith and co-workers. The he closed his book and put it in 
his bag. 
These stories could be said to be representative of stories that have been 
passed down through the generations, from grandparents, to parents, to 
children. The narratives by children for example illustrated 'enemy' stories 
that they stated had been heard from their parents (cf: 3.4.1: 93, 7.3: 197). The 
story below illustrated by the etching produced by a sixty-nine-year-old 
Burundian woman, is indicative of the type of narratives that feed the 'enemy 
culture' . 
Illustration 9.1 
Etching ofUutu' being led to death 
In 1972 some of our family members were 
massacred by Tutsis. One of the Tutsis could 
lead more than thirty Hutus to the commune to 
kill them there. The Hutu had first to collect 
special grass to make ropes to tie themselves. 
The last Hutu who was tied was given the task of 
beating out the brains of his colleagues with a 5 
kg hammer. Afterward it was his turn to be 
killed. 
What such stories and drawings illustrate is that these historical narratives, 
passed down through an oral tradition are one of the most powerful 
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mechanisms for transmitting the values and beliefs that the younger generation 
adopt. Through the informal educative processes of narrative, the enemy 
culture is maintained and the identity of conflict guaranteed. Similarly 
therefore one would expect that these educative processes have the potential 
for peace building. The question is how to transform negative identity 
construction into positive? Breaking the cycle of revenge is a critical element 
in the transformation into positive identity construction and is explored in 
more depth in the following chapter. 
9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted how educative processes in vanous forms 
influence the construction and reconstruction of identities that play a role in 
conflict and/or peace. It has demonstrated the importance of informal 
educative processes - particularly through oral tradition - in confirming 
cultural identities that are passed on to subsequent generations. 
The chapter has presented the framework within which educative processes 
can be defined as forming the basis by which identity is constructed or shifted. 
Identity has been identified in this research as being fundamental to the 
process of conflict and or peace building, despite the hope that this was not the 
case. Therefore any mechanisms which aim to mitigate conflict and build 
peace need to focus on the educative processes that affect identity. As will be 
outlined in Chapter Ten, while these mechanisms are not definitive, they may 
complement and strengthen existing peace making approaches of which 
informal educative processes are not typically a feature. 
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CHAPTER TEN: ENTRIES FOR PEACE: A CONCLUSION 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter reveals how the narratives of victims of conflict may provide a 
means of identifying opportunities to break the cycle of revenge. This was 
identified in the previous chapter as a critical element in fomenting hatred and 
continued violence against the 'other'. The original research aims and 
questions focussed around the role of educative processes (formal and 
informal), information acquisition and identity which in turn might influence 
conflict and/or peace. Three assumptions were made that related to this (cf: 1.3 
p.26): 
• There are various educative processes (formal and informal) that 
affect information acquisition at different 'structural levels', and 
which influence identity construction and shifts. These in turn 
affect the outcome of conflict. 
• Informal educative processes have a particularly critical role to 
play in identity construction and shifts which affect the outcome of 
conflict. 
• The synergy between educative processes, information 
transmission and identity within different 'structural levels' is 
crucial to determine the most effective conduits to promote peace. 
So are the assumptions of the research correct and how have the findings 
contributed to the existing body of knowledge within this arena? 
The original questions that guided the research in the early stages have been 
synthesised with the data analysis into a number of key issues which are 
outlined below. These then form the basis to determine a) if the assumptions 
are valid, b) how the findings have contributed to the existing body of 
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knowledge m this arena, and c) to identify concrete strategies for peace 
building. 
10.2 Central issues 
Although the assumptions listed above guided the process of data collection, 
the methodology included inductive methods. This implied that although some 
fundamental questions guided the research, the original assumptions were 
revised on a continual basis because of new issues emerging from the data 
collection and analysis. A key issue included in this section - which was not 
identified in the original research assumptions - is the element of trust. 
However, throughout the chapters in this thesis, there has been an underlying 
sense that trust is the enhancer, the glue that binds the elements of information 
transmission, educative processes and identity together. This issue of trust has 
been considered and embedded within the context of the other elements of 
information transmission, educative processes and identity, as examined in 
detail in Chapter Nine (cf: 9.2.4 pp. 246-251). However, it is considered more 
specifically within Issue Two (10.2.2) below. 
Therefore arising from the data collection and analysis, three key issues are 
outlined below which I believe are central to the context of conflict in the 
three countries under study, and therefore to fmding alternative mechanisms 
for peace building. 
10.2.1 Issue One: Informal educative processes have high significance in 
information acquisition affecting identity construction. 
It was evident from the data collection and analysis of findings that a number 
of educative processes were influential in information acquisition and the 
construction of identity, and that these were primarily informal. These 
focussed principally on oral tradition, rumour, belief systems, propaganda and 
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new technologies (cf: 3.4.1-4 pp 93-113; 6.3-4 pp.177-186). These infonnal 
educative processes clearly influenced people's perceptions of the conflict and 
therefore the potential for peace building. 
As examined in Chapter Seven, educative processes were perceived by the 
respondents to be particularly significant when they were embedded within 
infonnal mechanisms. These infonnal educative processes emerged from an 
extensive oral tradition within the cultures of the respondents, where word of 
mouth is more valued than written text, and learning is part of life's process. 
This is an education that begins at birth and is part of an individual's continual 
development throughout life. It possesses elements of the processes that have 
been described by others as contributing to the construction of identity. 
In an African context, this type of learning has traditionally been part of 
everyday education in an infonnal sense. Individuals, as part of a community, 
learn on a continuous basis through the environments they are placed in and 
the hardships they face. In this context institutionally based learning is less 
relevant than life learning and the acquisition of wisdom. In more recent years, 
radio has gained greater prominence both in fonnal and infonnal educative 
processes, indicated by the majority of respondents in the research. Both the 
research and literature illustrate the positive and negative influences of radio in 
inculcating values and in the transference of infonnation. 
These different fonns of largely infonnal educative processes can affect and 
contribute to the construction/shift of individual and collective identities. As 
Granville suggests 
The actIVIty of learning is not just an additive process, the 
accumulation of new knowledge: rather it is concerned with the 
creation of identity, and the individual becomes "someone or 
something new" through this process (Granville, 2004: 5). 
The research has indicated that this transfonnation process into 'someone or 
something new' comes about largely through infonnal educative processes, in 
particular through the oral tradition (cf: 6.3 pp.177 -184). The oral tradition is 
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part of the socialisation process which concretises individual, group and 
cultural identity and has the potential to preserve images of ethnic, cultural, 
political, or religious difference, whether positive or negative. One of the most 
powerful media within the oral tradition, which is often overlooked, is that of 
gossip. Gossip was identified in Chapter Three as a significant social 
consctruct, where talk defines the meaning of the world, and group gossip 
determines the social construction of a collective identity, again either 
positively or negatively (cf: 3.4.2 pp. 101-106). 
Informal educative processes such as gOSSIp and story telling perform a 
fundamental social function in terms of social bonding to overcome fear, 
promote confidence in oneself and within the group. Sometimes this might be 
used to subvert authority or in other cases might be used or manipulated by 
authorities to enfold groups, bring them into a wider group or state identity. 
Much of this social bonding process and basis for group inclusion is dependant 
on trust (cf: 4.4 pp.13 1-136). 
As noted in 10.2.3 below, trust is also an important element in the social 
binding of gossip. It is rare to gossip amongst those who are not part of your 
own social group, whom you do not trust. Trust is the glue that binds together 
the identity of a group (cf: 4.2.1 p.123-127). This element of trust was 
highlighted by the respondents. They believed information or knowledge only 
when it came from trusted sources (cf: 7.3 pp.197-201). The most trusted 
learning arenas were identified as those within their own identity group. Any 
possibility for transcending this group identity was perceived as being through 
individual friendship, rather than through cross-group interaction. 
Preservation of group identity while united by trust also has the potential to 
promote exclusivity. This can then either protect or expose a group to 
violence. People feel safe within their own group, but the perpetuation of that 
group, to the exclusion of others can also expose them to jealousy, ridicule and 
even violence. As Davies indicates there is a 
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· .. paradox that a secure identity is needed in order for people to 
be less aggressive towards others; and yet that 'essentialising' 
of identity can equally be a cause of conflict (Davies, 2004: 
212). 
There is however a negotiable and contextual element to identity that is 
frequently overlooked. Identities can and do shift, either over time, situation or 
context. For example large numbers of refugees were forced to reassess their 
own identities after fleeing from their lives before the conflict. This was 
highlighted in previous chapters which recounted the changes in traditional 
power structures observed in the camps. For some, these resulted in a 
consequent change in identity from powerful community member to 'mere 
refugee'. This negotiable element of identity allows it therefore to be 
manipulated by external forces, which can strip or invest identity according to 
need (cf: 9.2.3-4 pp.241-246). 
The potential for shifting of identity was explored in Chapters Four and Nine, 
and this is perhaps where an opportunity for positive change exists. The 
contextual nature of identity is possibly the key to the replacement of 'who 
one is' with 'what one's experiences are'. (Davies, 2004: 212). Others also 
point to the capacity to shift and 'reframe' identities. 
Rutherford for example argues that the capacity for identities to shift therefore 
implies that 
Identity then is never a static location, it contains traces of its 
past and what is to become. It is contingent, a provisional full 
stop in the pay of differences and the narrative of our own lives 
(Rutherford, 1990a: 24). 
These viewpoints illustrate that the definition of identity the respondents have 
adopted is contingent, and determined by 'other' factors over which they often 
have no control. As was illustrated in Chapter Four, the shift in identity is not 
always voluntary; it can corne about through coercion (cf: 4.2 p. 116). 
Furthermore, the signifying practices of one's experiences may be so 
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destructive that it becomes easier to shift identity towards the negative than 
towards the positive. 
The reclaiming of positive identities will be explored in more depth in the final 
section of the thesis which looks at the contribution of informal educative 
processes to the construction of positive identities. These would be through 
informal educative processes that promote positive information acquisition 
from trusted sources. 
10.2.2 Issue Two: There is a synergy between information transmission, 
educative processes and identity - which is enhanced by the element of 
trust 
As mentioned above in Chapters Three, Four and Nine, trust binds social 
interaction and is a vital element in the construction and shifts in identity. 
Chapter Seven highlighted how the respondents sought out information from 
trusted sources. For educative processes such as radio, gossip and other forms 
of oral/aural transmission to be believed they have to come from trusted 
sources. For identity groups to maintain their cohesion there has to be mutual 
trust and reciprocity amongst group members. For conflict to be sustained 
there has to be trust or belief in the justness of the cause for which you are 
fighting. For at least some closure of the gap between the top and bottom 
'structural levels', there has to be trust in the leadership that the needs of 
communities are being met and the involvement of civil society is recognised. 
As Colletta and Cullen suggest in their analysis of violent conflict and the 
transformation of social capital, intra-state conflict 
... divides the population by undermining interpersonal and 
communal trust, destroying the norms and values that underlie 
cooperation and collective action for the common good, and 
increasing the likelihood of communal strife (Colletta and 
Cullen, 2000: 3-4). 
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Trust therefore is an element that acts as 'glue' in either a negative sense -
cementing hatred against the 'enemy' or more positively, as a force for 
collective support and ' action for the common good'. 
Trust is possibly one of the significant means of breaking down 'enemy' 
culture and is certainly an essential element to peace building at all levels. 
However it is not only trust that is critical here, but also a sense of security, 
and as Davies suggests, a need for 'that sense of secure self which does not 
project deficiency onto others' (Davies, 2004: 214). I also suggest that it is the 
'sense of secure self' that allows for cross-identity group acts of heroism to 
take place (cf: 9.2 pp. 232-251). The findings have indicated that although 
trust is maximised within one' s own identity group, there is potential for 
extraordinary cross-identity acts of courage that save the lives of 'others' . 
Such acts however, typically operate on an individual basis. For the breaking 
down of a revenge culture, the question is: can the factors that allow for 
individual acts of courage or heroism be translated at group level to develop 
the sense of awareness and empathy with 'others'? 
This is related to who is trusted and why? One of the key questions of the 
research concerned the groups perceived as the most trusted transmitters of 
information and why they were regarded as such. As mentioned above, the 
findings indicated that typically information from own group networks, 
whether it be in the form of gossip, or through other oral/aural formats, 
required less verification than other sources. For information to survive and be 
passed on there had to be elements of truth which was trusted and verified by 
different avenues, often by radio. However, only certain radio stations were 
trusted, usually international stations or local stations that were regarded as 
independent and unbiased. 
Information passed on by family and friends was trusted and in particular for 
children, parents were perceived as purveyors of the truth and incapable of 
lying. The mechanisms for passing on this information would typically be 
word of mouth. When this came from close friends or family it was considered 
one of the most trustworthy sources. This trust of family and friends also 
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related to the preservation and definition of identity as ethnic identity was 
often defined by the tales of others rather than from an inborn sense of 
identity. 
Individuals in general tended to be trusted more than groups, although certain 
groups were more trusted than others. For example religious leaders as a group 
were trusted, but educated people were not. Educated people within the 
refugee community possessed a paradoxical role, as they were in general 
mistrusted for a number of reasons, primarily because they were seen as elites, 
closer to whites and liable to 'sell out' their fellows (cf: 7.2.l pp191-195). 
Despite this they were also perceived as providers of information, as they had 
better access to it, and understood the information that was presented to them. 
However, it was recognised that this knowledge of the outside was largely 
reproduced from elite knowledge and perception, whether through distillation 
of elite perspectives from radio, or from those with access to the internet. 
A key group of trusted people within the community were termed 'mediators' 
by the respondents. These were people within the community who could bring 
information from the 'powerful' (i.e. from those closest to the information and 
who had the most influence), and were trusted to pass on the truth to rest of the 
population. In Burundi and DRC these groups included religious leaders and 
also 'wise men' who 'had swallowed the stone', i.e. elders or Traditional 
Kings who had 'powers' which enabled them to understand information with 
greater clarity and wisdom. In the camps however, while religious leaders 
were still considered mediators, the youth had greater access to information 
and were perceived as mediators rather than elders who were seen as 
powerless. Youth however were also seen as more educated and although 
'educated people' were less trusted, they were perceived as 'necessary' in 
order to gain access to information. This paradox of education and 'educated 
people' was discussed in Chapters Three and Seven (cf: 3.3 pp87-91; 7.2.1 
pp.191-195). 
Focussing on some of the most trusted groups in these communities has 
enabled me to identify elements that encourage trust at group level. It is 
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envisaged that these can be exploited to promote similar acts of courage that 
cross-identity lines observed at individual level. These might serve as 'entries 
for peace' to provide alternative mechanisms for peace building. It is only 
through trusted mechanisms, that the potential for positive identity shift can be 
realised. For such a shift to take place, not only do trusted conduits have to be 
identified but appropriate educative processes need to be identified as the 
means by which change can occur. Davies argues that 'critical pedagogy' in 
schools may be the answer. A 'pedagogy of difference' that 'enables young 
people to analyse class, 'race' gender, 'ability' or 'special needs' in order to 
understand the sources of inequality and conflict' (Davies, 2004: 214). 
However I suggest that it is not only through the formal system that change 
can occur. For peace-enhancing identity shifts to take place, a number of 
informal educative processes also have to be identified (as outlined below in 
10.4 pp. 269-280). 
10.2.3 Issue Three: The gaps between different 'structural levels ' have the 
potential to influence the outcome of conflict and therefore peace 
It was evident from the data collection that for the respondents at least, while 
there was an acceptance of the existence of the 'structural levels', there was 
little recognition that things could change and that their contribution might 
make a difference to the outcome of conflict and/or peace (cf: 8.5 pp. 224-
228). In this way the gap between levels was perhaps even wider than first 
assumed. The role of the communities, particularly in their weakened state as 
'refugees', was perceived as minimal and the overwhelming sense of 
powerlessness was tangible, as this statement from a Congolese leader 
highlights: 
To rely on others is the worst thing in the life of a grown up. 
We are reduced to the state of mere beggars. The latter are even 
better because they can move to a spot where many people pass 
and offer something to himlher. Here we cannot budge a single 
mile, lest we are in trouble. 
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Such reduction in status and esteem undermines the traditional societal 
structures of the community. For example, one of the strongest customs of 
traditional African society, respect for age, becomes a victim of the new 
structures and environment of a refugee camp. From their position as 
'respected elders' older people in the camps became marginalised. This loss of 
status has major implications for the social cohesion of communities and for 
the transmission of cultural values. 
The respondents perceived the gaps between their own needs as a population 
and the interests of their leaders as being one of the major 'barriers to peace' 
(cf: 8.4 pp. 218-224). The perceived self interest of political leaders by the 'led 
population' is probably a feature of every nation. However, the fear which 
accompanies the gaps in the 'structural levels' between leaders and 
communities in the countries under study renders the situation different from 
gaps within most developed nations. The relationship of conflict with 
'incompetent, parochial, fragile and authoritarian governments' (Azar, cited in 
Miall et aI, 1999: 86) is evident in the countries under study where there is 
little recourse to justice and the populations perceive no opportunity for 
change, except in some cases through violence. A statement by a Congolese 
from the CBO group was indicative of such attitudes when he said, 'peace can 
only be achieved by fighting. Sometimes fire can extinguish fire.' 
The consequences of the perceived gap in the context of the research are 
particularly significant because there are no free and fair elections to enable 
the populations of these countries to expect change through a democratic 
process. The situation in Burundi is an example of this fact, as highlighted by 
an email sent during the June 2005 municipal elections from a refugee who 
had returned to live in Bujumbura: 
The campaign was led very carefully and peacefully, which 
was a surprise to many. The cities and the country as a whole 
had a variety of colours, speeches and slogans from the more 
than thirty parties (38). The situation changed only two days 
before the elections. During the night, each family was visited 
by armed men to tell them that they had to vote for a certain 
party. Since then, the population was so much terrorised that 
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there was no more vote at all. They were just going to save 
their lives. The well prepared elections became only a show. 
On the Election Day, hand grenades were thrown to the voting 
mass in different zones in Bujumbura. In the Provinces, three 
persons were killed by armed men from the army. Two 
provinces could not vote because of attacks from the 
government army to the population. 
The forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections appear to have little 
hope of rendering a true democratic process in Burundi (time of writing June 
2005). The fact that not only Burundi, but also Rwanda and DRC have not had 
consistently democratically elected governments is perhaps one of the political 
keys to understanding the situation in the Great Lakes. 
Although Rwanda's President Paul Kagame was re-elected in August 2003, 
the elections were said to have been fraught with corruption and there are still 
questions over the nature of the strict control of the country which Reyntjens 
likens to a dictatorship (Reyntjens, 2004). Similarly in DRC democratic 
elections planned for June 2005 have yet to be held and are likely to be 
delayed until at least October or November 2005 (time of writing June 2005). 
President Joseph Kabila maintains a fragile peace within the main cities of the 
west of the country as other nations such as Uganda and Rwanda continue 
fighting for control of mineral resources in the east. A credible and democratic 
election might be the only key to restoring peace to this beleaguered country. 
The involvement of other nations in the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region 
was another feature of the gaps indicated by the respondents. Particularly for 
the Congolese, there was a wide gap between themselves as a 'weak and poor' 
nation and the 'powerful' nations of the world such as US and UK. As this 
Congolese leader stated: 
Since we are weak and poor, we cannot refuse Americans to 
benefit from our wealth having in mind that the powerful is 
always right and all his acts always just or justified no matter 
how evil they might be. 
This is resonant of the suggestion by Miall et al that 
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Modem states, particularly weak ones, are porous to the 
international forces operating within the wider global 
community ... (Miall et aI, 1999:74). 
The different international mechanisms for resolving the conflicts in these 
countries are also recognised by some authors as contributing to the conflicts 
and widening the gaps between rich and poor nations. As Miall et al state: 
Galtung for example criticizes 'conflict dictators', who impose 
settlements in their own interests... The approaches they 
[Galtung and others] advocate are at odds with the stock-in-
trade of international diplomats, for whom sticks and carrots 
are an essential means of inducing or forcing parties towards a 
settlement, for which an international third party provides the 
framework (Miall et aI, 1999: 139). 
Some might suggest that closure of these gaps, whether between rich and poor 
nations, or between grassroots communities and their leaders, may be 
unrealistic in the short term. However, there should be possibilities for nations 
in conflict to develop sustainable systems that recognise community level 
peace building by respecting and utilising community contributions. The 
increased involvement of civil society may assist to bring this about. 
Organisations such as the African Great Lakes Initiative (AGLI) illustrate the 
attempt by grassroots societies to effect peaceful change. AGLI's 'Alternatives 
to Violence Project' works with local communities on 'trauma healing and 
non-violence training' to shift the dynamic of the community away from a 
cycle of vengeance (AGLI, 2005). 
Similarly, a 'Civil Society Dialogue' held in March 2004 by the International 
Peace Academy (lPA) brought together civil society groups from the Great 
Lakes Region. This recognised the involvement of grassroots civil society as a 
critical element in the integrated response needed for peace building in the 
region. As stated in their report: 
The complex, interlocking, and regional nature of the Great 
Lakes conflicts, the spillover across national boundaries of 
small arms, the large refugee movements, inadequate physical 
space for the populations, and environmental destruction from 
the exploitation and plundering of the region's natural 
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resources clearly require an integrated regional response (IPA, 
2004:1). 
Part of the response it was suggested should come from the increasingly 
important role of civil society, where for example in 
Rwanda and Burundi, women's organizations are at the 
forefront of the reconciliation and integration efforts ... in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), CSOs were part of 
the negotiations that led to the establishment of the Transitional 
Government in 2002 (IP A, 2004: 1). 
Such peace building 'from the bottom-up' has been a critical element in many 
recent peace initiatives which Lederach suggests' ... were driven largely by the 
pressure for change that was bubbling up from the grassroots' (Lederach, 
1997: 52). Only by the recognition and involvement of grassroots in the 
overall peace building process that takes place at all levels, can the gaps that 
form the 'barriers to peace' be closed. 
The potential for finding alternative peace building processes, that encompass 
all levels in different ways, have been outlined in section 10.5 (pp. 269-280), 
but the implications of the issues described above, are summarised below. 
10.3 The relationship of these issues to the original assumptions and 
research questions 
When analysing the above issues in relation to the original research 
assumptions, it is necessary to review Model A presented in Chapter One (cf: 
1.5.1 p. 30) to illuminate the synergy between educative processes, 
information acquisition and identity in relation to conflict. In light of the 
research findings, it is possible to summarise some of the processes by which 
this research suggest positive identities can be constructed - or shifted - which 
may contribute towards peace building. 
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Model A: How educative processes might affect 
information acquisition leading to identity construction 
EDUCA T1Vl ROCESSES 
Informal 
Family 
education 
Conversation 
Gossip 
rumour 
Multimedia 
Hidden 
Model E below has been revised slightly to include the element of trust that 
emerged from the findings. This shows how educative processes, whether 
formal or informal, feed into information acquisition through trusted sources, 
into identity construction or shift. This again is situated within a framework of 
structural levels, such as family, community, leadership and media as were 
identified in Model D (cf: 8.2 p.213). How these have been translated into 
concrete recommendations for peacebuilding can be seen in section 10.5 
below. 
Through the replacement of the negative with the positive, the same conduits 
that are used to promote conflict could be used to promote peace. This may 
then assist in reforming or shifting identities in favour of peaceful rather than 
violent approaches to difference. The findings indicate that the conduits that 
appear to be most successful are those that utilise informal educative 
processes, such as oral tradition, radio and internet. These conduits however, 
need to come from trusted sources, such as trusted radio networks, family and 
community groups, and where appropriate religious leaders. These 'entries for 
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peace' might promote the transcendence of group prejudices, fear and hatred 
of the 'other'. 
Model E: Revised model to illustrate the role of trusted sources in 
infonnation acquisition and identity construction or shift 
INFORMATION 
ACQU ITION 
Trust Sources 
IDENTITY 
CONSTRUCTIO 
10.4 The contribution to existing knowledge in this arena 
Informal 
Family 
education 
Conversation 
Gossip 
rumour 
Multimedia 
Hidden 
In Chapter One (cf: Chapter 1.6.4 pp.38-39) it was suggested that there has 
been limited research that investigates informal educative processes that affect 
information transmission and identity construction that thereby influence 
conflict. While the individual arenas of education, information and identity are 
enriched by substantial literature, there IS a scarcity of literature when 
considering the interrelationship of these three elements. This research has 
investigated these different elements, and has perhaps contributed to furthering 
existing knowledge and provided new insights in four key areas: 
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a) Increased understanding of the role of informal educative 
processes and oral transmission as a contribution to existing 
research in formal education. 
b) The presentation of the relationship between information 
acquisition, educative processes and identity within a 
framework of structural levels, has not been identified in the 
literature reviewed by this researcher. 
c) The representation of a broad variety of actors and their 
relationships within a structural levels framework has not 
previously been presented in a similar way, despite extensive 
literature searches. 
d) Identification of alternative peace building mechanisms 
(appropriate to a refugee context) that focus on informal 
educative processes, in particular a 'family approach' to peace 
building. 
10.5 A 'pick and mix' approach to peace-building: reclaiming positive 
identities 
The findings from this research suggest that informal educative processes 
appear to be significant in effecting identity shifts and transmitting important 
information relating to conflict and/or peace. Therefore peace building 
strategies need to be located also within the informal parameters of educative 
processes. It is here that identity construction is deeply rooted, through family 
and community interaction, and that the potential for identity shifts towards 
the positive might be achieved. However there are no quick fix solutions to 
achieving this. 
One approach by which some believe positive identity shifts can take place is 
through participatory methodologies. These aim to encourage a process by 
which people are expected to adopt a sense of ownership in the process of 
change which occurs at their own pace, style and level. Like formal education, 
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participatory approaches to developmental change have been regarded as a 
panacea; the new way forward. However more people are starting to question 
these approaches, suggesting they are as top-down as traditional approaches of 
the past. For example, Davidson cites the work of Mosse, who he says, 
... warns of how, rather than encouraging the use of bottom-up 
approaches, the dependence on participatory techniques can 
actually lead to the strengthening of top-down systems for a 
number of reasons, including the tendency for locally dominant 
groups (who may themselves have strong links to the regional 
or national elite) to take control of the production of 
knowledge, and the fact that the project organisers can never be 
seen as passive facilitators of the production of knowledge 
(Davidson, 2005: 311). 
This indicates the danger of adopting any single approach as a panacea, and I 
would argue that for effective peace building mechanisms to be established 
there should be a multiplicity of approaches to promote a positive identity shift 
towards peace rather than conflict. In their summary of peace education 
approaches for example, Smith and Vaux rightly argue that 
... none of them offers a 'magic solution' for the prevention of 
conflict. Rather they represent a complex matrix of education 
initiatives that address key themes and values that could have a 
preventative effect in the long term (Smith and Vaux, 2003: 
35). 
Therefore it is necessary to present a variety of approaches, to adopt a 'pick 
and mix' of peace building strategies that agencies and communities working 
within refugee contexts can utilise that are appropriate to their particular 
environment. 
Other authors have written eruditely on the potential of positive change 
through the formal education system. Therefore, this thesis suggests that the 
'pick and mix' approach to peace building should consist primarily of informal 
educative processes as a means for promoting a positive identity shift, but 
interact with the formal system in a holistic way, through what Miller and 
Affolter term the 
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... slow shift from ideologies of antagonism and the glorification 
of violence to constructive ideologies that offer an inclusive, 
peace-oriented vision of the future (Miller and Affolter (eds), 
2002: 34). 
The suggestions in this chapter are tentative and should be adapted according 
to the circumstance in which peace building is taking place. They have been 
presented as provisional ideas for peace building through positive identity 
shifts that are appropriate in a refugee context or similar (as explained in 
Chapter One (p. 32) and above (p. 245). The aim is not to provide a training 
programme, or set of guidelines, but suggestions for approaches and 
techniques that might be useful as 'entries for peace' i.e. starting points that 
may assist communities and practitioners to review peace building strategies 
from a holistic perspective. They are not suggestions for specific conflict 
resolution, conflict management or peace keeping practices, which are all 
related stages towards a process that 
... encompasses the full array of stages and approaches needed 
to transform conflict towards sustainable, peaceful relations and 
outcome (Lederach, 1994: 14). 
These interventions should be built up through existing community structures 
and complement, not replace, existing peace building strategies. While others 
may find the mechanisms below suitable for different contexts, I do not claim 
them to be so. They are based on the context in which the research was 
conducted and do not claim to have wider generalisability than a refugee camp 
setting. 
10.5.1 Through aformal educational approach 
As indicated in Chapter Three, formal education has had a powerful role to 
play in the development of conflict in many countries throughout history (cf: 
3.2 pp. 83-87). Therefore it is vital that formal education institutions playa 
role in the flip-side to conflict and take part in peace building. Peace building 
in this context is seen therefore as part of an ongoing process utilising formal 
educational institutions but still employing informal educative processes as 
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part of a community partnership. In a report written for the Centre for British 
Teachers (CffiT) I concurred with Bush and Salterelli when arguing that: 
Peace building cannot be seen in a vacuum, as a single 
educational input, but as a 'process rather than a product', 
relying on local rather than external inputs which seek to create 
opportunities rather than impose solutions. [Bush and Salterelli] 
suggest that peace building education has to go further than 
'add good education and stir' and offer more systematic 
community based mechanisms which encourage peace building 
as a process rather than a product of education (Bush and 
Salterelli, 2000 in Bird, 2003b: 22). 
The educational approach is one that aims to provide a co-ordinated 
mechanism to the creation of positive histories and peace building efforts, by 
linking what is taught at school with the teachings of parents or guardians at 
home. It would involve utilising informal educative processes in schools and 
creating greater community-school dialogues and partnerships that take 
learners out into the social context and bring communities into the school 
context. This type of community/school dialogue would perhaps fit with 
Davies' advocacy for 'democracy and dialogue' in her proposal for 'complex 
adaptive schools'. Such dialogue she suggests is part of the process of 
'positive conflict', allowing the processes of argument and difference to be 
played out through 
... a critical pedagogy and political education which surfaces 
inequalities such as class, ethnicity, gender and (dis)ability as 
well as global inequality ... (Davies, 2004: 223). 
By using radio and internet within educational and community institutions 
these dialogues can be strengthened further. As outlined in section 10.2.1 
above and in the findings (cf: 7.5 pp. 204-208) trust is a critical element here 
and only trusted radio and internet sites could be used as peace building 
conduits. As seen below in section 10.5.6 radio is already a feature for many 
learners in Africa and eventually internet will become a similar feature in 
many learning institutions. Tanzania for example already has a programme 
planned to introduce online technology into all teacher training colleges 
nationwide. This may well help to revolutionise the way teaching and learning 
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is approached, and some of the informal techniques below could be promoted 
through online technology. 
10.5.2 Through the oral tradition 
As was discussed in Chapters Three and Seven, the oral tradition was perhaps 
the strongest feature that emerged from the data collection (cf: 3.4.1 pp. 93-
101 and 7.3 pp.197-201). There was clear evidence that the stories that parents 
and grandparents passed on to their children and grandchildren had a profound 
affect on their perceptions of themselves and of others and their involvement 
in conflict. While the whole family approach mentioned below might be one 
way of approaching this, there may also be additional mechanisms which 
could encourage the use of story telling in schools and other institutions, as 
well as strengthening the tradition of storytelling which is becoming a dying 
art in African culture. As has been noted in previous chapters: 
Entertainment, education, initiation, government, welfare and 
religion were thus carried out through personal contact and in 
the language of the group. As in all face to face 
communication, the language of the exchanges was always 
parole, the dialect particular to the small group (Mafu, 2004: 
54). 
In recapturing this tradition of 'parole', it is necessary to encourage new 
storytellers who are willing to tell positive stories of the 'other' and also 
persuade the traditional elder storytellers to recite stories that might contribute 
to positive identity construction. McAdams' approach to storytelling asserts 
that the construction of culture and history is a critical feature of storytelling, 
which is not a mere chronicle of events (McAdams 1993). Meaning and moral 
values are attached to stories which can impart strong social and psychological 
messages as well as open up opportunities for different groups to share aspects 
oftheir 'joint history and the suffering ofthe other' (Chaitin, 2003). 
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Chaitin highlights examples of how 
Storytelling and narratives have been used since the 1990s to 
reduce conflicts and work toward reconciliation between 
Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, blacks and 
whites in South Africa, Palestinians and Israelis, and between 
descendants of Holocaust survivors and Nazi perpetrators 
(Chaitin, 2003). 
She provides examples from two groups which have utilised storytelling in 
this way: 
PRIME (the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East) and 
the TRT - To Reflect and Trust. PRIME is a jointly run 
Palestinian-Israeli research non-governmental organization 
(NOO) that undertakes cooperative social research that studies 
issues that have great importance for both peoples. Research 
projects are designed to explore crucial psycho-social and 
educational aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and to use 
the findings for peacebuilding work ... The TRT is an 
international organization that began in 1992 as an encounter 
group between descendants of Nazi perpetrators and of Jewish 
Holocaust survivors. These individuals met together in a self-
supporting atmosphere to tell one another their life stories in an 
attempt to better work through (that is, learn to live with) their 
pasts, in particular their parents' experiences during WWII 
(Chaitin, 2003). 
The use of storytelling therefore in the context of this research, could also be a 
powerful medium for change, to build up processes and action from within and 
through the conflicting groups' own cultures. At different arenas of learning 
and gathering places, story telling, theatre, radio shows and other events could 
be held in an ongoing, interactive basis, by community members rather than 
outsiders. It is the sense of ownership and action - the agency of control of 
positive identity shifting - that is critical here. This does not deny the positive 
role outsiders can bring to the process, but recognises the different starting 
points between professional communicators and communities. In traditional 
societies such as those concerned in this research, communities typically 
analyse and transmit knowledge through talk and visualisation. This is often in 
contradiction to the style of text based training conducted by educated, 
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professional people who typically conduct peace building courses, or 
introduce peace education into schools and communities. 
10.5.3 Through a whole family approach 
The family unit - whatever its composition - is one of the most fundamental 
learning environments and the interaction within that unit has profound and 
life-lasting consequences. Therefore in recognition of the critical importance 
of the family environment, it is suggested that the use of a whole family 
approach, if combined with other key arenas of learning such as school and 
work, has potential as a transformational mechanism for promoting positive 
identity shifts. The narratives from the respondents indicated the critical role 
of parents in providing trusted sources of information to children (cf: 7.3 
pp.l97-201). 
Therefore this approach focuses on the family unit as the essential element in 
developing a peace building strategy and like Smith and Vaux, questions the 
traditional 
... rationale as to why peace education programmes are directed 
towards certain groups (children, adolescents, adults, 
politicians, combatants, bereaved) ... (2003: 35). 
Many existing approaches to peace building focus on certain groups or sub-
sections of society who it is suggested should be 'educated' separately in 
peace building strategies. There is no particular rationale for this, except - so 
the argument goes - that some groups such as women for example, are more 
restricted in their responses while in the company of men, and similarly 
children in the company of elders. While this may be true in some 
circumstances, it is not defmitively so, as the printmaking workshop outlined 
in Chapter Five indicated (cf: 5.7.5 pp.157-158). Here the positive interaction 
observed between elders and children highlighted the potential for bringing 
together diverse groups. This inter-generational interaction between young and 
old has become increasingly part of African family life as a consequence of 
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the HIV / AIDS pandemic in Africa, where older people are frequently left as 
guardians of the young. 
As more and more of the working population are dying from AIDS, 
grandparents are increasingly burdened with the task of caring for children. 
This implies that work with grandparents as part of the family unit is essential 
when defining the learning needs of children. Using the ideas of the story 
telling approach mentioned above, elders could be encouraged to take an 
active role in peace building. The stories that many of the elders recounted 
during the process of data collection were negative and stereotypical. These 
harmful narratives of history are passed on through the generations and it is 
such narratives that need to be counteracted by positive stories that 'engage 
the self and other, and provide a narrative that is both cognitively and 
emotionally compelling' (Chaitin, 2003). 
It is not an easy process to encourage this positive outlook in elders who have 
traditionally failed to consider the perspective of the 'other'. Perhaps through 
engagement in positive narrative and contribution to radio drama mentioned 
below, it may be possible to bring about constructive transformation of the 
dominant narrative against the 'other'. 
This approach is not exclusive and can include aspects of traditional peace 
building programming, such as life-skills or human rights education. The 
difference is that family units are the focus of attention rather than the 
typically defined groups of women, youth, elders etc. Interventions would be 
complemented by using techniques such as those outlined in section 10.2.4-6 
which might include story telling, bringing together elders of a number of 
families and promoting interactive family radio drama or visual arts. 
Therefore the 'whole family approach' is put forward as central to an 
alternative process for peace building. It is appropriate particularly in a refugee 
context where there is the possibility to work more easily in a confined area 
where extended families live in close proximity. Having said this, the refugee 
camps are the size of large towns of fifty to sixty thousand persons. Through 
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this approach it could be possible to work with family units of different 
generations, through a number of means, such as community theatre, radio, 
family dialogues, family workshops etc. 
While this approach may be more intensive and time-consuming than 
traditional mechanisms for peace building, when combined with the other 
methods mentioned below, it could provide a strategy which has not 
previously been utilised in development circles. Family approaches have been 
used in many other arenas, from 'family therapy' to 'family literacy' to 
encourage better communication within and between families in resolving 
critical issues affecting one or all family members. However despite extensive 
researching it has not yet been used as part of peace building programmes. 
10.5.4 Through a leadership approach 
This section is designed merely to highlight why leaders should be included at 
all levels in order to lessen the perceived gap between leaders and 
communities. The ' structural levels' identified in Chapter One and confirmed 
by the findings in Chapter 8.2 (cf: pp 210-213) indicate that leaders at all 
levels from family level to community and national levels are perceived as 
critical in the decision making that leads to conflict or promotes peace. The 
approach outlined below is not based on traditional leadership training, but 
recognises the role of leaders at different levels and how such a role might be 
utilised to positive effect. 
In terms of leadership it is not only political leaders who might require 
training, but as in Lederach's model cited at the beginning of the thesis, there 
are a number of leaders at different levels of peace building strategy 
development (cf: Chapter 1.5 pp.28-36) who should be included. Lederach 
suggests that the top level consists of political, military and sometimes 
religious leaders and involves high-level negotiations, while the middle level 
leaders consist of respected heads of business, education or agriculture and 
utilises problem solving workshops. The grassroots leadership works within 
the community and might include refugee camp officials, NGO and health 
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workers who would work with local peace commissions (Lederach, 1997). 
Mediators in this approach would be a critical component in its success; 
ensuring that the gap between leaders at the top and the community could be 
bridged. 
Miall et aI, suggest a broader range of multi-track conflict resolution which 
builds further on the approach taken by Lederach. They also perceive a need 
for a 'complementary range of third party interventions' which should have an 
'increased emphasis on the importance of indigenous resources and local 
actors' (Miall et aI, 1999: 19). The emphasis on grassroots 'local actors' is the 
critical element in the approach recommended in this thesis. Many leadership 
programmes have focussed on leaders at the top levels of society. However, 
fewer national or international interventions have included leaders at 
grassroots level to accept and assume responsibility for peace building. As was 
seen in the Rwandan genocide it was the leaders at this level who implemented 
the orders of their national leaders. 
Therefore recognition of the roles and responsibilities of leaders at all levels is 
essential as Miall et al suggest: 
Conflict resolution must therefore concern itself not only with 
the issues that divide the main parties, but also with the social, 
psychological and political changes that are necessary to 
address root causes ... [to achieve this] a multi-track approach is 
necessary, relying on interventions by different actors at 
different levels ... (Miall et aI, 1999: 158). 
What Miall et al and Lederach fail to account for is the need to bring leaders of 
different levels together. It is not sufficient for interventions at different levels 
to be conducted in tandem, but it is necessary to have a holistic approach, 
which a) bring leaders of different levels together in one forum and b) bring 
these different leaders together with members of their community - to be 
accountable and to negotiate peace building strategies that are realistic and 
achievable for all. As religious leaders are particularly trusted conduits for 
information transmission, their inclusion and role in peacebuilding needs to be 
reviewed and developed further. Similarly, positive 'role models' as 'leaders' 
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could also be included amongst these groups i.e. individuals such as those 
mentioned in 9.2.2 (cf: pp.237-240) who have transcended the boundaries of 
identity prejudice. 
The engagements between different actors within various forms of leadership 
training would still involve the use of the informal educative processes already 
mentioned. 
10.5.5 Through media - the role of radio 
Distance Learning is not a new phenomenon in formal education circles and 
many projects have encouraged access to basic education through radio in 
many countries including those in Africa. For example in Tanzania, 'Mambo 
Elimu' which means 'education is everything' in Kiswahili, operates a 
distance learning programme on behalf of the US based Educational 
Development Centre (EDC) which provides basic education services for 
children of grades one to four using the national Tanzanian radio network. 
However radio is not only a mechanism for providing formal educational 
services to children and adults, it is also an important feature of everyday life 
in Africa. Few communities do not have access to radio. Despite the fact that 
many policy makers remain unconvinced about the strength of popular culture 
and the potential for its success, the successful use of radio soap opera has 
been recognised particularly in the field of HIV / AIDS communication 
strategies (Myers, 2002; Rogers et aI, 1999; Singhal et aI, 2003; Vaughn et aI, 
2000). Radio programmes such as the long running 'Twende Na Wakati', 
(Let's Go with the Times) in Tanzania or Rwanda's drama serial 'Urunana' 
(Hand in Hand), are designed to focus on urban and rural populations by 
using entertainment as a means of raising awareness on HIV / AIDS and other 
health related issues (Myers, 2002). These types of approaches have been used 
less frequently in the field of peace building, although an initiative by Search 
for Common Ground has brought together radio stations from sub-Saharan 
Africa, including Radio Kwizera in Tanzania with Radio Ijambo in Burundi to 
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launch 'Radio for Peace building Africa' 5 • This broadcasts programmes jointly 
in Burundi and Tanzania, which are designed to reduce tensions and facilitate 
reconciliation amongst Burundians (and other African countries) whether at 
home or in exile. 
Drama in particular is a powerful medium which Myers suggests: 
... can portray the psychological and social blocks that stand in 
the way of behavioural change. It can also explore emotions 
and motivations which conventional communication methods 
(such as public service announcements) cannot reach. Through 
realistic characters, drama can portray the different options and 
solutions that people can use to overcome the social, emotional, 
spiritual and societal barriers associated with HIV / AIDS. The 
best dramas are written on the basis of ongoing participatory 
audience research which is a continuous process of listening, 
recording and feeding back the reactions of ordinary listeners 
through focus groups (Myers, 2002). 
The use of interactive drama, through radio and television, as well as through 
community street theatre, and perhaps at a later stage through internet, when 
combined with the other approaches mentioned above, could provide a 
potential entry point for peace that has previously been overlooked. 
10.6 Conclusion 
The lasting impression gained from this research is the intensity of the 
respondents' desire to be heard, to have their stories told, and gain access to 
some kind of audience. This reflects their feelings in being reduced to 
'objects' in the conflict scenario: forced to flee, forced to re-organise 
themselves in refugee camps, and forced to obey restrictions imposed by the 
host countries. These people have decisions taken from them. The research 
provided one small, but critical, opportunity for the respondents to assert their 
dignity, to define themselves through their abilities to overcome adversity. For 
a short time, they became 'subjects', asserting their own importance. 
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The research underscores the need for refugees to be given the opportunity to 
assert their humanity through the provision of social and cultural services. 
These people are expected to rebuild their societies when peace returns. Their 
commitment to do this is either enhanced or damaged by the extent to which 
they are the subjects of their own destiny, not the apathetic objects of aid. 
It is hoped that soon the refugees may be able to return to a future that 
provides them with dignity and a sense of self-worth in themselves, in their 
communities and in their own countries. Perhaps by reclaiming positive 
identities through approaches similar to those mentioned above, they might be 
able to rebuild their sense as individuals and as communities in ways that 
assert their commonality, but that recognise and accept diversity. 
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Annex I: Maps of Refugee Impacted Areas in Tanzania 
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Annex II: Training Notes for interviewing skills workshop 
DAY ONE 
Time Topic 
9.00-9.15 Introduction: just go around and introduce, say who you are 
and what you do. 
9.15-9.20 Giving out folders and review of the programme 
9.20- 9.40 Why am I here? Overview of my research 
Questions? Clarifications? 
9.40-10.00 Conflict web. Brainstorm on what we mean by conflict 
What are your views on resolving the conflict in Burundi? 
10.00-10.20 In pairs ask each other to recount a story/experience 
(10 mins each) regarding conflict, this can be here in the camp, in your 
home, or in your own country 
10.20-10.30 Is there anyone who would like to tell their story to the 
whole group? 
10.30-10.45 TEA 
10.45-11.15 Review of research brief and understanding it. 
Clarifications of meanings etc. 
11.15-12.00 In pairs discuss the brief and the topics and in your own 
words try and summarise what you think the research might 
achieve? Do you think it is worthwhile? 
12.00-12.30 Plenary 
12.30-13.30 LUNCH 
13.30-13.45 SRA over view onflip chart. What are in depth interviews? 
13.45-14.00 Look and read the notes on key characteristics of interviews 
(Pages 1-4 SRA notes) 
14.00-14.15 Questions and clarifications 
14.15-14.30 Focus Group Discussions what are they? Flip chart 
14.30-14.45 In three groups discuss any other important features of 
FGDs 
14.45-15.00 Plenary 
15.00-15.15 TEA 
15.15-15.20 SRA Questioning techniques. Look at the paper on 
. questioning 
15.20-15.25 Exercise on opening closed questions. Brainstorm for 
examples of each 
15.25-15.35 SRA practice session. In pairs, 1 person listening but not 
responding verbally (5 mins) and then swap, this time 
respond verbally 
15.35-15.45 Plenary on the exercise. How did it feel? What was the 
difference between the non-verbal and verbal responses 
15.45-16.30 Planningfor the next two days. Identification of respondents 
for Day three. 5 teachers (for AM 9. 00), 1 gpo Children Std 
2, 1 gpo Std 6,· 3 healthlCS workers (PM 14. 00) 
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DAY TWO 
Time Topic 
8.30-8.35 Ask for two refugee volunteers to participate in the demo. 
interviews. Others are to take notes jar comment afterward 
8.35-8.45 First demo. Asking only closed questions. 10 mins 
8.45-9.00 Second demo. Open questions 15 mins 
9.00-9.30 Plenary session. What was good/bad about each demo? 
9.30-10.15 Practice session. Design your own demo interview, with an 
introduction, a few questions, and a conclusion. What do 
you have to remember in the introduction and conclusion? 
10.15-10.30 Plenary: what worked? 
10.30-10.45 TEA 
10.45-11.00 Topic guides: Flip chart. Overview of what is a topic guide 
and how to design one. 
11. 00-11.15 Look at the dentist Topic Guide and compare with the FGD 
questions (hand out FGD questions) Plenary 
11.15-11.45 Working with children. What are the issues? How to conduct 
FGDs with children 
11.45-12.30 In three groups redesign the FGDs into a topic guide using 
the research brief also as a guide. One group focus on 
individual interviews, one on FGDs for children and the 
other on FGDs for adults 
12.30-13.30 LUNCH 
13.30-14.00 In pairs practice interviewing each other using the topic 
guides 
14.00-14.30 Plenary. How did the Topic guides stand up to the 
interviews? Were they useful? Did you manage to ask some 
other questions not just those on the guide? 
14.30-15.00 Revise the Topic Guides according to our experience as a 
brainstorming session 
15.00-15.15 TEA 
15.15-16.00 FGD practice session. Using the new TGs for FGD, in two 
groups practice conducting an FGD, one as though you 
were children, and the other as adults 
16.00-16.20 Plenary 
16.20-16.30 Preparation for the next day. Spaces for interviews. What to 
remember about making interviewee feel comfortable, 
introductions, confidentiality etc. 
Use of the recorder 
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DAY THREE 
Time Topic 
8.30-9.00 Inform caterers to prepare tea for extra 5 people 
Preparation for interviews-everyone should have their 
notebooks and pens. In pairs decide which one will be 
interviewing and which one will take notes. You can also 
swap over during the course of the interviews. At the end of 
the interview (this may take one hour, but you decide the 
timing according to the interest of the respondent) review 
your notes with your partner and make a summary of the 
interview. At the end the interviewee is to get a soda/tea and 
mendazi at the tea break 
Give the 2 pairs the recorders and recorder stands and a 
quick repeat of the training. I shall sit in on one interview 
9.00-10.30 In pairs conduct the interviews at Sheraton with the 
identified teachers 
10.30-10.45 TEA 
10.45-11.30 Feedbackfrom the interviews, comments, any changes in the 
way you conducted the questions? Types of questions? Any 
interesting outcomes? 
11.30-12.30 Revision of topic guide for adults- small groups and plenary 
session. 
12.30-13.30 LUNCH 
13.30-14.00 Preparation for interviews. Hand out topic guides for FGDs 
one for adults and one for children. if only one of was the 
main interviewer in the morning swap over so that each of 
you has a chance to conduct an interview 
14.00-15.00 Conduct interviews, two groups of children, 3 CSlhealth 
workers. I will sit in on one of the groups of children. Two 
interviews recorded. 
15.00-15.15 TEA 
15.15-15.30 In your pairs make a summary of the interview 
15.30-16.00 Plenary session. Interesting outcomes 
16.00-16.30 COMMENTS anyone who would like to comment on the 
research etc. for informal chat otherwise close 
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Annex III: Example of a topic guide 
TOPIC GUIDE FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION ADULT 
1. Introduction and greetings 
• Introduction of interviewer 
• Introduction of respondents 
• Brief purpose of the study and expected procedure of the interview 
• Confidentiality and recording 
Once the tape recorder is switched on, respondents should each identify 
themselves to the tape. They do not have to give their real name. The 
interviewer must write note the social group from which each respondent 
has come, their sex and the approximate age. 
2. Background 
• Life in the refugee camp 
• Compared to life in their country 
3. General information about leaving their country and arriving in 
Tanzania 
• Can they describe how they came to the camp from their country 
• Were there specific incidents that caused them to flee 
4. Groups of people in society and their relation to information 
• Description of different groups of people within the society. If 
necessary give respondents examples of groups such as religious 
leaders, traders, professional/working people etc. 
Probe: which of these groups is most powerful 
which have no voice 
are the groups the same in the camp as in their country? 
Describe the differences 
• IN THE GROUP ask respondents to draw a social map where 
information is at the centre of the circle representing the camp, and ask 
them to place the different groups in or outside the circle depending on 
their 'small or big voice') i.e. their ability to access information about 
the war and to pass that information on to others. Help them by giving a 
small example. Once they have drawn the map ask them to identify 
who are the mediators/middle people who help the marginalised to get 
access to the information, or who are used by the powerful people to 
give information. Are these mediators trustworthy or can they change 
or misinterpret the information? Who out of the mediators are most 
trusted? Would the social map be the same for society in their country? 
Draw the differences. 
NB If necessary use objects such as stones, beans etc to represent people 
from different groups e.g. a bean represents a journalist, a stone a leader, 
how close is the bean to the centre of the circle? 
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• Difference between information sources in the camps and back home in 
their country. Are they the same? Describe the differences and why 
they might be different 
• From these groups on the social map who do they believe most to give 
them the most accurate information about the conflict 
Probe: why 
• Ask about the role of different forms of education/teaching (e.g. 
school/university, parental teaching, religious teaching, media etc.) in 
giving information about the conflict 
Probe: which form of teaching is most effective in passing on 
truthful information? 
Which is most trusted? 
• Ask them to describe what they know of the role of politicians in the 
conflict and the peace process. 
Probe: Do they have a chance to speak to politicians at any 
time? 
5. Possible solutions to the conflict 
• Any suggestions from them as to how the conflict might be solved in 
their country 
• What action is needed within the community to promote peace 
6. Questions from the respondents 
• Any further comments or questions 
• Reminder of confidentiality, purpose of the study what will happen to 
the info. 
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Annex IV: Example of questionnaire distributed to all 
groups (English version) 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Thank you for answering this questionnaire. Your answers are 
confidential. 
Age: Sex: Education: Primary 0 SecondaryD 
University 
1. Where did you live before you fled to Tanzania? 
Country ............................ . 
Province ....... . ................... . 
2. Please describe what happened to make you flee from your own 
country 
3. Before the war started how did you hear that there might be a war (tick 
YES or NO in the box next to the question. You can tick more than one) 
YES NO 
A) A relative o o 
Please say what relation to you (e.g. brother, 
mother) ....................................... . 
B) A friend o o 
C) A leader 
Please state what kind of leader (Ten Cell, Prefecture etc.:D o 
ŸŸŸÜŸĚ 0 0 
Please say which radio 
programme/s) .................................... .................. . 
E) From an education institution 
Please tick which one . ... Primary School 
Secondary School 
o 
o 
o o 
o 
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College 0 
University 
4. If you witnessed the conflict directly, please describe what happened. 
5. Which groups were most involved in the conflict and why? 
6. While you were still in your country and the war was going on, who 
gave you the most reliable information about what was happening? 
7. After you arrived in the refugee camp from who/where did you get the 
most reliable information about the conflict still happening in your 
country? 
8. If there was more than one person/group please name them all. 
9. 
YES 
Did you check the information that you received? 0 
NO 
o 
10. How? ..................................................................................... ............. ..... . 
Would you be willing to talk more about your experience in the war? 
o 
YES 
o 
NO 
o 
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Annex V: Example of individual topic guide with adults 
1. Introduction and greetings 
• Introduction of interviewer 
• Introduction of respondents 
• Brief purpose of the study and expected procedure of the 
interview 
• Confidentiality and recording 
Once the tape recorder is switched on, the respondent should each 
identify himlherself to the tape. They do not have to give their real name. 
The interviewer must write note the social group from which the 
respondent has come, their sex and the approximate age. 
2. Background 
• Life in the refugee camp 
• Compared to life in your country 
3. General information about leaving your country and arriving in 
Tanzania 
• Can they describe how they came to Tanzania from their country 
• Were there specific incidents that caused them to flee 
4. Experiences of conflict in their country 
• What do they know about the conflict in their country 
• Where did that knowledge come from 
• What have they suffered as a result of the war 
5. Learning about conflict 
• Before they fled what things had they heard about the 
preparation/planning for the conflict 
Probe: How 
who from 
• What methods do they find out about the ongoing conflict now 
they are in the camp 
Probe: Who 
How 
influence of radi%ther media? 
• Are there any other methods of communication that they think 
are more effective to pass on information e.g. radio, rumour, 
word of mouth, gatherings/meetings, posters etc. NB Only give 
a few examples if necessary as a prompt 
Probe: Why 
• When they get information from different sources, whose 
information do they trust most? Who do they trust? 
Probe: Why 
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what makes these people trustworthy? 
• Ask them to talk about some of the rumours they have heard 
about the conflict 
Probe: How do these rumours get circulated 
which ones do they believe and why 
7. Groups of people in society and their relation to information 
• Description of different groups of people within the society. If 
necessary give the respondent examples of groups such as 
religious leaders, traders, professional/working people etc. 
Probe: which of these groups is most powerful 
which have no voice, 
are the groups the same in the camp as in their country? 
Describe the differences 
• Find out how the small voices get information to and from 
people who are most powerful. Are there middle people who 
pass on the information to grassroots people? Who are they? 
Probe: Are these people different in their country to those in 
the camp 
• From the groups they mentioned above who do they believe 
most to give them the most accurate information about the 
conflict 
Probe: why 
• Ask about the role of different forms of education/teaching (e.g. 
school/university, parental teaching, religious teaching, media 
etc.) in giving information about the conflict 
Probe: which form of teaching is most effective in passing on 
truthful information? 
Which is most trusted? 
• Ask them to describe the role of politicians in the conflict and 
the peace process. 
• Do they trust politicians? 
8. Possible solutions to the conflict 
• Any suggestions from them as to how the conflict might be 
solved in their country 
• What action is needed within the community to promote peace 
9. Questions from the respondent 
• Any further comments or questions 
• Reminder of confidentiality, purpose of the study what will happen to 
the info. 
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Annex VI: Example of Analysis Matrix 
NO. Group 
MTiI Teacher 
Coding male-
summary 
Interview 
male 
MTI2 Teacher 
Coding male 2 
male 2 
MTI3 Teacher 
Coding female 
female 
MTI4 Child 
Coding interview 
Child 
Interview 
CAMP A TRAINING 
MATRIXMTI 1 
INFORMATION TRANSMISSION 
What are the different Who are the most trusted 
mechanisms used transmitters 
MTI 1.1 cf: MTI 3.1 MTI 1.2 
From neighbours, New refugees coming from 
other students and Burundi were seen as 
head teacher via word reliable sources of info. In 
of mouth. Radio, the camp 
leaders telling people 
individually 
Oral transmission, Tutsi neighbours/friends 
from father to son who 'tell you what is being 
' when I get a child I planned' who says 'friend 
will tell him the story'. there hasn' t been any 
From peers. Radio conflict between us until 
and newspapers cf: now, I pray, go away. We 
MTI 5.1 have prepared a massacre 
here.' This kind of 
information is most trusted. 
It then goes round by word 
of mouth, 'from friend to 
friend'. Written information 
is less trusted because it 'can 
be leaked'. Only certain 
radio stations and 
newspapers are trusted -
those seen as unbiased e.g. 
lsan2aniro, BBC. 
Heard from the radio Letters to those living back 
on the day of at home they 'tell you how 
assassination. No the situation in our country 
information of conflict is'. Certain radio stations 
before that. From are trusted e.g. Isanganiro, 
other people who Radio Free Africa, 
listened to radio when 
she had no access. 
Internet, letters 
When in Rwanda N/A 
through businessmen 
who had travelled to 
Burundi. While in 
Burundi seeing things 
with her own eyes, 
other information 
throu2h school, radio. 
What is seen as 
truthfullbelieved 
and why 
MTI 1.3 
N/A 
Doesn't 
automatically 
believe or trust 
everything. 'The 
Burundi tell lies' 
in case they are 
implicated. He 
analyses 
information first 
from past 
knowledge or 
experience. 'The 
truth of 
information 
depends on how 
you get it'. 
'Those who tell 
the truth are 
those who have 
been pushed out' 
i.e. Hutus. Sees 
her own ethnic 
group as telling 
the truth 
Again she sees her 
own ethnic group 
as most truthful 
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Annex VII: Example of Matrix analysis from Camp B 
No. GRO 
UP 
NM CBOs 
F 1 FGD 
Codi CBOs 
D.g 
NM Leade 
F2 rs/co 
mmer 
cial 
Grou 
p 
COM 
BINE 
12 
LEA 
DER 
S + 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
CAMPB 
MATRIX 1 NMF 
INFORMATION TRANSMISSION 
What are the different Who are seen as closest to the 
mechanisms used-how did information and why? 
people learn NMF 1.2 
NMF 1.1 cf: NMF 2.1 
They seemed to learn Women were seen as close to 
about the war initially information sources because 
by accident. They men possessed the 
couldn't believe it at information, therefore 
first. A lot of rumours women would find out first 
circulating about either as a wife, girlfriend or 
different acts of prostitute 'politicians use 
violence, and of things prostitutes to get inside 
happening, but no information of their 
accounts of actual opponents; they even use to 
witnessing of killing or harm their political 
violence first hand. enemies.' The question is in 
People passed on this case is possessing the 
information through information enough? 
family and friends. If Politicians closest in the 
they got news of sense that they create the 
something then it would information, they might pass 
be passed on informally. this on to other influential 
'The way the people. 
information circulates Religious leaders also seen as 
among refugees is being close to information 
informal. Therefore 'Religious leaders are also 
there is nobody get first hand information 
responsible for news.' by virtue of their being close 
to all works of life. They 
easily mingle with all their 
followers irrespective of 
their social classes.' 
They heard rumours Politicians are the first 
from the radio that war because they create the 
was imminent. They news, then journalists who 
suggest that the US was follow them and then 
involved form the start. listeners who get 
Two respondents were information after that. 
told by Banyamulenge 
friends who had been 
told to kill non-
Banyarwandans. 'My 
husband was 
approached one day by 
Who are the trusted 
transmitters or 
most 
truthfullbelieved 
and why 
NMFI.3 
Leaders are not 
trusted as they are 
seen to have their 
own interests at 
heart. 'They all 
consider Congo's 
politics and 
leadership like 
their profit 
making project.' 
One respondent 
though said that 
information that 
came from 
politicians could 
be trusted because 
'they are in the 
kitchen.' 
N/A 
General paranoia 
about US and 
Rwanda, and that 
there is a 
conspiracy to 
poison them even 
while they are in 
the camp. They 
don't seem to 
trust anybody 
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COM his friend Onesphore, a 
MER Munyamulenge, to warn 
ClAL him on an imminent 
GRO war. He said that he was 
UP told to kill his best 
friend who was none else 
than my husband. So he 
decided to inform my 
husband that secret so 
that we get out of the 
area before it is too late.' 
Another respondent got 
news from a tract that 
was being spread 
around. 
NM ? not In tbe camp, Educated people because N/A 
F3 sure information is controlled they hear the information 
?? by UNHCR and then first and pass it on to others. 
Interv camp leaders pass it on Also leaders and traditional 
iewer: from there. Church kings 
Sela leaders also make 
relevant things known to 
their con2rC2ations. 
NM Teach Rumour - 'As said Politicians, Intellectuals who N/A 
F4 ers earlier, during tbe last tben pass tbe information on 
TEA days of MOBUTU's era, to the people. Religious 
CHE tbe government was no leaders, Traditional Kings, 
RS more. Rumours were politicians 
plenty on activities of 'Intellectual people wbo are 
Banyarwanda tbat could sougbt by politicians in 
endanger tbe security of order to gain tbeir support 
tbe land but notbing was and spread tbeir ideas 
done,' among tbe learned ones wbo 
in turn will descend to tbe 
community in general. ' 
NM Civil "Radio Canal Afrique" Politicians are tbe most 'Tbe youtb are 
F5 societ of Soutb Africa. I aware wben sometbing is very instrumental 
y believe that the cbannel about to bappen. Tbey are because 
ClYI was owned or managed the ones 'cooking politics' so politicians need 
1 by tbe rebels. Relatives they know. Cburcb leaders tbem to attain 
SOCl wbo lived in tbe Plain of also very important, and tbeir objectives. 
ETY Ruzizi used to tell us some were directly involved. Tbis is tbe cradle 
that troops from NGOs because tbey bave of activists.' 
Rwanda were entering connections with tbe masses. Traditional Kings 
daily in the Congo witb Traders: because of their who are seen as 
a lot of ammunitions. ' wealth end up occupying ' people's 
Hearing of various good positions in tbeir representatives 
killings and tbat respective community. and custodians. ' 
government was ' doing Tberefore politicians 
nothing' to protect approach them to get their 
them. Then hearing of support and financial 
tbe 'slain priests of assistance; 
Uvira' they realised war 
had truly started. 
Witnessing: a few 
accounts of actual 
witnessing of killings in 
tbis group (cf: NTMF 
ill 
Politicians, tell 
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traditional kings who 
tell 'husbands' women 
are left out until they 
are told by their 
husbands, and children 
are last to know, 
NM Famil Journalists. Market 'The information we get Elected leaders: 
F6 y place, through gossip here is more often than not camp leaders, 
FAMI and rumour. In the inaccurate; it is amplified or class leaders etc; 
LY camp, the camp leaders distorted so we have to be Organizations 
inform people what is careful or skeptic.' working in the 
happening at all levels. camp 
Church leaders 'are 'Between the source of the Traditional 
sought' for their information and consumers Kings/Chiefs 
information. Email also there are mediators: Church and other 
a new way of getting UNHCR and NGOs' Religious leaders 
information. Also workers and those who are School leaders 
people who travel close to them constitute the 
between the camp and main source: Camp leaders, 
DRC. In the camp travelers, radios, and people 
getting information is known as "journalists" in 
particularly important. the camp.' 
'It is quite different. As 
refugees we need Those 'out' of the circle seen 
information as we need as the old, people with 
food, it is a part of our disabilities, uneducated 
life taking into account women, children and 'the 
that people who were don't care'. 
informed in time about 
the war and who acted 
accordingly have saved 
their lives. Therefore 
information is life. In 
the Congo we were busy 
struggling to earn our 
living, how to get money, 
buy this or that for the 
family and so forth. But 
now the experience has 
taught us to information 
is a necessity.' 
'How does the 
information circulate in 
the Congo? Sources: 
Leaders at all levels, 
Radios, 
ChurchlReligious 
leaders, Traditional 
Kings/Chiefs. ' 
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